# Introduction

An account of the 1840 blood libel on Rhodes, written by its victims and published in a German periodical a few months later, attributes to the local rabbi the following response to the ritual murder accusation: "We would be unworthy of being God's children if now, after the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane has bestowed on us its benefits, we would cause the government the smallest unpleasantness by our conduct."[1] This bizarre refutation of the ritual murder allegation was my introduction to the Rhodes Affair. Initially, I interpreted the mention of the Noble Rescript of Gülhane proclaimed a few months earlier, on 3 November 1839, simply as a rhetorical device aimed at winning the authorities' sympathy. But a study of earlier unknown Ottoman archival materials and Ladino sources convinced me that while the authors of the account had a valid reason to declare loyalty to the Tanzimat reforms announced by the Noble Rescript, the connection between the reforms and the acquittal of Rhodian Jews was misconstrued by most contemporaries. Indeed, what appeared to be due process was in fact a political move. Finding out what led the Ottomans to take this unusual step required establishing the causes of the Rhodes incident, tracking its development, and identifying the perpetrators. I had to scrutinize the few extant local sources, including the notes scribbled in their margins, and even resort to detective work. Going back to the resolution of the Rhodes crisis, I realized that the Ottomans' supposedly juridical decision can be adequately understood only in the context of the Tanzimat reforms and, inseparable from them, the Sublime Porte's relations with its European allies. I start with a detailed examination of the incident that happened on the island, then move to the imperial capital where the reforms were being implemented, and finally, return to the site of the tragic events to compare my interpretation with those of the victims and their descendants.

By the end of this book, the full significance of the statement ascribed to the Rhodian rabbi will become clear: intended as a pledge of loyalty, it is

a reference to the historical moment when the Sublime Porte's interests and those of its Jewish subjects were closer than ever before or probably after.

I will begin by summarizing two major blood libel incidents that happened in the Ottoman lands in 1840, relaying the course of events without comment. The rest of this book, however, complicates the Rhodes Affair account and challenges common assumptions concerning it.

## The 1840 Blood Libels

On 5 February in Damascus, a Capuchin monk and his servant disappeared and were never seen again. Local Christians accused the Jews of having murdered them to use their blood for ritual purposes. The French Consul in Damascus and the governor supported this charge and had several Jews imprisoned and brutally tortured. In the next few weeks, several Jews "confessed," implicating others, one converted to Islam, and a few died.

On 17 February, a Greek boy went missing on the island of Rhodes. A few days later, several Orthodox Christians accused the Jews of having kidnapped him. A Jewish peddler named Istambuli was seized and flogged until he implicated a few individuals who were also arrested and tortured. But during the trial, Istambuli withdrew his deposition, saying that it was written under duress. The Muslim sub-district judge (*naib*) demanded the closure of the case and release of the defendants for lack of evidence. Instead, the Jewish quarter of Rhodes town was surrounded by soldiers, presumably to protect its inhabitants from violent Christians. Meanwhile, the European vice-consuls residing on the island visited the Jews and demanded, resorting to death threats, that they produce the missing boy. The community was left without food or drinking water for twelve days until a newly appointed government official (*muhassıl*) arrived on the island and forced the governor to lift the blockade.

Several days later, the vice-consuls received a letter from Damascus informing them of the alleged ritual murder, which, in their eyes, proved the culpability of Rhodian Jews. The vice-consuls convinced the governor to imprison ten Jewish elders, including the chief rabbi, which was done on 16 March, Purim eve. After three days of interrogations conducted by the vice-consuls and accompanied by atrocious torture, the ten prisoners were released, but not those arrested earlier. The disturbances and anti-Jewish violence continued. In late April, the governor received a letter from the grand vizier ordering him to send to the capital three Orthodox Christians and three Jews to testify before the empire's highest court, the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-I Vala-yı Ahkam-I Adliye*). In mid-July, following the Supreme Council's and the grand vizier's recommendations, the sultan acquitted the Jews and dismissed the governor of Rhodes.

In April, upon learning about the blood libels in Ottoman lands, European Jews appealed (not always successfully) to their respective governments and sent a delegation headed by Adolphe Crémieux and Moses Montefiore to Alexandria to free the Damascene prisoners. After long negotiations with Mehmed Ali, the ruler of secessionist Egypt, who had just received a military ultimatum from his adversaries, Crémieux and Montefiore achieved the release of the Jewish prisoners, who were not pardoned or acquitted, however. In late October,[2] during his visit to Istanbul, Montefiore obtained from the sultan a firman that denounced ritual murder allegations in the Ottoman lands. In Europe, the resolution of the blood libel crisis was widely seen as a victory for European Jewry, achieved with the assistance of the British and Austrian governments, and virtually without the Porte's involvement, to say nothing of the participation of Ottoman Jews. The Jews of Rhodes, who had shown great courage and resilience, uncritically accepted this version of events imparted to them by their European supporters.

## The Blood Libel Outside the Compartment

The ritual murder charge, also known as the "blood libel," is a false allegation that Jews use Christian blood for baking matzos. It emerged in England in the twelfth century and has survived, in various forms, until today.[3] Ritual murder accusations have been studied by scores of specialists who have produced a large body of literature on the subject. Yet the Rhodes blood libel, although mentioned in passing in many studies, has not attracted scholarly attention. It is only discussed at length in the two histories of the Rhodian Jewish community, Abram Galante's *Histoire des juifs de Turquie* and Marc Angel's *Jews of Rhodes: The History of a Sephardic Community*.[4] In addition, Jonathan Frankel's seminal study, *The Damascus Affair: "Ritual Murder," Politics, and the Jews*, dedicates a few pages to the Rhodes case.[5] But none of these authors provides an account of the incident based on firsthand research. The main reason for this neglect is clear: the events on Rhodes were overshadowed by the Damascus Affair, which began less than two weeks earlier, lasted a few months longer, and became an international emergency involving several prominent politicians. Apparently, historians take for granted that the Rhodes blood libel was a variation of what happened in Damascus simply because the two events occurred almost simultaneously in the same part of the world, although contemporaneity is likely irrelevant here. The sultan's firman, granted to Montefiore, also indirectly contributed to this misconception, since it condemned persecutions both in Damascus and on Rhodes.

While Frankel observes that "even in the earliest days, it was possible to discern certain distinguishing features" between the two incidents, he

believes that "in their origins, shape, and development, the ritual murder cases in Rhodes and Damascus were essentially alike."[6] On some level, this is obviously true: following the disappearance of a Christian in Damascus and on Rhodes, the Jews were accused of murdering this person to use the blood for ritual purposes for which they were imprisoned and tortured. But most blood libel cases can be reduced to the same template.

The erroneous assumption that the Rhodes Affair was a small-scale Damascus crisis largely explains the general lack of interest in what took place on the island, and why it has not been studied as a separate event. Also, unlike the Damascus Affair, which made international news, was widely covered by the European press, and generated a great deal of diplomatic and other correspondence, the Rhodes debacle was usually mentioned by journalists in passing, barely leaving a paper trail in European languages. The sources available to Frankel included correspondence between the British vice-consul on the island and the Foreign Office, two letters sent by the Rhodian community to Jewish leaders in Istanbul, and a handful of short newspaper reports. Given that some of the writers intentionally lied and others were misinformed, a study based solely on these documents would have been untenable, and Frankel likely did not know that more sources existed. In any case, he was chiefly interested in the response in Europe, not in the Ottoman Empire. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Rhodes blood libel was regarded as a kind of echo of the one in Damascus and discussed as such, if at all. Indeed, for those primarily interested in Judeophobia and the ritual murder charge per se, the two incidents illustrate the same point, differing only in the number of victims. This is how these two cases were seen, for example, by the Alliance Israélite Universelle (henceforth, Alliance), a Paris-based Jewish philanthropic organization founded in 1860 whose ultimate goal was eliminating antisemitism in the east by "regenerating" Jews and whose judgment on this subject carried considerable weight.

It is human nature to tag historical events to facilitate their categorization, but labels often stick and effectively reduce events to the generic designations on the tags. Thus an episode that involves the ritual murder charge is identified as a "blood libel," which in turn, belongs in the "antisemitism" compartment. And once it has been relegated to antisemitism studies, everything that does not fit the template is automatically cast off, and only students of Judeophobia will show interest in it. Since it is almost impossible to avoid the tagging trap, the only solution, it seems, is revisiting events behind old tags from time to time. In fact, we see scholars of antisemitism "re-label" certain known events as blood libel episodes. For instance, Jeffrey Veidlinger has exposed elements of the ritual murder myth in the so-called Doctors' Plot, Stalin's 1953 antisemitic campaign, during which Jewish physicians were accused of poisoning Soviet officials.[7] But I

am not aware of scholars from other fields revisiting blood libel cases, even though most incidents could be productively examined from several perspectives. By treating "the Rhodes blood libel" merely as an identifier or shorthand for the crisis that began on the island in 1840, we can place it in a broader perspective as one event among others that happened at the intersection of several social and political developments. For instance, rather than comparing this incident with the Damascus Affair, one could focus on anti-Jewish violence on the island and consider it in a diachronic perspective as an early case of sectarian conflict that frequently erupted in the Ottoman Empire starting in the middle of the nineteenth century. Alternatively, by setting the 1840 blood libel against the reforms underway in the empire, one understands why the Ottomans chose to treat the Rhodes Affair as a purely legal case that must be publicly heard and resolved. Moreover, as I will suggest at the very end, these approaches are not mutually exclusive.

This book's title, *The 1840 Rhodes Blood Libel*, identifies the thematic category to which the case in question belongs, and the first two chapters will focus entirely on what happened on the island. The subtitle, *Ottoman Jews at the Dawn of the Tanzimat Era*, refers to the monograph's problematic and indicates the perspective from which I chose to examine the event. This will be the subject of chapter 3, which presents the same development as it was viewed from London and Istanbul.

Although chapters 1 and 2 are, respectively, a prehistory and history of the 1840 disturbances, triggered by a ritual murder accusation leveled against the Rhodian community, I will not discuss the nature or essence of Judeophobia, but rather, the consequences brought about by its specific manifestation. For comparison, Helmut Walser Smith's brilliant *Butcher's Tale* is also a microhistory of a blood libel in a small town, but it focuses on what the author calls "process," that is, "what makes latent anti-Semitism manifest," or how "local enmities become potent symbols resonating with larger antagonisms."[8] Although most of my questions are historical, rather than sociological, Judeophobia interests me as an important component of Sephardim's social experience at the beginning of the Tanzimat era. My analysis of the Rhodes case also sheds light on some of the factors that led to the proliferation of blood libels in the Ottoman lands in the second half of the nineteenth century.

## A Mediterranean Story

Chapter 1 deals with intercommunal relations on Rhodes, focusing on Levantines, a social group that played a key role in the events but has not been examined as a source of sectarian antagonism. Discussing blood libels

in the Ottoman Empire, historians usually claim that they were initiated by local Christians (either Greek-Orthodox or Armenians) and link them largely to commercial rivalries. Recently, more scholars have acknowledged the role of Muslims in kindling such incidents.[9] Yet another social group whose members often competed with the Jews in the commercial sphere is never mentioned in the context of blood libels. Scholars who study sectarian conflicts in the empire ignore the role of a small community that existed alongside the Ottoman *millets* (religious communities), whose members were called "Levantines" or "Franks." I use these terms in their narrowest sense, that is, in reference to Christian residents of the Ottoman Empire of European descent (no matter how distant or vague) who were not Ottoman subjects.[10] An investigation of this group's relations with Ottoman Jews, I hope, will serve as a contribution to the study of Judeophobia in the Ottoman Empire, as well as to Mediterranean Studies, where Levantines are typically represented as one-dimensional figures.

By the end of the eighteenth century, Levantines had become so deeply entrenched in the Ottoman world and had such extensive relations with members of other communities that their presence had become a significant economic and social factor. Most Levantines resided in large port cities, such as Istanbul, Salonica, Aleppo, and others, but a minority lived on the Aegean and Mediterranean islands. Almost all Franks, whether they were sea captains and sailors or served as dragomans and consuls, engaged in foreign commerce. Ottoman Jews, who by the start of the Tanzimat era had lost out to the Porte's Christian subjects in most economic spheres, still fared relatively well in foreign trade, thanks to their international connections. In addition, many Jewish merchants, especially in port cities, were foreign protégés and thus enjoyed tax benefits and access to consular courts. Both legal categories—Levantines and foreign protégés—were created by Capitulations (*Ahdnames*), treaties between the Sublime Porte and European states.[11] It is not surprising, then, that there was often a fierce commercial rivalry between Levantines and Jews. This rivalry dated back to the eighteenth century, when Jewish traders and brokers competed with European merchants, often to the detriment of the latter. French correspondence from that time is full of pejorative epithets referring to the Jews,[12] but I am not aware of any open conflicts between the two groups. As I will suggest in chapter 2, the blood libel on Rhodes was devised by local Levantines (vice-consuls) who sought to eliminate their local Jewish competitors and, more importantly, a Jewish merchant from London who had established a sponge-fishing company on the island. Having failed to achieve this by other means, the vice-consuls, I believe, saw an opportunity to incite the Greek-Orthodox majority on Rhodes to slander the Jews and physically attack them, forcing some of them to leave the island. In a big port city, Levantines would not have been able to involve the authorities

in their scheme, but on Rhodes, the vice-consuls manipulated the newly appointed governor and likely bribed his deputy and thus nearly achieved their goal.

The Rhodes case is a Mediterranean story, (a) because in the Ottoman Empire, Levantines resided chiefly in Mediterranean port cities; and (b) because the events would have developed differently had this happened on the mainland instead of an island. Yet a key feature usually associated with the Mediterranean, namely, cosmopolitanism, is missing. As will be discussed in chapter 1, contrary to the accepted view, the 1840 disturbances were not the first episode of violence on Rhodes in the nineteenth century. In 1821, during the Greek uprising, political disorders on the island lasted several weeks and led to bloodshed. At the same time, hundreds of Greeks were killed in Izmir (Smyrna), and in 1797, around fifteen hundred Christians were murdered during the infamous Smyrna Rebellion.[13] Furthermore, there were several blood libels in Izmir in the nineteenth century. All of these events happened in the Smyrna whose cosmopolitan past is celebrated by many scholars. Naor Ben-Yehoyada explains this incongruity as follows: since nationalism was "the most controversial and least popular stripe on the banner of modernity," the Mediterranean became the opposite of nationalism, and the image of cosmopolitan port cities turned into "an object of paradoxical nostalgia for a moment that emblematized a certain image of modernity—urbanness, refinement, and inter-cultural co-existence and conviviality."[14] The Rhodes Affair does not fit this image of modernity. At least in this case, "cosmopolitanism" should be replaced with a value-neutral descriptive term, for instance, "plurality," which is used by many authors.[15] As it is used today, "cosmopolitanism" says more about us and our world than about life in Mediterranean port cities in the nineteenth century.

Rhodian Jews summarized their experience in one sentence: "those who had been our friends turned into our enemies."[16] In chapter 2, I will explain how this happened and what made me suspect that the vice-consuls intentionally instigated local Christians to accuse the Jews of ritual murder. But since information on the sequence and development of events, starting with the child's disappearance, is patchy and contradictory, I often had to decide which version, if any, to accept. Sometimes, when I was unable to find definitive answers to my questions, I hypothesized, but in every instance of this kind, I explained my reasons (which readers may challenge) for adopting a particular conjecture. While my reconstruction of events likely includes errors, before I began working on this project, we knew very little about the Rhodes blood libel, and even what we thought we knew was mostly wrong. Furthermore, I made a few discoveries, one of which is that the sultan granted Rhodian Jews a duplicate of the firman received by Montefiore refuting the ritual murder charge, which testifies to the importance

of this case for the Porte at that moment. To my disappointment, however, the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances was not keen on establishing the facts of the Rhodes Affair. The reasons for this lack of interest will become clear in chapter 3, which deals with the official investigation and adjudication of the Rhodes case and explains the Porte's treatment of this blood libel in the context of the Tanzimat reforms and the newly implemented Ottoman penal code.

## The Beginning of the Tanzimat

Since the Damascus and Rhodes blood libels took place in different parts of the Ottoman Empire that at the time had different rulers and political regimes, the two crises were handled in different ways. While European Jews managed to turn the Damascus blood libel into an international affair, the Porte treated the Rhodes incident as a domestic legal case. Hence, documents pertaining to it are stored with other court records generated by the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, that is, at the Presidency Ottoman Archives in Istanbul (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet/Osmanlı Arşivi, hereafter BOA), which holds a trove of relevant materials.[17] But to construe the true meaning of these documents, one must bear in mind that their point of reference is the Tanzimat, even if the word itself is never mentioned.

The Tanzimat (restructuring) was a program of reforms officially announced on 3 November 1839, by the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane (the Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber), confirmed by the sultan's pledge to implement its promises. The Tanzimat Decree announced a series of administrative, military, fiscal, and legal reforms aimed at turning the Ottoman Empire into a centralized modern state with an efficient army and competent bureaucracy. This massive project required new sources of income for the imperial treasury. But the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–74 led to a surge in expenditures, and uprisings in Serbia and Greece in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, followed by the Egyptian crisis of the 1830s, "brought the Ottoman political system and its treasury to the brink of collapse."[18] When in June 1839, for the second time in six years, Istanbul faced the threat of a takeover by the army of Mehmed Ali, Great Britain intervened to avert catastrophe. Preservation of the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity became a central issue in European diplomacy and the chief concern of the British Foreign Office, which feared new Russian intervention and the strengthening of France's ally, Mehmed Ali. Most importantly, Great Britain wanted the Ottoman Empire to serve as a bulwark against future Russian expansion.

Dependence on the European powers compelled the Porte to accept their conditions and "synchronize Ottoman policy with [the] European

international order," as one scholar put it,[19] that is, to begin aggressive Westernizing reforms. Yet the Tanzimat Decree was not merely the Porte's "short-term response to the military setbacks in the summer of 1839, which sought to gain further European, and more specifically British support against Mehmed Ali Pasha's onslaught."[20] On the contrary, many reforms announced by the Gülhane rescript were a continuation of the process begun in the 1820s by Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839). Even the term "tanzimat" and related words meaning "restructuring" were used in official documents during his reign in reference to the change of taxation, the centerpiece of the reforms project.[21] In fact, Mustafa Reşid Pasha (who became the Ottoman foreign minister in 1839), known as the architect of the Tanzimat, planned to announce the beginning of the reforms as early as 1838.[22]

The Hatt-ı-Şerif of Gülhane, issued in the name of Mahmud's son, Sultan Abdülmecid I (r. 1839–1861), declared that from then on, all subjects of his empire "shall have complete freedom to enjoy their rights concerning their life, property, honor, and respectability."[23] Furthermore, the decree stated, "until the pleas of criminals are examined and adjudged publicly, in accordance with the laws of the *sharia*, no one shall be executed, secretly or publicly."[24]

In addition to guaranteeing his subjects security of life, protection of property, and due process, the sultan promised to abolish tax-farming as an inefficient and corrupt system of tax collection and replace it with tax distribution based on each subject's ability to pay "according to his fortune and means."[25] The new taxation method, a system of salaried tax collectors (*muhassıls*), was intended to introduce direct collection and centralized control of revenues. In conjunction with this innovation, the state reorganized the administrative divisions of each province and sent a *muhassıl* to each.

Finally, the Tanzimat Decree made it mandatory for all Ottoman subjects to provide recruits to ensure the defense of the fatherland but envisaged fair methods of conscription and short terms of service in the army and navy. It is noteworthy that the Hatt-ı Şerif's conscription stipulation does not juxtapose Muslims and non-Muslims (*ahali ve reaya*) but talks of Ottoman subjects. Yet until 1846, the authorities were not ready to allow non-Muslims to serve in the military.[26]

It is generally accepted that Ottoman Jews first felt the effect of the Tanzimat in the mid-1850s, after the Decree of Reform (1856) proclaimed all Ottoman subjects equal, regardless of their religion, and the two newly enacted penal codes and code of commerce began to curtail the *millets*' autonomy.[27] Since we know very little about the life of Sephardim in the early 1840s, this assumption requires thorough re-examination, which must start with archival research. The Ottoman court documents generated by the Rhodes case, which involved what must have been the first judicial interaction between Sephardim and the Porte after the proclamation

of the Noble Rescript, help to elucidate the issue of legal status of Ottoman non-Muslims.

While the taxation and conscription provisions were clearly articulated, the rescript's brevity and ambiguity of language, combined with some wishful thinking, led Europeans to misinterpret the sultan's promise to ensure that all his subjects "shall have complete freedom to enjoy their rights."[28] Some scholars still read this statement as a declaration of legal and social equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Ozan Özavcı argues that the edict puts "explicit emphasis on equality between the Muslim and non-Muslims subjects," because Reşid Pasha associated granting the latter the liberties and rights enjoyed by the former with "civilization."[29]

Reşid's intentions notwithstanding, this interpretation is incorrect. First, as was already mentioned, the Hatt-ı Şerif does not use any term (*reaya* or another word) referring to non-Muslims as a distinct group, but instead talks about Ottoman subjects as one collective. Second, non-Muslims, being *zimmis* (*dhimmis*), had limited rights, and the decree does not specify whether it refers to those partial rights or to the freedoms and liberties enjoyed by their Muslim compatriots. In fact, it does not even mention the *zimmis*' legal disabilities or promise to change their status. Ussama Makdisi believes that the Tanzimat "did not intend or imply the granting of any political rights to the empire's subjects," because the Porte rejected the idea of a democratic social or political contract with its subject population."[30] (Rather, it did not even consider such a scenario, if only because of its incompatibility with *sharia*.)

The firman refuting the ritual murder charge, which, like the Hatt-ı Şerif, was prepared by Reşid Pasha and granted by the sultan to Montefiore, spells out what exactly the Tanzimat Decree guaranteed: "Our imperial rescript read at Gülhane stipulates that, as they [Jews] are subjects of our Exalted Monarchy enjoying full protection, like other subjects of the Sublime Porte in our Imperial and Protected Domains, no one shall interfere with the celebration of their religious rites."[31] Thus, the Tanzimat rescript confirmed the religious rights of non-Muslim communities that they enjoyed since the fifteenth century, but it did not eliminate their legal disabilities.

For comparison, the 1856 Decree of Reform (Hatt-ı Hümayun), drafted by the same official for the same sultan, begins by reiterating promises of protection and security but then announces a series of provisions, the most important of which states: "Every distinction or appellation lending to render any class whatsoever of the subjects of my Empire inferior to another class because of religion, language, or race, shall be forever erased from administrative protocol. The law will deal severely with the use of any injurious or offensive term either by private individuals or the authorities."[32]

This obviously goes far beyond guaranteeing Ottoman subjects the right to practice their respective religions, which hardly differed from the

assurances of the previous administration given before the Tanzimat. Already in 1837, during his visit to Varna, Mahmud II addressed his audience: "You Greeks! You Armenians! You Jews! Just like Muslims, you all are God's servants and my subjects. You differ in matters of faith, but you are all protected by the law and by my imperial will."[33] In 1846, during his trip to Rumelia (in the European part of the empire), Abdülmecid repeated this assurance almost verbatim.[34]

Nevertheless, because in 1839 the Porte endeavored to prove to Europeans concerned about the rights of Ottoman Christians that Muslim and non-Muslim subjects enjoyed the same treatment, the penal code adopted on 3 May tacitly implemented equality before the law, for instance, by limiting the number of privileged groups, such as office holders.[35] A few weeks later, the equal treatment claim was ostensibly confirmed by the acquittal of the Rhodian community.

In the weeks following the Rose Chamber ceremony, the Tanzimat Decree was publicly read in all Ottoman cities, including Rhodes, where one could even purchase a printed copy of its official Greek translation.[36] In Izmir, not only the chief rabbi was present at the reading (a requirement), but a teacher even brought Talmud-Torah students to the main square.[37] Initially, the Tanzimat Decree must have given some hope to the empire's non-Muslims, but they would have quickly realized that they were still subject to religion-based tax discrimination and continued paying the *cizye* (poll tax). Given that the account with which I began was written in late May in Istanbul, where non-Muslims could no longer have any illusions regarding their status, it is unlikely that the "benefits" presumably bestowed on Jews by the Hatt-ı Şerif referred to what at first seemed to be abolition of the *zimmet* (*dhimma*), that is, the end of their legal disabilities. Chapter 3 shows that the authors of this account were indeed among the first Jews who benefited from the Tanzimat. Yet this happened not so much thanks to the legal reform, but more because of the Ottomans' desire to prove to Europeans that it was enforced and implied equal treatment of all subjects, irrespective of their faith.

A comparison of the Rhodes case with a few others heard by the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances around the same time demonstrates that its adjudication served chiefly as a foreign policy ploy. Cengiz Kırlı, in his book *Yolsu`zluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi*,[38] studied the cases of three high-ranking officials, the governors of Edirne and Izmit and the grand vizier, who were charged with bribery and improper implementation of Tanzimat reforms. Their trials took place within three months of one another following the Rhodes hearing, and all three pashas were found guilty. Kırlı exposed the Supreme Council's misuse of the new penal code, ostensibly in the interests of reform policies and because of the defendants' hostility to Reşid Pasha. Unlike the Rhodes Affair,

a showcase intended chiefly for Europeans, these three cases were meant to serve as a lesson for a domestic audience. In chapter 3, I examine commonalities and differences between them and the Rhodes Affair and show that at least in the early stages, judicial reform was sometimes at odds with its intent, namely, regulating legal process, and served political purposes.

## "Old X-Ray Slides"

Another book thematically relevant to my study that deals with the implementation of new policies and the modernization of criminal justice is Omri Paz's *Who Killed Panayot?: Reforming Ottoman Legal Culture in the 19th Century*.[39] It is a microhistory of a robbery investigation conducted in Izmir in 1850–52 that led to the death of a suspect, possibly as a result of torture. The account centers on legal reform in action in an Ottoman province, where torture continued to be unlawfully used as a tool of judicial investigation. Paz also shows a rift between Great Britain's interests and those of the local consul and other Levantines who conspire with the perpetrators. My approach differs, however, from the one adopted by Paz, which he defines as the Rashomon principle. The so-called Rashomon effect, referring to Akira Kurosawa's 1950 cinematic classic, is created by "the lack of evidence that enables the spectator/reader to disqualify some versions and verify one over the others."[40] Rather than trying to establish the facts, which he considers an impossible task in his case, Paz focused on how each participant interpreted the events. This approach, he concludes, allowed him to see "the weaknesses of the men involved."[41] Obviously, the fact that each actor has a different perspective of the same event does not mean that the event is unknowable and cannot be reconstructed if sufficient evidence is discovered. Depending on the event and the available evidence, the existence of multiple narratives may or may not allow us to get closer to the past and reliably reconstruct it.[42] While this may be of no value for an artist (a film director), the historian's first task is to try to do it in good faith.

Paz's conclusion that texts often conceal the truth rather than disclose it and that no one actor can be believed[43] is a given in linguistic pragmatics, the study of meaning in context, one of whose goals is identifying the writer's true intention in producing the text in question. No texts should be "believed," that is, taken at face value, but as I will show in chapters 4 and 5, a comparison and close reading of several texts makes it possible to reconstruct, to some degree, past realities and perceptions.

I share the view of Helmut Walser Smith, who having conducted a "high-resolution" investigation of the blood libel in Konitz, compared the official reports and trial records to "pieces of old x-ray slides, which, when

put back together, rendered transparent a more complete picture than even the people of the town themselves saw."[44]

I use primary sources produced by multiple actors with different intentions to tell the story of the Sephardim's first encounter with Ottoman justice after the enactment of the 1840 penal code. Due to the paucity of relevant sources, we know next to nothing about early responses of Ottoman Jews to the reforms. The only study that deals with this subject is Mustafa Kulu's master's thesis, which describes the life of the Jewish community of the Dardanelles (Çanakkale) in 1839–1845. According to Kulu, the Dardanelles community's attitude to the reforms was positive once they understood the new taxation principle.[45] But this conclusion is unreliable, (a) because Kulu does not use a single Jewish source; and (b) because his stated goal is "to emphasize the exceptional status of the Jews within the Ottoman Empire," and show that Jews' relations with the authorities were always good.[46] This claim reflects the misguided and outdated belief that the Ottomans were great benefactors of Sephardim, for which the Jews, who presumably enjoyed a privileged status, were eternally grateful to the Porte.[47]

In reality, however, between 1823 and 1826, five powerful Jewish leaders and financiers, whose business interests were connected to the Janissary corps, were murdered on the government's orders.[48] This catastrophe deeply undermined the Jewish leadership's trust in the Ottomans and the community's sense of security. In a dirge lamenting the early death of "the best among the Jews," the Istanbul community vowed not to forget this even in a thousand years.[49] Thus, for Sephardi leaders, the administration's response to the Rhodes blood libel was the first test of its true intentions since the tragic events of 1826. It was the first major instance of anti-Jewish violence, albeit perpetrated by members of another *millet* after the Tanzimat proclamation.

By "reopening" the Rhodes case, which was effectively closed and filed away in the antisemitism archive, and bringing to light this episode, barely familiar to students of Jewish history and unknown to Ottomanists, I hope to fill a new page in the history of Tanzimat implementation, its effect on the Porte's relations with the Jewish community, and the impact of early reforms on the lives of Ottoman Sephardim. Since the Rhodes Affair is a crucial event in the history of Ottoman Jews, which is notorious for the dearth of sources on the era preceding the emergence of the Ladino press (mid-1840s), a reconstruction, albeit an approximate one, of what happened on the island and in Istanbul is in order. Examined against the backdrop of Tanzimat reforms, it radically changes our understanding of the Porte's role in resolving the crisis. In terms of its general objective, my project is similar to *Lethal Provocation: The Constantine Murders and the Politics of French Algeria* by Joshua Cole,[50] who, drawing on his own investigation of the riot, rewrites the story of the 1934 anti-Jewish violence.

## The Sources

The non-Jewish sources used in this study include Ottoman court records, European and Ottoman periodicals, and consular and business correspondence. The production and survival of the first two corpora are results of the Ottoman judicial reform and the rise of the press, respectively. But the Rhodes Affair, exceptional in several ways, is also remarkable as far as the number of local Jewish sources that have reached us. The events of February-May are related in two prose accounts originally written in Ladino or Italian and two Ladino Purim songs produced between 1840 and the 1870s. In addition, in the late 1880s, an anonymous self-appointed historian of the local community produced a unique document, a corpus of notes in the margins of the earlier song, a historical account in its own right. There is also a French rendering of an oral version of the events written down in 1887. Finally, a commemorative plaque honoring one of the community leaders installed on a synagogue wall in 1893 is a reminder, in an esoteric rabbinic idiom, that the tragic events of 1840 are not forgotten. That a traumatic experience should have generated several written responses is not surprising. The remarkable part is that unlike others from earlier periods, these texts have survived, including those not intended for posterity.[51] This was possible thanks to two new circumstances: first, letters sent by Rhodian Jews to the community leadership in Istanbul were forwarded to Europe, where they appeared in French, English, and German newspapers; and second, new generations of Sephardi scholars (in our case, Abram Galante) turned their attention to the history of Ottoman Jews and preserved Ladino songs that were still extant in the late nineteenth century. Thus, the sheer number and genre diversity of available Jewish sources from Rhodes are evidence of new processes in the social life of Ottoman Jews.

Part 1 of this book is a microhistory of the Rhodes blood libel—its causes, events on the island, and the resolution of the crisis—based, among other sources, on texts composed by local Jews. In part 2, the focus of my investigation shifts to the impact of the Rhodes Affair on the intellectual world of Rhodian Jews as it is reflected in these documents, which become an object of my analysis. I treat them as literary texts that see the story of the ritual murder charge through different interpretative lenses. Told at different moments to different audiences, these accounts serve as a barometer of the transformation of the community's ideological and intellectual climate. One of the most significant changes revealed by these texts is the evolution of Sephardim's view of the causes of the blood libel and thus their understanding of history. Thanks to the diversity of our sources, we learn that this process was by no means linear, and traditional explanations coexisted with fact-based ones. Close reading and genre analysis make it clear that the synchronic diversity of interpretations is accounted for by the use

of different genres, the choice of which was determined by the function of a given text. Consequently, seemingly incompatible interpretations would have been acceptable to the same audience when they appeared in different genre guises and were assigned different social functions.

Rhodian Jews were familiar with blood libel accounts, and their initial experience fit the well-known template. This is why their first written response was also formulaic: it was a plea for help sent to their more powerful brethren that described their sufferings in terms of religious persecutions. But a few months later, victims of those persecutions made a completely unpredictable move by submitting another report to a European newspaper and bringing up different causes of the blood libel. These two prose accounts of the Rhodes blood libel are included in chapter 4, where they are discussed and compared. The subject of chapter 5, the two Purim songs composed a few decades apart, demonstrate the opposite dynamic: from an eyewitness report to a formulaic traditional song. These texts are so long that I had to place them in Appendices II and III, respectively (both the Ladino and English translations). My translation of the footnotes in the margins of the first song is included in chapter 5, but the Ladino original appears in Appendix IV. Chapter 5 examines the perspectives on the 1840 events expressed in these three texts. The earlier song, which until now was known only to a few people, is published here for the first time.

The transformation and coexistence of material and religious explanations of blood libel causes have never been discussed in the context of Sephardi history in the modern period. Due to the common erroneous assumption that Ottoman Jews were never persecuted, this subject did not come into the scholarly purview. The first book dealing with the ritual murder accusation to appear in the Ottoman Empire was Solomon Ibn Verga's *Shevet Yehudah* (The Scepter of Judah, Edirne, ca. 1560). Ibn Verga died much earlier on the way from Europe to the Ottoman lands, and his work was published posthumously by his son, Joseph, who edited it and included two more blood libel stories in addition to the seven found in the original manuscript. While the accounts added by Joseph related true events that occurred during Sultan Suleyman's reign (1520–1566), those composed by his father are imaginary episodes that supposedly took place in Iberia and France. All of these accounts are constructed on the same model adjusted as needed: a king is informed of a Christian murdered by Jews for ritual purposes. Convinced of their innocence, the king is able to save the Jews from execution but declares that they brought misery upon themselves with their arrogance, ostentation, and most important, usury. Ibn Verga proposed not only a rational explanation of Judeophobia but also a remedy for it: the king demands that the Jews return to the Christians the lands they took from them as payment of debts, and that they become humble again, as when they arrived in the kingdom as poor slaves. For the first time

in Jewish historiography, one finds an attempt at finding (a "natural cause" of) Judeophobia, which is presumed to be a Christian's reaction to the economic success and prominence of the Jews.

Yet Yosef Yerushalmi, who describes *Shevet Yehudah* as "a precociously sociological analysis of Jewish historical suffering," notes that its author is not truly a rationalist, and his approach does not preclude or contradict the notion of divine providence.[52] Indeed, in several tales, God plays the key role in rescuing the Jews by guiding the king, for example, in chapter 16 of Ibn Verga's book (related below).

It is noteworthy that while *Shevet Yehudah* quickly became popular and was translated into Yiddish and a few other languages, its first Ladino version appeared only three centuries later (Belgrade, 1859). This is understandable given that until the nineteenth century, blood libels were infrequent in the Ottoman lands, so a ritual murder story as such would not have been of great interest for Sephardim, because few had relevant personal experience. The earliest known instance of a ritual murder charge in the Ottoman lands is related in chapter 64 of *Shevet Yehudah*, added by Joseph Ibn Verga. This incident occurred in ca. 1550 in Amasia, where presumably, many Jews were brutally executed.[53] In response, Sultan Suleyman issued a firman mandating that false allegations against Jews, such as the ritual murder charge, be brought before the Imperial Divan.[54] There are a few mentions of blood libels in Ottoman archives, for instance, an incident that happened on Easter in Moldavia in 1726.[55] But these materials have not yet been systematically studied. One can find mentions of a ritual murder charge against Ottoman Jews in Galante's work, but very few are reliably documented. However, he cites an episode related by Pierre Baudin (*Siège de Rhodes: chronique du XVIe siècle*), according to whom there was a blood libel incident on Rhodes in 1521, on the eve of Süleyman's takeover of the island from Knights of St. John.[56] It is dubious that this episode was still remembered three centuries later, especially since it happened before the arrival of Sephardim on the island. In any case, this was certainly not common knowledge, otherwise the first ritual murder accusation would have come up in the 1840 sources, but it is not mentioned even once.

Of course, *Shevet Yehudah* was always available to Sephardi rabbis, who read it in Hebrew. Jacob Huli, who started the *Meam Loez* series, the famous Bible commentary in Ladino, included chapter 16 from Ibn Verga's book in his Exodus volume (published in Istanbul posthumously in 1733). It is a story about King Alfonso, whose Christian subjects report a dead man in a Jewish courtyard, accusing the Jews of murdering him. In response, the king calls this a libel (*alila*) and explains that the previous night, kept awake by God, he learned that the Christians conspired to slander and thus bring down the Jews. He asks the Jews to translate a biblical verse, Psalm 121:4, but rejects the standard translation and offers his own inter-

pretation: "God neither sleeps, nor does he allow the guardian of Israel (the Spanish king) to slumber."[57] This slightly adapted tale does not deal with the cause of Judeophobia but instead emphasizes the monarch's concern for his Jewish subjects and promotes the myth of a "special relationship" between the Jews and the Ottoman state. According to this myth created by sixteenth-century Jewish chroniclers, Sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) invited expelled Iberian Jews to his empire, deriding King Ferdinand for not appreciating them. Later Sephardi authors claimed that their community was the sultans' "favorite minority" and enjoyed special treatment.

Not surprisingly, in the 1840s–50s, a few Sephardi rabbis turned to the subject of the blood libel in their vernacular works. Isaac Amarachi and Joseph Sason included into their two co-authored Ladino *musars* (ethical writings) a couple of blood libel stories from *Shevet Yehudah*. Like Ibn Verga, the two rabbis hold victims responsible, though on religious grounds. The two rabbis explain that they translated chapter 7 of *Shevet Yehudah*, "for in this story we learn that the Temple was destroyed because of senseless hatred, and we also learn from this story how to respond to those uncircumcised persons who claim that we Jews put blood into the matzah."[58] "Senseless hatred" (*sinat hinam*) is used in the Talmud to refer to the strife between the Jews that caused the destruction of the First and Second Temples, which led to exile and subsequent suffering. But since the rabbis understand suffering as punishment for sinful acts, they are convinced that victims bear responsibility for their own suffering.[59] In other words, Ibn Verga's and Huli's God constantly watches over his people, whereas the two rabbis present him as a severe teacher.

Rabbi Judah Alcalay, often described as a precursor of Zionism, briefly talks about the Damascus Affair in his Ladino book *Shalom Yerushalayim* (The Peace of Jerusalem), finished in the summer of that year. Alcalay considers the Damascus Affair the culmination of a chain of disasters that happened in 1839, which he interprets as a divine warning to the Jews of Diaspora that they must go to the Holy Land.[60] But alongside mystical explanations, he offers a simple argument: as long as Israel depends on other nations, its persecutions will only intensify, and there will be more blood libels.[61] His remedy, then, is becoming independent by living in a Jewish land.

The authors of our Ladino texts articulate a whole range of interpretations of the Rhodes disaster, most of which are not new. Yet one source relates the events in non-confessional terms, another uses a hitherto unseen format, and a third promotes the perceived power of European Jews to combat persecutions. Most significantly, these documents finally allow us to hear the voices of blood libel victims, which we barely heard before 1840. This does not mean there were no written responses to earlier ritual murder accusations. But such incidents were infrequent, and handwritten

Ladino texts had small chances of survival, let alone in good condition, due to their low cultural status. (The story of the Sarajevo Purim, which commemorates the averted disaster of 1819, is an exception to which I will turn in chapter 5.) Elena Romero published a Purim song that possibly deals with a blood libel case resolved in favor of the Jews attacked by the Greek-Orthodox.[62] Produced around 1790, this document is of very poor quality, and it is unclear when and where the conflict in question took place. In fact, the song comes from a Rhodian archive, but there is no reason to believe that the event in question happened on the island.

Here it would be legitimate to ask why the only local sources (not to mention consular correspondence) I use are Jewish ones. The Muslim community of Rhodes was small and, except for the judge and the administration, was not actively involved in the events of 1840. The Greek-Orthodox community, which was two times as large as the other two combined, did not leave any documents, except for the official testimony given at the court, which I will quote in chapters 2 and 3. At the very beginning of the crisis, a Greek newspaper that appeared in Izmir published a short article on the events on the island, but the documents held at the Dodecanese State Archive (Rhodes) do not appear to have any references to the events of 1840, and neither do histories of Rhodes (all of which mention local Jews chiefly as the governors' spies). The most detailed Turkish history of Rhodes talks about some of the vice-consuls but leaves out the blood libel episode.[63] This silence is more proof that Mediterranean cosmopolitanism (unless it is communitarian) is a product of the "nostalgia industry." Alexis Rappas, who studied Greek and Jewish narratives from Rhodes focusing on the 1912–45 period, found almost no cross references between these two corpora. Written accounts of relations between the three religious communities on the island in modern history are almost non-existent, and "testimonies of actors of the time—including Holocaust survivors—make only transient, and rarely favourable, allusions to intercommunal relations."[64] Rappas concludes that this inability or unwillingness to "remember together" challenges "nostalgic invocations of a pre-national, 'cosmopolitan' Mediterranean."[65]

All extant Ottoman sources, including those produced on the island, were generated by the Rhodes case heard at the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances. They convey their own version of the Rhodes blood libel, revealing the Ottomans' determination to proclaim Rhodian Jews innocent by acquitting them in accordance with the newly enacted penal code.

No doubt, the Ottomans acted out of self-interest, but as was mentioned before, this was a rare (if not unique) instance when the interests of Ottoman Jews and their government fully coincided. Although it is generally believed that there was no "Jewish question" in the Ottoman Empire, in 1840, it did exist, albeit briefly. This offered the Porte the perfect oppor-

tunity to demonstrate to Europeans its commitment to the promise of the Hatt-ı Şerif to protect the life and honor of all Ottoman subjects. As for the Jews, although even in the wake of the acquittal of the Rhodian community, relations on the island remained fraught, some of them found a source of optimism in the favorable outcome of the case, which they associated with the ongoing reforms and the support of their European coreligionists.

Despite being an important event in the history of Ottoman Jews and a notable one in the history of Tanzimat implementation, the Rhodes Affair was entirely forgotten by the Ottomans and largely overlooked by the Jews. An episode in their shared history, it was misunderstood, if at all remembered, by both sides. My chief goal in writing a book about the Rhodes Affair is to restore its proper place in Sephardi and Ottoman history. At the same time, this is a contribution to the history of Rhodes, which offers a window onto the life and, more specifically, intercommunal relations in the eastern Mediterranean in the late Ottoman era.

## Notes

1. "Licht und Schattenbilder aus der jüdischen Geschichte der Gegenwart: Die Juden in Rhodus," 246.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all dates in this book refer to 1840.
3. On the history of the blood libel in Europe and the differences between Ashkenazi and Sephardi experiences, see Teter, *Blood Libel*.
4. Galante, *Histoire des juifs*; Angel, *Jews of Rhodes*. Most Ottoman Jews were Sephardim, descendants of the Jews expelled from the Iberian Peninsula in the fifteenth–sixteenth centuries.
5. Frankel, *Damascus Affair*.
6. Frankel, *Damascus Affair*, 156.
7. See Veidlinger, "Was the Doctors' Plot a Blood Libel?" For other examples, see Bemporad, *Legacy of Blood*.
8. Smith, *Butcher's Tale*, 2.
9. See, for example, Çay-Özkan, "Osmanlı belgeleri ışığında antisemitist bir söylem olarak kan isnadı üzerine bir değerlendirme"; Baer, *Sultanic Saviors and Tolerant Turks*, 103, 169.
10. The use of these and other terms for this group is discussed in Schmitt, *Les Levantins*, 55–64. Malte Fuhrmann finds Schmitt's term "ethno-confessional" unsatisfactory but does not propose an alternative definition. See Fuhrmann, *Port Cities of the Eastern Mediterranean*, 287–90.
11. See Van Den Boogert, *Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System*.
12. Eldem, "French Trade and Commercial Policy in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century," 37–38.
13. On both events, see Clogg, *I Kath'imas Anatoli*.
14. Ben-Yehoyada, "Mediterranean Modernity?," 116.
15. See an insightful discussion of this term in Hanley, "Grieving Cosmopolitanism in Middle East Studies."
16. Appendix III, *Koplas del Gregito*, stanza 5.

17. In the 1970s, however, even if Frankel had been interested in them, Ottoman archives would not have been accessible to him.
18. Özbek, "Tax Farming in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," 225.
19. Topal, "From Decline to Progress," 125.
20. Şimşek, "The Grand Strategy of the Ottoman Empire, 1826–1841," 233.
21. Ibid., 234–35.
22. Ibid., 235.
23. See Yıldırım, "Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane (Tanzimat Fermanı)," 338.
24. Ibid., 336.
25. Ibid., 337.
26. Şimşek, "The Grand Strategy," 236.
27. See Rodrigue, "From Millet to Minority," 242–44.
28. Yıldırım, "Hatt-ı Sherif of Gülhane," 338.
29. Ozavci, *Dangerous Gifts*, 206.
30. Makdisi, *Age of Coexistence*, 53.
31. BOA, Irade mesaili muhim (I.MM), 1005/2. The translation of this firman made by Montefiores' secretary, Louis Lowe, is too far from the original. Apparently, he not only compressed the text but did not fully understand it. Wishful thinking might have also played a certain role. "In the conformity to the Hatt-i-Şerif which has been proclaimed at Gulhani [*sic*], the Jewish nation shall possess the same advantages and enjoy the same privileges as are granted to the numerous other nations who submit to our authority. The Jewish nation shall be protected and defended." Loewe, *Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore*, 1:278–79.
32. Stillman, "Decree of Reform (*Hatt-ı Humayun*)," 358.
33. Quoted in Kırlı, "Surveillance and Constituting the Public in the Ottoman Empire," 292.
34. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 16 May 1846 (20 Cemaziyelevvel 1262), 1. This address was in fact read by Reşid Pasha.
35. Paz, *Who Killed Panayot?*, 38.
36. Ross, *Inselreisen*, quoted in Strohmeier, "Economy and Society in the Aegean Province of the Ottoman Empire 1840–1912," 173.
37. "Smyrna: Das jüdische Quartier."
38. Kırlı, *Yolsu`zluğun İcadı*.
39. Paz, *Who Killed Panayot?*
40. Ibid., 15.
41. Ibid., 234.
42. Avi Rubin rhetorically asks whether the existence of multiple narratives can get us closer to definitive conclusions, implying that the answer must be negative. Rubin, *Ottoman Rule of Law and the Modern Political Trial*, 6. But if this is true for a specific case, one cannot say the same about all cases, let alone conclude that an abundance of archival materials "stifles analysis" Rubin, *Ottoman Rule of Law*, 16.
43. Paz, *Who Killed Panayot?*, 232–33.
44. Smith, *Butcher's Tale*, 2.
45. Kulu, "Brief History of the Dardanelles Jews," 103.
46. Ibid., 3.
47. For this myth and its critique, see Baer, *Sultanic Saviors*, 1–40.
48. See Rozen, *Last Ottoman Century and Beyond*, 56–59.
49. Published in Franco, *Essai sur l'histoire des Israélites de l'Empire Ottoman*, 135–36.
50. Cole, *Lethal Provocation*.

51. The story of the Sarajevo Purim, which commemorates the averted disaster of 1819, is similar in that it was also related in several songs and prose accounts. But all those texts were meant to be performed (not that this guaranteed their preservation). In chapter 5, I will discuss similarities between the local Purims of Sarajevo and Rhodes.
52. Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 65.
53. Broydé, "Amasia," *The Jewish Encyclopedia*.
54. Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, 223. However, it is unclear how often, if at all, this regulation was applied.
55. Çay-Özkan, "Osmanlı belgeleri ışığında antisemitist bir söylem olarak kan isnadı üzerine bir değerlendirme," 53. It does not appear that this case was tried in Istanbul.
56. Baudin, *Siège de Rhodes*; Galante, *Histoire des Juifs de Turquie*, 7:147–48.
57. García Moreno, *Relatos del pueblo ladinán (Me'am Lo'ez de Éxodo I)*, 47–48.
58. Quoted in Lehmann, *Ladino Rabbinic Literature*, 65.
59. See Ibid., 68.
60. Alcalay, *Šelom Yerušaláyim*, 66.
61. He saw a connection between commerce and blood, "because money is called 'blood'" (a pun based on the double meaning of the word *damim*). Ibid., 72.
62. Romero, *Entre dos (o más) fuegos*, 164–69.
63. Örenç, *Yakındönem Tarihimizde Rodos ve kOniki Ada*.
64. Rappas, "Memorial soliloquies in post-colonial Rhodes," 90. One of the few exceptions is Michael Frank's conversations with Stella Levi, a Holocaust survivor from Rhodes (*One Hundred Saturdays*).
65. Rappas, "Memorial Soliloquies," 89.