On 15 March 2019, twenty-eight-year-old Australian Brenton Harrison Tarrant killed fifty-one people during Friday prayers at the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand. Tarrant live-streamed his attack on social media, shocking the world and “revolutionizing” terrorism.1 Before committing the attack, he had traveled extensively across Europe and sought connections with far-right groups, including Germany’s Identitarian Movement (Identitäre Bewegung). In his seventy-four-page manifesto, “The Great Replacement,” he referenced Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who had killed seventy-seven people on 22 July 2011. Although he never met Breivik, Tarrant saw himself as part of a transnational far-right counter-jihadist movement, dedicated to what he believed was the defense of Western civilization.2
On the evening of 20 December 2024, fifty-year-old Taleb Al-Abdulmohsen drove a car into a crowd at a Christmas market in Magdeburg, Germany, killing six and injuring around 300. Al-Abdulmohsen, a Saudi-born doctor who had lived in Germany since 2006, was arrested at the scene. Right-wing extremists in Germany and abroad were quick to label the incident as an act of Islamist terrorism. However, initial investigations revealed a different motive: Al-Abdulmohsen appeared driven by Islamophobia, accusing Germany of facilitating the Islamization of Europe through immigration. He had also sought contact with far-right parties and figures, including Germany’s Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland; AfD) and Tommy Robinson, founder of the English Defence League (EDL).3
These attacks exemplify what many scholars describe as a global surge in right-wing terrorism. However, it is not merely the rising frequency of such attacks that has alarmed and captivated politicians, scholars, and the public; it is also their purportedly distinctive features—most notably, the apparent indiscriminate mass casualties they inflict, their transnational character and the use of digital platforms. Consequently, building on David Rapoport’s influential “four waves” theory of modern terrorism, some scholars have argued that right-wing extremism constitutes a new “energy” behind a potential “fifth wave.”4 This hypothesis not only seeks to extend Rapoport’s framework into the twenty-first century but also addresses a major criticism—its failure to adequately account for right-wing terrorism. By defining right-wing terrorism as a “fifth wave,” the objective is to reinforce a theory increasingly challenged by historians for its oversimplifications and contradictions, while emphasizing the phenomenon’s distinctiveness and unprecedented nature.5 As Jonathan Collins asserted in 2021: At “no point has there been such a consolidated transnational effort from far-right terrorists to affect the Western world as in the past ten years.”6
But how helpful and correct is this assessment? Are these characteristics truly new or how do they fit into the broader history of right-wing terrorism? Why is right-wing terrorism on the rise today? And are the internal and external radicalization dynamics different from those of the past? Or is this interpretation of recent events nothing but a self-fulfilling prophecy, since according to Rapoport’s model, a “fifth wave” would have had to start around 2020 and scholars had been looking for signs to define a “new” wave?7
While recent research from social science scholars, who still dominate terrorism studies, has focused on these new features, one glaring issue remains: the relative absence of historical scholarship on terrorism broadly, and on right-wing terrorism specifically.8 In numerous overviews on the history of terrorism, right-wing terrorism is only mentioned in passing or even ignored.9 In addition, most studies treat right-wing terrorism primarily as a post-1990 phenomenon—sometimes acknowledging incidents in the 1930s and 1980s—neglecting its historical roots and longue durée, including transnational dynamics and the far right’s obsession with modern communication technology that predate this period.10
When terrorism research expanded significantly in the 1990s, much of it focused on the threats posed by terrorism and the responses of nation-states and international organizations. However, many studies lacked historical depth, a strong empirical foundation, and rigorous theoretical frameworks. In 2001, criminologist Andrew Silke offered a scathing critique of terrorism studies, comparing the field to “fast-food research”—rushed, superficial, and overly reliant on paraphrased secondary sources rather than original empirical studies. He pointed to the absence of comprehensive research based on primary sources as a fundamental weakness.11
Since then, the field has made some progress. Many thought-provoking and quality empirical studies—also thanks to the emergence of critical terrorism studies—have been published that address terrorism and counterterrorism from diverse perspectives.12 Terrorism studies have also remained highly relevant and accessible, engaging a broad audience and bridging the gap between academia and public discourse. However, this increased public interest has introduced new challenges. On the one hand, scholars sometimes feel pressured to comment on current events despite lacking the critical distance and robust empirical data necessary for thorough analysis—resulting, at times, in overly simplified interpretations presented as empirical scholarship.13 In 2015, Marc Sageman echoed these concerns, criticizing the prevalence of speculative studies and the undue influence of media commentators over academic specialists.14 On the other hand, the study of terrorism has often been shaped by contemporary political events, with research priorities shifting to once again align with law enforcement needs and to data-heavy quantitative studies, driven by the belief that the collection of data is the key to finding a solution to a problem.15 Following the 9/11 attacks, for instance, terrorism research became overwhelmingly focused on Islamist terrorism—a trend that continues today and was reignited by incidents such as Hamas’s attack on 7 October 2023.16
While these broader challenges impact terrorism studies as a whole, a closer examination of right-wing terrorism research reveals additional gaps and complexities. In the following, I will highlight three key issues that have shaped the structure, content, and objectives of this book.17 First, research on right-wing terrorism tends to focus heavily on US and European contexts, with little attention given to its possible manifestations outside the Western sphere. Right-wing terrorist activities in post-Soviet states and the Global South remain largely unexplored. In the case of Latin America, scholarly attention has primarily centered on state terror during the Cold War—often supported by the United States and European powers—while the role of reactionary non-state actors in Latin America’s “dirty war” has received significantly less scrutiny. This geographical asymmetry is partly due to the dominance of Western academics in terrorism research. However, other factors also contribute to this imbalance, including the limited availability of and restricted access to sources and data on right-wing terrorism.18
Second, comparative and especially transnational analyses remain notably scarce.19 Since the publication of the first comparative study on postwar right-wing terrorism in 1995, most research has continued to focus on national case studies—such as Daniel Köhler’s, Barbara Manthe’s, and Darius Muschiol’s work on Germany or studies by Kathleen Belew, Bruce Hoffman, Jacob Ware, Martin Durham, and Cynthia Miller-Idriss on the United States.20
A systematic comparison is naturally hindered by the significant differences in how offenses are defined by national police forces and researchers. These discrepancies in classification—such as the US legal category of “hate crime”—have a direct effect on data collection and the statistical analyses that underpin social science research.21 In addition, it is important to recognize that in some countries comprehensive record-keeping only began in the 1990s, leading to a disproportionate representation of later events.22 Additionally, many right-wing terrorist groups do not claim responsibility for their actions, which further complicates the accuracy of the collected data.
Nevertheless, the national emphasis risks overstating local and national particularities while overlooking broader cross-border patterns and international trajectories. Moreover, it can reinforce the conventional distinction between the “national” and the “transnational,” despite the reality that right-wing terrorist groups often transcend national boundaries. They may deliberately target individuals from other countries, receive material and financial support from abroad, or adopt ideologies and strategies originating in different regions of the world.23
This issue should be considered within the broader context of scholarship on right-wing extremism, where a “global turn” has recently begun to take shape. An increasing number of studies now examine transnational connections, recognizing them not merely as supplementary but as fundamental to the extreme right. Despite this trend, the nation and the nation-state continue to dominate analyses of the far right, while transnational influences and networks are often overlooked—dismissed as either too short-lived to be significant or as mere conspiracy narratives.24
And third, although there is growing acknowledgment of the importance of studying right-wing terrorism within the broader context of social movements—particularly by examining far-right (subcultural) milieus to better understand the radicalization process—this perspective has not yet gained widespread traction. Many studies primarily focus on terrorist acts themselves, aiming to analyze the perpetrators’ immediate motivations and tactics through macro-, meso-, and micro-level explanations.25 However, they risk overlooking the broader sociopolitical environments, as well as the (transnational) networks and communities that provide material and ideological support, moral justification, and a sense of belonging to individuals who may later engage in terrorism. These milieus often function as incubators for extremist beliefs, reinforcing an “us versus them” mentality and legitimizing violence as a means of achieving ideological goals. Understanding the dynamics of these environments is crucial to explaining how individuals might transition from passive sympathizers to active participants in terrorism.26 While left-wing and ethnonationalist terrorism have long been examined as products of broader social movements, right-wing terrorism has frequently been portrayed through the lens of the lone wolf—a misleading term that implies perpetrators act entirely independently of any far-right networks. However, lone wolf terrorism is better understood as a strategic and tactical choice rather than a sign of true isolation. It is in this sense that the term is used in this book.27
These gaps, along with the shifting dynamics of contemporary right-wing terrorism, highlight the need for deeper historical contextualization and a more comprehensive global perspective to fully grasp its development and impact. This study aims to address these issues by examining the historical trajectories of transnational influences and networks, as well as the global dimensions of right-wing terrorism since the nineteenth century, through various case studies set within their unique societal and historical contexts. Before outlining the study’s structure and objectives in greater detail, however, it is essential to first define what constitutes right-wing terrorism.
• • •
“What is right-wing terrorism?”—a seemingly straightforward question that defies a simple answer. To explore it, we must first consider the broader concept of “terrorism” and then examine the political ideology of right-wing extremism. Organizations responsible for countering terrorism—such as law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, government ministries, legislators, and international bodies—often employ differing definitions, shaped by their specific mandates. This inconsistency becomes even more pronounced when comparing definitions across different countries.28
Attempts to establish a universal definition of terrorism at the international level have consistently fallen short, despite efforts dating back to the late nineteenth century. The League of Nations, for instance, defined terrorism in its 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons, or the general public.”29 However, the convention was ratified only by India. Similarly, the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) reached a consensus definition, but it remained legally non-binding and contentious. Negotiations for a comprehensive, legally binding UN convention against terrorism have been ongoing since the 1970s, yet no resolution has been reached.30
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the European Union (EU) developed a definition of terrorism that was adopted by the European Council in 2002. It classified offenses as terrorist acts if committed with the aim of “seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing an act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or an international organization.”31 However, this definition was shaped by the context of its creation and reflected the priorities of the EU as an international organization. It lacked specificity regarding the motivations and actors involved, making it difficult to distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence. Consequently, its practical influence on prosecuting terrorist groups was limited.
To mitigate the challenges of defining terrorism comprehensively, the international community has often adopted a sector-specific approach. This strategy centers on defining specific acts of terrorism rather than the phenomenon as a whole, as seen in targeted agreements such as the Tokyo Convention (1963) on aircraft offenses and the UN Convention for the Prevention of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005). Similarly, the Council of Europe’s 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism aimed to classify and facilitate extradition for specific offenses. These agreements reflect a pragmatic approach, prioritizing functional definitions over a universal one.32
In academia, the quest for a universal definition of terrorism has been equally elusive. Scholars from diverse disciplines have proposed more than 150 definitions, yet consensus remains distant. Terrorism expert Walter Laqueur once dismissed the possibility of a universal definition, citing the complexity of the phenomenon.33 Despite this situation, those seeking to study or write the history of terrorism cannot afford a fatalistic outlook. Any meaningful definition, however, must first address the roots of today’s conceptual ambiguity, including the evolution of both the term and the phenomenon over time.
The concept of “terror” itself dates back to ancient Assyrian texts, where it described the deliberate use of violence to suppress and intimidate opponents during the ninth century BCE. The modern word “terror” derives from the Latin terror, appearing in French (terreur) in 1356, English in 1375, and Spanish in 1440. By the late Middle Ages, “terror” had become a term for the psychological, physical, and political use of violence across several European languages.34
The term “terrorism” (terrorisme) emerged in the wake of the French Revolution. Initially, the Jacobins embraced terror as a positive concept tied to revolutionary justice, while labeling royalist violence as “White Terror,” referencing the color associated with monarchy. The neologism terrorisme was introduced by journalist and revolutionary Jean Lambert Tallien, who used it to denounce Jacobin despotism. The related terms terrorisme and terroriste soon gained traction and were adopted into other European languages. By 1798, the Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française defined “terrorism” as a “system or regime of terror,” directly linking it to the Jacobin period.35 This early usage already hinted that terrorism was not confined to one ideology or actor.36 Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, the term increasingly came to denote politically motivated violence by non-state groups, contributing to the view that modern terrorism was “invented” during this era.37
This brief etymological history also highlights the dynamic nature of the phenomenon itself. Over the centuries, terrorism has been used to describe a wide range of violent acts and has taken on a heavily politicized and negative connotation, often used more as a rhetorical weapon than an objective classification. Politicians frequently label diverse acts of violence as terrorism, not always based on evidence but as a strategic move to discredit opponents. This tactic is frequently employed by authoritarian regimes and—as the second Trump administration shows—increasingly by political opponents in democratic systems, where it is used to influence public perception.38 Geopolitical considerations also play a role; for instance, in 2021 the Trump administration labeled Yemen’s Houthi movement a terrorist group—a move later reversed by the Biden administration amid humanitarian concerns.39 Similarly, China has used terrorism claims to justify its repression of Uyghurs, branding the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group. The United States initially supported this label to strengthen ties with China during the “War on Terror,” but later reversed the decision due to a lack of evidence.40
The media also plays a pivotal role in the ambiguous use of the term. In today’s fast-paced digital environment, where competition for attention is fierce, media outlets and press agencies prioritize rapid reporting to maximize user engagement. This often comes at the expense of in-depth analysis and thorough research. As a result, the concept of terrorism is blurred in two conflicting ways: on the one hand, the term is overused, applied to a variety of violent acts that do not meet any strict definition of terrorism; on the other hand, there is a hesitancy to use the term in certain cases to maintain an appearance of neutrality.41
This inconsistency is particularly evident in the portrayal of right-wing terrorism in Western public discourse.42 Violent acts linked to Islamist ex-tremism are typically labeled terrorism without hesitation, yet similar clarity is often lacking when it comes to domestic right-wing violence. Incidents such as the Oak Creek Sikh Temple shooting (2012), the Munich shooting (2016), the Finsbury Park attack (2017), and the El Paso shooting (2019) demonstrate that politicians, terrorism experts, security agencies, and the media in many Western countries frequently hesitate to categorize right-wing extremist attacks as acts of terrorism.43 When young right-wing perpetrators, such as members of skinhead or hooligan groups, commit acts of violence, these are often depoliticized by framing them as the actions of “lunatics” or “drunks,” rather than as acts of terrorism.44 Even when strong evidence indicates political motives, right-wing terrorists are often portrayed as mentally unstable “lone wolves,” framing their actions as isolated rampages divorced from any broader ideological context. During the 2012 trial of Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik, for instance, psychological assessments controversially emphasized mental illness—effectively downplaying the political dimension of his attack and seeking to mitigate sentencing.45 While it is true that many perpetrators may struggle with mental illness—and this should neither be denied nor trivialized—the tendency to foreground psychological instability in cases of right-wing terrorism stands in stark contrast to how other forms of terrorism are treated, where political motives typically dominate public and political discourse.
This perspective aligns with a broader narrative that often portrays terrorism as an inherently “foreign” phenomenon, alien to Western civilization. According to this view, only the “others”—in today’s context, Islamist extremists—are seen as capable of such violent, barbaric tactics. This narrative reinforces a stark division between a supposedly civilized, Christian, Western world and a backward, irrational Islamic world dominated by religious fundamentalism. As a result, major right-wing terrorist attacks have repeatedly been misattributed to Islamist terrorism by both experts and the media.46
The political, media, and public discourse on terrorism highlights that the term is frequently applied as an external label, carrying strong negative connotations. It often functions as a tool of power, used to delegitimize certain forms of violence while legitimizing others—particularly when such violence is carried out by states or actors close to state institutions. This makes it crucial to examine by whom, when, why, and how the term is deployed in both academic and civilian discourse. Whether an individual is labeled a terrorist often depends on whether their violent act is perceived as (morally) legitimate or illegitimate, both at the time it occurs and in hindsight. Ultimately, the designation of an act as terrorism is deeply tied to the cultural, social, and political context in which it occurs. These frameworks, which are continually evolving and differ across regions, shape the ways terrorism is understood and discussed. Therefore, it is important to interrogate these frameworks to uncover the biases and power dynamics that underlie the use of the term “terrorism.”47
Despite all efforts to maintain an objective and impartial perspective, this book and its author are not entirely immune to the influences of cultural, social, and political frameworks. To reduce the risk of subjective interpretation, this book adopts a definition of terrorism drawn from the work of Leonard B. Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, who analyzed seventy-three academic definitions to identify the core elements of terrorism and develop a comprehensive framework. “Terrorism,” the scholars concluded, “is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.”48
This definition characterizes terrorism as a distinct tactic of violence, one that has been utilized by individuals and groups across various ideological spectrums and historical contexts to pursue diverse objectives. Consequently, it is more accurate to speak of “terrorisms” in the plural, recognizing its varied manifestations rather than treating it as a singular, monolithic phenomenon.
One such manifestation is terrorism rooted in right-wing extremism. Much like the term “terrorism,” there is no universally accepted definition of right-wing extremism.49 What is considered “right,” “far right,” or “extreme right” varies over time and across different countries, reflecting cultural and historical contexts. Furthermore, some ideologies or movements are difficult to place definitively on the right-wing spectrum and may even transcend the traditional left–right dichotomy.50
This study follows Cas Mudde’s definition of the “far right” as a broad category encompassing the “radical right,” which operates within democratic norms, and the “extreme right,” which rejects democracy and endorses violence. While the distinction is theoretical, Mudde notes significant overlap in practice. Despite its ambiguity, he argues the term “far right” is useful for capturing a wide range of ideologies that frequently intersect and extend beyond narrower labels such as “racism” or “fascism.”51
Far-right movements typically share traits such as racism, nativism, authoritarianism, antiliberalism, anti-leftist, extreme nationalism, the belief in violence as a creative or redemptive force, and nostalgia for a lost “Golden Age.” These are often rooted in two core beliefs: a perceived existential threat—usually blamed on conspiratorial enemies working to undermine their values, identity, or way of life—and a conviction in the inherent inequality of people, leading to anti-pluralistic and authoritarian societal visions.52
Thus, for the purposes of this book, right-wing terrorism is defined as a politically motivated tactic carried out by non-state actors predominately driven by a belief in their own superiority and the inherent inequality between people that involves the threat or use of force or violence in which publicity plays a significant role.
While this definition may not capture the full complexity of every right-wing terrorist group, it identifies six core components that remain consistent across historical contexts: (1) the political motivations driving terrorist acts; (2) the use and/or threat of violence; (3) terrorism as a deliberate act of communication designed to produce psychological effects that extend well beyond the immediate victims or targets of the attack; (4) its characterization as a tactic—implying intentional planning—rather than an ideology; (5) the recognition that such an act can be executed by either a group or an individual; and (6) its perpetration by non-state actors. While many terrorist groups also engage in other forms of violence—ranging from spontaneous political acts to guerrilla warfare and common crimes such as bank robberies—these six elements provide a framework for understanding right-wing terrorism as a distinct form of violence and offer a basis for analyzing the conditions under which such groups strategically choose specific modes of violence based on the situational context. However, two clarifications are necessary.
First, distinguishing right-wing terrorism from broader political violence can be challenging, as terrorism is often considered a subset of political violence. A common distinction is that terrorist acts are premeditated and intended to instill fear in a wider population to achieve political change.53 However, right-wing terrorism frequently targets minority groups first, and the fear it generates within these communities is often overlooked by the broader public. The murders committed by the German National Socialist Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund; NSU) illustrate this dynamic, as fear had long been instilled within the immigrant community before the wider German public recognized the group’s existence.
Second, this book defines terrorism as violence perpetrated by non-state actors. While this distinction is widely used, some scholars criticize it as too narrow, arguing that states can also engage in terroristic practices. They further contend that violence by non-state actors against powerful nations receives disproportionate attention, while similar or even greater violence affecting marginalized or colonized populations is frequently overlooked—contributing to a selective, Western-centric view of terrorism.54
However, such critiques risk overgeneralizing and overlooking key nuances. Defining terrorism as violence carried out by non-state actors does not exclude the possibility that states also engage in terroristic practices, and it is misleading to suggest that scholars and policymakers consistently ignore such actions. In fact, terms like “terror” or “state terror” are commonly used—particularly in German discourse and, to a lesser extent, in English—to distinguish these actions from non-state terrorism and to describe abuses by authoritarian regimes or colonial powers.
Moreover, conflating state terror with non-state terrorism can blur critical distinctions rather than enhance analytical clarity. Differentiating between state and non-state terrorism is essential not only for the sake of analytical precision (especially since no single study can adequately cover all forms of political violence), but also because these actors often differ fundamentally in resources, goals, and motivations. State actors typically have significantly greater resources and seek to consolidate or maintain power (reactionary), whereas non-state actors generally aim to challenge existing power structures (revolutionary), reinforcing the idea of terrorism as the weapon of the weak in asymmetric warfare.55
However, as the following typologies will illustrate, right-wing terrorism can take multiple forms, encompassing both revolutionary and reactionary elements. Therefore, it is crucial to assess whether an individual or group operates as an autonomous non-state entity or acts in collaboration with—or even on behalf of—segments of state institutions or officials. Thereby, state involvement in right-wing terrorism can take various forms, ranging from covert support to tacit approval.56
• • •
In the 1990s, the Israeli political scientist Ehud Sprinzak was among the first to develop a specific theory of right-wing terrorism and offered a detailed typology to categorize its various forms. According to Sprinzak, right-wing extremists typically follow a trajectory of “split delegitimization,” which begins with a primary conflict against an “inferior” community and later expands into a secondary conflict with the state itself. This second phase, emerges when terrorists perceive themselves as targets of the security apparatus, prompting them to engage in an armed struggle against both the marginalized group and the state, attempting to—like their left-wing counterparts—overthrow the entire system (a form of revolutionary terrorism).57
Based on this framework, Sprinzak identified six forms of right-wing terrorism: revolutionary terrorism, reactive terrorism, vigilante terrorism, racist terrorism, millenarian terrorism, and youth counterculture terrorism. These categories, though distinct, are, according to him, not mutually exclusive. He classified fascist and neo-Nazi groups from the 1920s to the 1940s, as well as post-1945 movements embracing fascist ideology—such as the Italian New Order (Ordine Nuovo; ON), the German Military Sports Group Hoffmann (Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann; WSG), and the French Charles Martel Club—as examples of revolutionary right-wing terrorism. Reactive terrorist organizations, on the other hand, emerge when groups that previously held power either lose it or fear its loss. The French Secret Army Organization (Organisation Armée Secrète; OAS) was a key example of this category. A subset of reactive terrorism is vigilante terrorism,58 in which individuals or groups take violent action under the belief that the government has failed to protect them. While racism can be a component of all right-wing terrorist forms, Sprinzak distinguished racist terrorism as a category where racial supremacy is the group’s central focus, with the American Ku Klux Klan (KKK) as the prime example. Millenarian terrorism, by contrast, is religiously motivated and envisions a post-apocalyptic society dominated by the Aryans—exemplified by groups like the American Christian Identity movement. Finally, his youth counterculture terrorism category included subcultures such as hooligan groups and skinheads, notably the Hammerskins, which embraced violence as part of their radical ideology.59 Despite its groundbreaking contributions, Sprinzak’s model exhibits several limitations. Four key issues stand out.
First, it lacks precision in defining the secondary target of right-wing terrorism, using terms like “regime,” “state,” “government,” and “authorities” interchangeably. However, right-wing terrorists often differentiate between the ruling government and the “state” as an overarching system. While government officials—particularly those from left-wing parties—were initially viewed as legitimate targets, non-political representatives of the state, such as police officers, were generally spared. A tactical shift toward direct attacks on security forces often marked the onset of a new phase in terrorist activity.
Second, while Sprinzak correctly notes that the distinction between primary and secondary targets can blur when terrorists believe the state is controlled by an “inferior” group, his model presents this as a rigid, linear progression—from targeting marginalized groups to attacking the state itself. Yet, right-wing terrorism often follows cyclical patterns, with different phases overlapping or recurring rather than unfolding in a fixed sequence.
Third, Sprinzak argues that violence against minorities tends to occur when right-wing terrorist groups feel strong, whereas attacks against the “system” emerge when they feel marginalized or isolated. However, this oversimplifies the relationship between self-perception and target selection as the perceived strength or weakness of a group also influences the type of violence employed—more overt attacks when they feel empowered, and covert operations when they feel threatened or repressed.
Fourth, while Sprinzak’s typology acknowledges the diversity of right-wing terrorism, its classification system can sometimes obscure rather than clarify distinctions. Categories frequently overlap, and the criteria for classification vary inconsistently—at times focusing on objectives, at others on ideology, and in some cases on demographic factors like age. This inconsistency weakens the model’s ability to fully capture the complexities of right-wing terrorism.
For a long time, Sprinzak’s theory and typology remained largely unexpanded and unchallenged. Only in more recent years have scholars attempted to refine the specific characteristics of right-wing terrorism. Alongside these efforts, other emerging forms of politically motivated violence—such as environmental terrorism and incel terrorism—have been examined in relation to right-wing terrorism. However, in contrast to Sprinzak’s transnational approach, many of these newer classifications remain limited to Western European or strictly national perspectives, often oversimplifying complex historical realities.60
Ultimately, much like Rapoport’s “wave model,” the search for a single, all-encompassing framework—along with efforts at further conceptualization and typologization based on quantitative data—underscores the difficulty of neatly categorizing historical realities within rigid theoretical constructs. While these models—especially the notion that right-wing terrorism can be both “reactionary” and “revolutionary”—provide valuable conceptual tools for this book, the goal is not to replace one typology with another, as such an approach is, in the words of one scholar, “unsatisfactory for a historian.”61 Instead, the study’s main goal lies elsewhere.
• • •
The aim of this book is straightforward: to provide the first concise historical overview of the global dimensions of right-wing terrorism from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. A historical perspective—rather than merely reacting to the latest headlines—offers deeper insight into right-wing terrorism’s roots and evolution, helping scholars and practitioners better understand current dynamics and potentially anticipate future developments. In doing so, this book challenges prevailing assumptions about modern right-wing attacks and expands the boundaries of existing research in four key areas.
First, it traces the longue durée of right-wing terrorism. It explores the persistence of right-wing terrorism over time, illustrating how this phenomenon has adapted to shifting sociopolitical contexts. It examines how contemporary societies—politicians, the public, and the media—understood and responded to right-wing terrorism at different historical junctures, shedding light on its evolution and historical significance.
Second, it examines the motivations, goals, and targets of selected right-wing terrorist groups. By delving into the ideological, strategic, and tactical dimensions of right-wing terrorism, this study highlights both the diversity and the recurring patterns within the phenomenon. It examines the differences and similarities across various movements, emphasizing how right-wing terrorists have repeatedly redefined their “enemies” in response to changing political and cultural landscapes. Thereby, it demonstrates that the far right—and by extension, right-wing terrorism—does not manifest in a single form, nor is it driven by just one ideology or worldview.
Third, it explores the radicalization of right-wing extremism into terrorism by analyzing the evolving relationship between right-wing groups, state institutions, conservative elites, and the broader public. In doing so, the book also considers how other forms of terrorism and corresponding state responses may have influenced the trajectory and development of right-wing terrorism.
And fourth, it uncovers the transnational networks of right-wing terrorism. This book brings to light the extensive cross-border connections between right-wing terrorist groups since the nineteenth century. Thereby, it also highlights the role of culture, media, and technological advancements in shaping these networks.
Consequently, rather than portraying right-wing terrorism as a static, monolithic phenomenon, this study highlights its adaptability across diverse historical, political, and cultural contexts. It seeks to clarify the relationship between the right-wing extremist milieu and its actors on the one hand, and terrorist violence on the other. It investigates when and under what circumstances different actors contemplated the use of terrorist violence, as well as the extent, methods, and objectives involved. Particular emphasis is placed on how these individuals positioned themselves, the ways they justified their actions, and the broader contexts of their radicalization processes and network structures.
Due to the complexity of the topic, the book does not aim to provide an exhaustive account—which would require detailed, case-specific research and extensive archival work beyond the scope of a single volume. Instead, it provides a structured introduction using a selection of case studies that align with the aforementioned definition of right-wing terrorism and are also chosen for several specific reasons: first, they span different historical and societal contexts; second, they represent varying forms and expressions of right-wing terrorism; third, they reflect significant transnational influences; and fourth, they are drawn from different world regions to counterbalance a predominantly Western perspective. Thus, these case studies serve to illuminate key themes and developments across time and geography, offering a well-balanced representation and insightful overview of the global and evolving nature of right-wing terrorism and its cross-border networks.
At its core, this study operates on the premise that extremist ideologies transcend borders, undergoing adaptation and reinterpretation within different national settings. Transnational influences can manifest both directly and indirectly, as far-right movements have historically been shaped by international crises and perceived threats—ranging from political modernization and immigration to communism and economic globalization to wars and left-wing violence. While acknowledging the significance of these global dependencies and connections, this study also underscores the enduring role of the nation as a central factor. National context and identity remain crucial drivers of recruitment, as many right-wing terrorists seek to align their actions with nationalist sentiment rather than contradict it to help with recruitment. Thus, the interaction between global influences and local conditions is key to understanding both the opportunities and constraints facing right-wing terrorists and their networks.62
The book combines a chronological structure with thematic analysis, diverging from many other studies that often align with Rapoport’s “wave theory.”63 It is divided into four broad chapters: The first chapter, “The Birth of Modern Right-Wing Terrorism in the Long Nineteenth Century,” traces the origins of right-wing violence in reaction to civil rights movements, revolutionary movements, nationalism, and modernization. The second chapter, “The Age of the World Wars,” explores the radicalization and diversification of right-wing terrorism amid war, political upheaval, and totalitarian regimes. In the third chapter, “The Cold War,” right-wing terrorism is examined in the context of decolonization, anticommunism, geopolitical rivalries, racism as well as countercultural movements. The last chapter, “From a Bipolar to a Multipolar World Order: Right-Wing Terrorism since the End of the Cold War,” assesses the resurgence and transformation of right-wing terrorism in the age of globalization, digital communication, and identity politics. These chronological divisions are not rigid but rather serve as an orientation for the reader.
Within each section, the book follows a thematic structure to highlight the coexistence, interaction, and rivalry among multiple strands of right-wing terrorism, enabling comparative analysis across different historical and geographical contexts. This approach also supports a more focused exploration of temporal dynamics, while emphasizing that dominant far-right ideologies—whether rooted in racism, anticommunism, antiliberalism, or other worldviews—were often shaped by perceived national grievances and threats, even when framed as global challenges. Consequently, ideological overlaps among different groups were common, with organizations frequently shifting their orientations over time to adapt to changing circumstances.
Inevitably, in a book of this scope, difficult choices had to be made regarding which events, movements, and perspectives to include. Some aspects of right-wing terrorism, such as eco-terrorism and cyberterrorism are not covered in detail.64 Likewise, while the gender history of terrorism and victims’ perspectives are crucial areas of study, they are only addressed insofar as they intersect with the central theme of right-wing terrorism. Similarly, counterterrorism policies are only examined when they significantly influenced the development of right-wing terrorist organizations.
Despite these limitations, an effort has been made to integrate a wide range of historical sources, including media reports, archival documents, and visual materials, to provide a balanced and comprehensive perspective. Rather than offering a definitive history of right-wing terrorism, this book aims to provide an entry point into a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. It is intended to stimulate further research and discussion by offering a well-balanced selection of case studies that illustrate key developments, continuities, and ruptures in the history of right-wing terrorism. The hope is that this work will inspire new inquiries into this topic and encourage a deeper understanding of how right-wing terrorism has shaped and been shaped by global historical processes.