German Politics and Society

For the first time in a long while, German politics was full of drama in the year 2024. In November, the traffic light coalition of Social Democrats (spd), Greens, and Liberals (fdp) collapsed when Chancellor Olaf Scholz dismissed fdp Finance Minister Christian Lindner, whose party left the government. A staged and lost vote of confidence followed in December, which set up early elections on 23 February 2025. Won by the cdu/csu as predicted (28.5 percent of the vote, 208 seats), there were only two possible majority coalitions with the second-place Alternative for Germany (AfD), which received 20.8 percent and 152 seats, or with the spd (16.4 percent, 120 seats). Because the AfD is still considered politically toxic by the other parties, negotiations between the cdu/csu and the spd (led by Lars Klingbeil and Bärbel Bas) soon began and the new Black-Red coalition entered office on 6 May 2025 with cdu leader Friedrich Merz as chancellor.

The federal election of February 2025, triggered by the collapse of the traffic light coalition in November 2024, resulted in a marked rise in support for parties that are critical of, or openly hostile to, the political system. While the cdu/csu under newly elected Chancellor Friedrich Merz benefited only marginally from its position in opposition, it was the right-wing extremist AfD that capitalized most, nearly doubling its vote share and emerging as the strongest party in all eastern German states. On the left fringe, the good result of the Left Party came as a surprise and surpassed the electoral fortunes of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (bsw), which had split from it in 2024. Nonetheless, with a Cabinet formed by the cdu/csu and spd, the country continues to be governed from the democratic center—albeit under constrained conditions, as the combined strength of the Left Party and the AfD now constitutes a blocking minority.

Most earlier assessments of the Scholz chancellorship (2021–2025) have, implicitly or explicitly, focused on a comparison between Olaf Scholz and his long-term predecessor Angela Merkel. This article develops a wider perspective, which puts the Scholz chancellorship in the context of the Federal Republic's three previous Social Democratic chancellorships (Brandt, Schmidt, and Schröder). Such a comparative assessment casts a different light on Scholz as a political leader. It reveals that some issues, such as strained chancellor-party relations and modest electoral fortunes, have been rather typical for other Social Democratic chancellors, too. At the same time, Scholz stands out even, or in fact particularly, within this sample of German post-war chancellors due to his limited skills as a communicator and crisis leader.

Traditional European parties face a dilemma: they must choose to accommodate or exclude far-right parties in policy and coalition formations. Although breaking a cordon sanitaire may counter far-right appeals, it could also legitimize the party and increase its voter base. We test these competing expectations during the 2025 German federal election, strategically varying whether the presumptive coalition leader (the cdu/csu) is portrayed as breaching or preserving the Brandmauer (firewall) against the far-right AfD. We find that neither accommodation nor exclusion of the far right affects German voter party approval, democratic satisfaction, vote choice, or immigration attitudes. These findings suggest that party strategies toward the cordon sanitaire may have limited influence on voters, providing implications for the efficacy of the firewall as a stand-alone defense against the far right.

The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (bsw) is the youngest party in Germany to have entered state parliaments from a standing start. While the programmatic positioning of the bsw and its electorate are already fruitful areas of study in this still young field of research, scholars have paid little attention to the leadership and organization of this party. To shed light on both aspects, this article draws on official party documents and publicly available materials as well as media reports. The study's findings illuminate the composition of the bsw leadership, including socio-demographic data, former party affiliations, and political experience. Utilizing a comparative approach, the study highlights the parallels and divergences between eastern and western Germany. Regarding organizational characteristics, the minimal party apparatus and restrictive accession policy for new members are interpreted as obstacles to electoral support.

This article examines how migration became a defining and polarizing issue in Germany's 2025 federal election. Although centrist parties initially aimed to campaign on socio-economic concerns, violent incidents involving asylum seekers and rising public anxiety pushed them to recalibrate their messaging. The campaign saw a pronounced shift toward restrictive rhetoric, particularly from the Christian Democratic Party (cdu), whose discourse increasingly mirrored the hard-line positions of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Seeking to stem voter losses to the far right, mainstream parties toughened their stances, with cdu leader Friedrich Merz even accepting AfD parliamentary support for a migration bill. This strategic decision triggered mass protests and raised fundamental questions about engagement with the radical right. While the AfD gained support, Die Linke benefited from its principled opposition against the right-wing party. The election highlights the risks of mainstreaming far-right narratives and weakening the political firewall against the AfD.