

Introduction

INVENTING THE ORIGINS OF THE “DUTY OF MEMORY”



Writing the history of the French expression *devoir de memoire*, translated here as “duty of memory,” is a project that is part of an established historiographic tradition. History as a discipline has long been interested in words and how they are used, in order to better understand the past and its narrative. Even in the nineteenth century, in his classic study *La Cité Antique*¹ Fustel de Coulanges underlined the importance of paying careful attention to the vocabulary of the period being studied. But it was above all in France, in the *Annales* school created in the late 1920s by March Bloch and Lucien Febvre, that the history of words became a scientific project in its own right. Febvre dedicated several case studies to this project (focusing on words like frontier, civilization, capitalism, work, honor, or motherland), with his germane insistence on the need to renounce the theoretical definition of a word to focus on the evolution of its usages.

Since the *Annales*, the historical analysis of words has undergone deep transformations both epistemologically and technically. In the 1970s, this approach was revived, most notably in Germany with the emergence of *Begriffsgeschichte* around Reinhart Koselleck, a movement which has made the history of concepts an essential component of social history and the understanding of historical temporalities.² In France, around the same time, a new field of research in linguistics known as “discourse analysis” was emerging, based on lexicometrics used to analyze discourse through large corpora of texts. Historians such as Jacques Guilhaumou and Régine Robin actively contributed to these studies for the period of the French Revolution.³

Discourse analysis has recently been used for the creation of new tools and the digitalization of immense corpuses enabling the exploration of big data. The logometric program “Hyperbase,” for example, produced by the research center “Bases, Corpus, Language” at the University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis, has been used by researchers for several years.⁴ This program was extremely useful in navigating the archives of the French National Audiovisual Institute (INA), which constituted one of the main corpuses of this research.

In accordance with this field of study, writing the history of the expression “duty of memory” cannot be limited to historically defining the notion encapsulated by the term. Injunctions to remember, on an individual or collective level, have always run through human societies, in myriad words and ritual practices.⁵ The approach used here investigates the words rather than the object they refer to, and thus cannot be restricted to quantifying the uses of that term. Taking Reinhart Koselleck’s expression “the power of words”⁶ seriously, in this case of the “duty of memory” (broadly decried by the community of historians since the late 1990s), means accounting for its imbrication in a specific historical context, which it is up to us to untangle. But we must also account for its function in the structuring of representations and practices relating to the past. As a result, this book sets out to retrace not only the lexical invention, but also the social and political inventions associated with the emergence and then the omnipresence of the term “duty of memory” in French society. Indeed, this appears sufficiently salient for us to characterize this period as “the time of the duty of memory”; a time that began in the 1970s and which continues in various forms today.

First appearing in the Larousse dictionary in 2003,⁷ the expression now seems to be well entrenched in contemporary French vocabulary. Although the philosopher Paul Ricœur postulated that “history appears once the game is over,”⁸ the history of the duty of memory is an object of study that is fully situated in contemporary history, which the French call the “history of the present time.”⁹ It involves actors who are for the most part still living, and is written by an author who belongs to the same “time” as they do, and whose object is still in effect. This particularity has had an impact on the evolution of research dedicated to the expression, and especially on the question of its origins, which it seems essential to revisit in this introduction.

Reconstructing the trajectory of the expression “duty of memory” leads us to establish a periodization according to its evolutions, its key moments, and of course, its origins. This quest for the first occurrences, or even *the* first usage (which would reveal the identity of its author, similar to what occurred for the term “public opinion”),¹⁰ took place in a specific memorial framework. Many of the references encountered at the beginning of the research attributed the origin of the “duty of memory” to the obligation for survivors to testify about their experience in the Nazi camps, suggesting the

term emerged either immediately after the war or in the 1980–1990s. This same historical reference was also mentioned by most of the teachers interviewed in a 2007–2008 study on the “duty of memory” in schools.¹¹ Most of the political actors interviewed also associated the emergence of this term with that historical event.¹² Above all, the academic sphere itself confirmed this reading of the origins of the “duty of memory.” Although no historical study had been conducted then, the information collated on this point through writings or interviews all mobilized this same historic referent shared in the scientific community.¹³ When questioned on the “duty of memory” by a journalist from the news website *Rue89*, Holocaust historian Annette Wieviorka indicated in January 2009 that “this expression became popular in France, eventually becoming a slogan during the Barbie trial in 1987.”¹⁴ Of course, it existed before then, and was particularly used by deportees to refer to those who died in the camps. Then the expression became a sort of slogan, covering anything and everything, a kind of carry-all.¹⁵ Two elements played a role in the construction of this reference through scientific discourse: the first was the association between the expression and the writer Primo Levi, and the second was the appropriation and dissemination of that association by eminent historians of the Holocaust.

From the late 1990s, several historians tied the notion of the “duty of memory” to Primo Levi. In a book of interviews published in 1998, the historian of World War II and Vichy’s memory, Henry Rousso sought to remind readers that “originally, the injunction to the ‘duty of memory,’ born of the pen of Primo Levi, was inscribed in the continuation of the event. It was a call to survivors to testify . . .”¹⁶ Rousso emphasized the need to differentiate the contemporary misuses of the expression (which he saw as transforming it into “morality by substitution”), from the Italian writer’s original meaning, “the imperative duty of truth that Primo Levi assigned above all to the true duty of memory.”¹⁷ By presenting this genealogy in the media, Rousso ensured that it circulated widely.¹⁸ In 2010, another historian, Olivier Wieviorka, indicated in a book on the memory of World War II, that “the ‘duty of memory’ is in fact a very recent injunction. The term even dates from 1995 and draws on the French title of the posthumous publication of an interview that Primo Levi accorded in 1983 to two Italian historians.”¹⁹ Thus we can see two different chronologies, established by two well-known French historians, but with a single reference: Primo Levi. The starting point of the association between the Italian writer and the French expression was a small book that was published in French under that title, *Devoir de Mémoire*, to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, in January 1995. The author was given as Primo Levi.²⁰ This book was the publication of an interview recorded on January 27, 1983, by two Italian historians from the University of Turin, Anna Bravo and Federico Cereja.²¹

This interview was conducted as part of a major oral history study undertaken from 1982 onward in the Piedmont region by the *Associazione Nazionale Ex Deportati* (ANED), the Regional Council of Piedmont, and the history department at the University of Turin, to collect the testimonies of more than two hundred deportees from that region. The study gave rise to a publication, prefaced by Primo Levi himself.²² The interview with Levi was first published in Italy in 1989, two years after his death, entitled “*Ex deportato Prim Levi: un intervista*,”²³ before being translated and published in France in 1995, in the collection *Mille et une nuits*. Yet the term “duty of memory” is not mentioned in this interview. The French title of the book, *Devoir de mémoire*, was in fact chosen by the editors Natta Rampazzo and Maurizio Medico for the French publication.²⁴ Indeed, none of Primo Levi’s writings mention an expression that corresponds to the French *devoir de mémoire* or “duty of memory.”²⁵ Although the notion of a duty to remember runs throughout his work,²⁶ with the former deportee and Auschwitz survivor affirming in an interview on Italian television in 1985 that “memory is a duty,”²⁷ the exact expression was not, strictly speaking, used by Levi. Yet his status as the author of this expression was clearly established in several French newspapers as soon as the book came out in 1995, suggesting that he was the author of the book’s title and thus consequently of the expression itself.²⁸

Indeed the association between the expression and Primo Levi circulated rapidly, including in the academic sphere.²⁹ In the late 1990s it took on a new form, becoming more frequently used to evoke other periods of history. The reference to Primo Levi served to offer the expression a particular meaning, the obligation for Holocaust survivors to testify after the end of World War II. Already mentioned by Henry Rousso, the etymological proof was scientifically established in 2001 by the Holocaust historian Olivier Laliou in an article with the programmatic title, “The invention of the ‘duty of memory’,”³⁰ published in the key contemporary history journal, *Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire*. Although Laliou states that the title of the book of interviews was not coined by Levi himself, and even though he distinguishes the expression—formulated in the 1990s according to him—from the concept, he constantly slips between the two. The use of quotation marks around the expression “duty of memory” in both the title and the body of the article³¹ sustain a certain confusion between the word and the thing it refers to, which the summary presented at the end of the journal issue merely prolongs.³² This genealogy of the “duty of memory,” which the author traces back to the deportees’ associations responsible for preserving the memory of the Holocaust after 1945, established its narrative path in these terms around the 1990s–2000s. Whether in reference to Primo Levi or to the deportees’ associations, the argument of the etymological proof of the expression has since been taken up numerous times by different authors who “refer to the origin

of the words which is assumed to provide the truth of their meaning³³ to legitimate the criticism of an expression that is seen as having been distorted, or even instrumentalized, since the 1990s.³⁴

The scientific discourse surrounding the origins of the “duty of memory” has thus been transmitted by actors who are recognized as highly legitimate in the French academic sphere or in the media (Annette Wieviorka, Olivier Wieviorka, Henry Rousso, the journal *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire*). It was with these authoritative discourses in mind that I set out to explore the earliest traces of the expression among former deportees’ associations. Sorting through the archives of several of these associations and in particular the *Amicale des anciens déportés juifs de France (AADJF)*, founded in 1945, revealed no occurrences of the expression. Although the vocabulary used by these associations very often contains the words “duty” and “memory” to refer to the compulsion to remember those who died in concentration and extermination camps, the expression “duty of memory” was not used as such. By comparing other sources and focusing this time on the uses of the word “memory,” it became increasingly clear that the expression came from a configuration of language that was not part of the vocabulary used by the deportees’ associations immediately after the war and up until the 1980s.

How can we understand this discrepancy between the silence of the archives and the affirmations of historians, who have, since the 1990s, considered that the expression emerged through the transmission of the experience of genocide and concentration camps through the voice of Primo Levi or of former deportees? The notion of discursive memory developed in discourse analysis through the work of Mikhail Bakhtine,³⁵ or more recently that of interdiscursive memory developed by Sophie Moirand,³⁶ has allowed us to take into account the processes by which the expression “duty of memory” has become historicized. “Inhabited”³⁷ by a dominant historical reference—the persecution and extermination of French Jews with the complicity of the Vichy regime—over this decade, the term then became part of a historical narrative beginning with the transmission of the experience of concentration camps and genocide. The circulation of this narrative took place through dialog in different discursive fields (media, science, Internet), ultimately becoming a shared reference. Through the empirical investigation of various oral and written sources, I observed a spontaneous association between the origins of the expression “duty of memory” and the transmission of the Holocaust. It therefore became clear to me over the course of my research that this association was ultimately the result of an interdiscursive, and thus social, memory of the expression. Constituted through discourses, a memory of this expression was thus formed without speakers themselves being really conscious of it, “because memorial reminders often function unbeknownst to speakers and memory processes partially escape the subject’s awareness.”³⁸

The goal of historicizing the expression “duty of memory” unexpectedly gave rise to a memory of this expression, which was also shared by scientific actors who fully participated in the development of a narrative presented as scientific knowledge. Although the notion of narrative is used here to evoke the invention of the origins of this expression in the late 1990s, it is in the sense that this biographical narrative referring to the transmission of the Holocaust provided a storyline for the expression that has become omnipresent in the public space. The use of “duty of memory” to refer to the Holocaust and/or to take a position in the face of issues raised by that event, progressively constructed a narrative identity for this expression with key reference points: the author (Primo Levi), social groups (the deportees), founding events (the Holocaust, deportation), and a story (the original meaning later distorted by its popularization). The construction of this narrative was made possible by the frequent lack of distinction between the term and the concept. As the latter feeds into an overall reflection on the prevention of crimes against humanity, various voices have stated that the genocide of the Jews was the matrix of the invention of this expression.

To a certain extent, considering that the “symbolic function of historical writing allows a society to situate itself by giving itself a past in language,”³⁹ this historical discourse has ultimately fulfilled one of its functions by contributing to the construction of such a narrative. Alongside this, as “performative writing,”⁴⁰ the references by the historians mentioned have contributed to the *construction* of a genealogy of “duty of memory” that is then used by other scholars. This biographical narrativization was developed at the very moment when the duty of memory, as a notion and an expression, became a public issue in the scientific, intellectual, and activist space, before emerging onto the political stage in France from 2005 onward. Yet the appearance of a public issue “is played out in the dynamic between the production and reception of descriptive and interpretative narratives, as well as the proposal of solutions. These narratives . . . involve knowledge of common wisdom, prejudices, and stereotypes, among other things, shared by those who produce and those who receive.”⁴¹ It is therefore not so surprising that academic discourse did not develop a degree of autonomy in relation to the production and circulation of discourses on the origins of “duty of memory.” Scientific actors—particularly historians—fully participated in this “problematization phase”⁴² of the expression, from the mid-1990s.⁴³ By drawing attention to an unusual situation, they in fact participated in the production of an “interpretative narrative” of “duty of memory,” involving “knowledge of common-sense ideas.”⁴⁴ This knowledge concerning the origins of the expression was mentioned numerous times in the study (mentioned in endnote 11) with teachers, and in the interviews or observation carried out as part of this research.⁴⁵ Ultimately, the construction of a narrative with scientific

objectives, associating the origin of the term with a given historical event, seems to have progressively evolved toward knowledge of common-sense ideas.⁴⁶ Although at the time contemporary scholars were able to note that the expression had become commonplace in ordinary language, the discourse on its origins also became trapped in an “object preconstructed in, and by, common parlance.”⁴⁷

The particularity of this kind of research object also comes from the fact that the scientific discourse has *situated* it, by bestowing upon it a past without provoking an epistemological break from this common wisdom.⁴⁸ For reasons already mentioned above (the scientific actors themselves involved in public debate on the “duty of memory”), this authoritative discourse even participated in the construction of knowledge, which as a result claimed to be scientific. Knowledge shared about the origin of the expression has allowed members of a community (historians but also social scientists, and others) to identify a “situation”⁴⁹ that was partly formulated through this expression and its historicization in this way. The problematization of this situation (involving criticism of the abuse of memory, return to the original meaning through etymological evidence, legitimacy of the transmission of the Holocaust) differs depending on the scientific actors involved and has anchored the “duty of memory” as part of these actors’ standpoints in the scientific and/or public debates concerning the usages of memory more generally.⁵⁰

Through the oral and written sources encountered in this research, what emerged was ultimately the presence of a “collective memory” of this expression. This notion comes from the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs⁵¹ and has been used by linguists in discourse analysis, such as Marie-Anne Paveau, who considers that “postulating the collective nature of memory means clearly adopting an anti-innateist position and siding with experience and context. If discourse is indeed constructed based on the memory of past discourses, and the words of others, then it does not fall under the intentional and individual competency of speaking subjects.”⁵² After being situated within significations and issues connected to a supposed origin, the term was progressively endowed with this historical reference through interdiscursive reminders. This also shows that, generally speaking, collective memory stems from “communication between individuals,”⁵³ to use the terms of the historian Marc Bloch in his discussion with Halbwachs. Indeed, in this particular case, the memory constructed around the supposed origins of the expression “duty of memory” followed complex mechanisms that were largely due to the circularity of the term, enabling communication—either directly between individuals, or indirectly between those who emit and those who receive—through literary or scientific publications, allusions in the media, commemorative events, political speech, and so forth.

The progression of this research thus unexpectedly led to the identification of a collective memory around “duty of memory,” presented as being the intellectual history of the expression. This research thus allowed us to reveal the gap between this knowledge and the sources that suggest other usages, speakers, meanings, and chronologies. It was nevertheless essential to present the itinerary of this illusion in the introduction of the book because, ultimately, here as elsewhere “illusion . . . is part of reality.”⁵⁴

Notes

All French quotes have been translated by Katharine Throssell, excepting titles where the English edition has been cited.

1. Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité antique* (Hachette, 1943 [1864]). Translated by Willard Small, *The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome* (Dover Publications, 2006).
2. See Reinhart Koselleck, “Histoire des concepts et histoire sociale,” in *Le Futur passé. Contribution à la sémantique des temps historiques*, trans. from German by Jochen et Marie-Claire Hoock (EHESS, 1990), 99–118. Translated into English by Keith Tribe as “*Begriffsgeschichte* and Social History,” in *Futures Past, on the Semantics of Historical Time* (Columbia University Press, 2004).
3. Régine Robin studied the semantic field of the term “feudalism” based on grievance registers from 1789, while Jacques Guilhaumou conducted his doctoral research in 1978 on revolutionary discourse (1792–1794), supervised by Michel Vovelle.
4. See for example Damon Mayaffre, *Le Discours présidentiel sous la V^e République. Chirac, Mitterrand, Giscard, Pompidou, de Gaulle* (Presses de Sciences Po, 2012).
5. Emmanuel Kattan, *Penser le devoir de mémoire* (PUF, 2002); also Ledoux, “Écrire une histoire du “devoir de mémoire,”” *Le Débat*, no. 170 (May–August 2012): 175–85.
6. “According to a well-known saying by Epictetus, it is not deeds that shock humanity but the words describing them . . . It draws our attention to the autonomous power of words, without whose use human actions and passions could hardly be experienced and certainly not made intelligible to others.” Koselleck, “*Begriffsgeschichte* and Social History,” 75.
7. The definition was as follows: “the moral obligation to bear witness, individually or collectively, for events about which knowledge and transmission are considered necessary to learn the lessons of the past (such as the Resistance or deportation during World War II, for example).” (“*L’obligation morale de témoigner, individuellement ou collectivement, d’événements dont la connaissance et la transmission sont jugées nécessaires pour tirer les leçons du passé (la Résistance ou la déportation pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale par exemple),*” *Le Petit Larousse illustré*, 2003, 642.
8. Paul Ricœur, *Temps et récit* (Seuil, 1983), 222. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, as *Time and Narrative* (Chicago University Press, 1983), 157.
9. This is a historiographical movement that was established at the end of the 1970s and which focuses on recent history, particularly between 1945 and the present day. See Henry Rousso, *The Latest Catastrophe: History, the Present, the Contemporary*, trans. Jane Marie Tood (Chicago University Press, 2016).
10. The term is said to have been coined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1758 in his *Lettre à*

- D'Alembert sur les spectacles*; see Colette Ganochaud, "Opinion publique et changement social chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau," *Revue française de science politique*, no. 28 (1978): 899–924.
11. See Sébastien Ledoux, *Le "devoir de mémoire" à l'école. Essai d'écriture d'un nouveau roman national* (Éditions universitaires européennes, 2011).
 12. See, for example, Christine Albanel, Edwige Avice, Robert Badinter, Michel Noir. Details of the content of these interviews can be found in my PhD thesis: Sébastien Ledoux, "Le temps du 'devoir de mémoire', des années 1970 à nos jours" (PhD diss., University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2014).
 13. Interviews with Pierre Nora and Philippe Némo; see Ledoux "Le temps du 'devoir de mémoire'."
 14. During World War II, Klaus Barbie was the head of the Gestapo for the Lyon region and responsible for the repression and torture of Jews and members of the French resistance between 1942 and 1944. In 1983 he was extradited from Bolivia to France, and in 1987 he was found guilty of crimes against humanity—the first trial of this kind in France. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and died in prison in 1991. See Sébastien Ledoux, "The Barbie Trial (1987): Narrator of the Holocaust in France," *Genobs* 1, no. 2 (2017): 40–71.
 15. Interview with Annette Wieviorka, *Rue89*, 1 January 2009.
 16. Henry Rousso, *La Hantise du passé* (Textuel, 1998), 42.
 17. *Ibid.*, 45.
 18. *Le Monde*, 7 April 1998.
 19. Olivier Wieviorka, *La Mémoire désunie. Le souvenir politique des années sombres, de la Libération à nos jours* (Seuil, 2010), 254.
 20. Primo Levi, *Le Devoir de mémoire* (Éditions Mille et une nuits, 1995).
 21. The interview was translated from Italian in 2014 with a new title, *The Gray Zone, Working Paper for the Lezione Primo Levi: Raccontare per la storia* (Einaudi, 2014). French translation, *La Zone grise. Entretien avec Anna Bravo et Federico Cereja*, trans. Martin Rueff and Celia Levi (Payot, 2014).
 22. A. Bravo and D. Jalla, eds., *La Vita offesa, Storia et memoria dei Lager nazisti nei racconti di duecento sopravvissuti* (Franco Angeli, 1986).
 23. Published in the journal *La Rassegna Mensile di Israel* LVI, no. 2–3 (May–December 1989): 299–330. It has since been republished. See Anna Bravo and Federico Cereja, *Intervista a Primo Levi, ex deportato* (Einaudi, 2011).
 24. Interview with Natta Rampazzo, 17 November 2009.
 25. The expression used by Italian former deportees was more often the duty to bear witness (*dovere di testimoniare*). On 28–29 October 1983 in Turin, Levi participated in a congress organised by the Piedmont region and the ANED which was entitled, "*Il dovere di testimoniare. Perché non vada perduta la memoria dei Campi di annientamento della criminale dottrina nazista.*" The congress proceedings would be published the following year as *Il Dovere di testimoniare* (Franco Angeli, 1984).
 26. We can quote one passage, among others, from a text written in 1982. "Indeed as soon as I returned to Italy . . . I began to write . . . I did not realise I was writing a book, for such was not my intention; it seemed to me I was fulfilling a duty, paying a debt to my dead companions, and at the same time satisfying a need of my own." In "Itinerary of a Jewish Writer," published in *The Black Hole of Auschwitz*, trans. Sharon Wood (Polity, 2005).
 27. "*La memoria è un dovere*," interview of 3 February 1985, retranscribed in Gabriella Poli and Giorgio Calcagno, *Echi di una voce perduta. Incontri, interviste e conversazioni con Primo Levi* (Mursia, 1992), 173.

28. The journalist at the *Le Monde* newspaper, Nicolas Weill, mentioned on 20 January 1995 “an unpublished work by Primo Levi—the Duty of Memory.” A few months later the same newspaper presented a list of “little masterpieces like Primo Levi’s *Duty of Memory*,” *Le Monde*, 4 November, 1995.
29. See Muriel Gallot, “Primo Levi, de Tirésias à la Gorgone,” *Littératures*, no. 33 (Autumn 1995): 199; and Myriam Anissimov’s biography, *Primo Levi ou la tragédie d’un optimiste* (J.-C. Lattès, 1996), 509.
30. Olivier Laliou, “L’invention du ‘devoir de mémoire’,” *Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire*, no. 69 (January–March 2001): 83–94.
31. In the introduction, he notes that the “expression ‘duty of memory’ is now part of ordinary language in France,” and considers it “necessary” to return to the origin of the ‘duty of memory’ as well as its meaning and historical legitimacy. Laliou, “L’invention du ‘devoir de mémoire’,” 83.
32. “The expression ‘duty of memory’ which is so popular today, emerged after Liberation with the deportees’ movement associations,” *Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire*, no. 69 (January–March 2001): 233.
33. Marie-Anne Paveau, *Les Prédiscours, Sens, mémoire, cognition* (Presses Sorbonne, 2011), 146.
34. See, among other examples, Jean-Pierre Rioux, “Devoir de mémoire, devoir d’intelligence,” *Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire*, no. 73 (2002): 163; Pascal Bruckner, *La Tyrannie de la pénitence. Essai sur le masochisme occidental* (Grasset, 2006), 181–82.
35. See the work by Jean-Jacques Courtine in the bibliography.
36. See the bibliography for more details.
37. For Bakhtine, “when a member of a speaking collective comes upon a word, it is not as a neutral word of language, not as a word free from the aspirations and evaluations of others, uninhabited by others’ voices . . . His own thought finds the word already inhabited.” *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics*, trans. Caryl Emerson (University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 202.
38. Sophie Moirand, *Les Discours de la presse quotidienne. Observer, analyser, comprendre* (PUF, 2008), 134.
39. François Dosse, “Michel de Certeau et l’écriture de l’histoire,” *Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire*, no. 78 (April–June 2003): 148.
40. Michel de Certeau, *L’Écriture de l’histoire* (Gallimard, 2002 [1975]), 122. Translated by Tom Conley, *The Writing of History* (Columbia University Press, 1992).
41. Daniel Céfaï, “La construction des problèmes publics. Définitions de situations dans des arènes publiques,” *Réseaux* XIV, no. 75 (1996): 47.
42. Pierre Muller and Yves Surel, *L’Analyse des politiques publiques* (Montchrestien, 2000), 57.
43. See Éric Conan and Henry Rousso, *Vichy: An Ever-Present Past*, trans. Nathan Bracher (University Press of New England, 1998).
44. *Ibid.*
45. See Ledoux, PhD diss., 2014.
46. Here we can quote Jean-François Theullot, who wrote in 2005: “We can reasonably suppose that the expression ‘duty of memory’ was first used in the context of reflections on the Holocaust,” J.-F. Theullot, *De l’inexistence d’un devoir de mémoire* (Pleins Feux), 11.
47. Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Chamboredon, and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Le Métier de sociologue* (EHESS, 2006), 37. Translated by Richard Nice, *The Craft of Sociology* (Walter de Gruyter, 1991).
48. For this notion of epistemological break in scientific discourse, in relation to common-sense ideas, see Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron, “La rupture,” in *Le Métier de sociologue*, 125–92.

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49. Patrick Pharo, “Sens commun,” in *Dictionnaire de la sociologie*, ed. R. Boudon, Ph. Besnard, M. Cherkaoui, B.-P. Lecuyer (Larousse, 1989), 178.
 50. See the example of the forum organized by the *Le Monde* newspaper in October 2001, and published the following year. Also Thomas Ferenczi, ed., *Devoir de mémoire, droit à l’oubli?* (Complexe, 2002).
 51. See the chapter “Le langage et la mémoire,” in *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Albin Michel, 1994 [1925]), 40–82, translated as *On Collective Memory* (University of Chicago Press, 1992); *La Mémoire collective* (Albin Michel, 1997 [1950]), translated as *The Collective Memory* (Harper & Row Colophon Books, 1980).
 52. Paveau, *Les Prédiscours*, 86.
 53. Marc Bloch, “Mémoire collective, tradition et coutume. À propos d’un livre récent,” *Revue de synthèse historique* XL (1925): 79.
 54. P. Bourdieu, “La double rupture,” in *Raisons pratiques Sur la théorie de l’action* (Seuil, 1996), 93. Translated as *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Stanford University Press, 1998).