INTRODUCTION

In September 1908, members of the local council came together for an extraordinary meeting in Mehadia, a market town in the south-eastern corner of then-Hungary's Banat region. They arrived in a distressed mood – the sole item on their agenda alarmed as much as it baffled them. In a letter from the Budapest Ministry of the Interior, which the town secretary read out in an improvised Romanian translation, they were asked whether they consented to have their town renamed to the more Hungarian-sounding *Miháldvára*, a name that nobody present had even heard of before. Ominously, attached to the letter was an expert judgement by a competent national body they had similarly never heard of, which praised *Miháldvára* as being closer to *Miháld*, the original medieval name. For thirty-five years, since the Habsburg Military Frontier was dissolved and they came under Hungarian rule, their secretaries had been increasingly pressured to do the paperwork in Hungarian, but no authority had found a problem with their name as it also appeared in Hungarian documents. All this would have sounded like a childish prank to them, had it not been deadly serious.

The Orthodox archpriest, the spiritual father of a large majority of locals, came prepared with an elaborate and carefully worded plea in defence of the existing name, compiled from all relevant Romanian and Hungarian books he found in his rectory. *Miháld*, he contended, while certainly the historical Hungarian name, was far from being the original. According to him, the place had been founded by the Roman army in the first century AD, and had, since then, only borne the name *Miháld* for two and a half centuries, whereas the current name harked back to the Roman one. He further reminded the Budapest board of the eighteenth-century battles against the Ottomans that had brought the town perpetual fame, and concluded that 'we have no right to change this name since it does not belong to us, but to the past and the future'.

Some on the council advised caution, suggesting that their voice could not alter a decision already taken and that defiance could easily get them in trouble with the district administrator. Another party pushed for taking a firm stand against the name change. Should they agree to this nonsense with many *a*s, they warned, it would expose them to the ridicule of the entire valley. The latter

opinion finally carried the day, and the quorum unanimously voted to minute the priest's detailed rebuttal and send a Hungarian transcript to Budapest. This turned out to be an unusually bold move. Similar decisions were sent out by the hundreds to majority Romanian local governments in those months, and while most of them objected to the idea of a name change, few dared to lecture the experts on the Communal Registry Board, mandated by an 1898 law to revise Hungary's settlement names, on history.[1]

At this point in the story, pragmatic considerations unexpectedly came to the help of locals. The county leadership weighed in in favour of keeping the name unchanged, with an acute accent on the first *a* as a nod to Hungarian pronunciation. They pointed out that it was still widely used for neighbouring Herkulesbad/Herkulesfürdő/Băile Herculane, contemporary Hungary's only spa resort of international standing, and they expressed fear that a name change would jeopardize the brand. This chimed in with the opinion of the National Archives and with that of one board member in the first round, and the board finally overturned its previous decision. This turn of events, however, owed nothing to the confident response of the Mehadia council, and by no means did the board acknowledge the historical statements laid out in it. Most protests were swept off the table without further ado, and the county soon saw a record number of name changes, with 255 out of its 363 settlement names being revised or replaced.

The council meeting may not have happened in the exact way I have described; it seems likely, however, that the councilmen were unaware of the flurry of learned polemics surrounding the name of their hometown. At the heart of the dispute there was either a strange coincidence or a remote folk etymology – on one hand, the point marked *Admediā* on the so-called Peutinger Map, the most complete road map of the late Roman Empire, matched the position of modern Mehadia to a tee; and on the other, the settlement and its fortress appeared under the meaningful Hungarian name *Mihald* (Hun. *Mihály* 'Michael' + *-d* suffix) in documents between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries, then part of the Kingdom of Hungary.[2]

Behind these two possible etymologies, there lay two diametrically opposed visions of history. If the modern place name (first occurrence in 1614) went back to the Latin *Admediā*, that was understood to support the idea of unbroken Romance-speaking settlement and to justify the claim that the three million Romanians of Hungary made up an indigenous entity. Romanian nationalists in Hungary quoted this etymology as the single most certain toponymic proof of Romance continuity within the Carpathians, and the response of the Mehadia council also took it as a basis. Whereas if *Miháld* was the original form, possibly dating from the first centuries after the Hungarian conquest, then that made the modern Romanian population 'latecomers' in comparison to the state nation.

Both etymologies were established around the same time, after the 1848–49 revolution had showed the mobilizing power that antagonistic national movements could muster, which claimed the same territories for their homelands. In 1826–27, the local Romanian archpriest Nicolae Stoica still saw the legacy of a South Slavic *međa* 'border' behind the place name.[3] Soon after its inception, comparative linguistics cast a shadow of doubt over the Latin etymology, because a regular sound change would have produced Romanian *miază* out of Latin *Media* (as it did in the words *miazăzi* 'noon' and *miazănoapte* 'midnight'). It was rejected on this ground by the leading Romanian philologist Bogdan Petriceicu-Hașdeu,[4] while the German pioneer of Romanian dialectology Gustav Weigand allegedly scoffed at it as 'so crass a dilettantism that I don't waste words on it'.[5] It was upheld by the Romanian historian Xenopol, however, in an influential French-language defence of Romanian continuity.[6] He thought to solve the problem by a supposed development *Ad Mediam* > *Meaddiam*, which his fellow-Moldavian Ioan Nădejde dismissed as a 'salto mortale'.[7] For good measure, the Romanian Orthodox seminary professor Iosif Bălan insisted on deriving the name from Slavic, but from *meha* 'fly' instead of *međa*,[8] while Dimitrie Dan, a Romanian Orthodox priest from the Bukovina, contended for a Hungarian etymology from *Méhed (Hun. *méh* 'bee'), linking the name to the neighbouring Mehedinți County of then-Romania, and presenting various historical testimonies that described the area as a bee-keeping paradise.[9]

This book is not about the correct etymologies, and etymological scholarship will in general play an accidental role in it. Instead, it raises questions such as how nineteenth-century nationalists turned personal and place names into powerful sites of memory; how and to what effect they popularized the resulting new meanings and uses among the populace at large; and how a nationalizing state elite sought to reshape the names in its reach to reflect its ideals. It combines three ambitions. To begin with, it navigates the rich but difficult subject of Hungary's nationality policies and national conflicts between the Compromise of 1867 and the First World War – a period referred to as Dualism after the broad Hungarian autonomy within the empire. In this respect, it is a sequel to my book *The Politics of Early Language Teaching*, which explored how the Hungarian state language was taught to native Romanian and German children.[10] Sharing the earlier study's temporal and spatial framework, it also uses many of the same sources.

After various attempts at direct governance of the Hungarian lands, which took up most of the eighteen years since the quelling of the 1848–49 revolution, foreign policy setbacks led Francis Joseph to negotiate a deal with Ferenc Deák and Gyula Andrássy, which granted Hungary far-reaching autonomy. The new constitutional framework was looser than a federal link and tighter than a personal union, but as its exact terms were not fixed and half of the Magyar political elite rejected it, the relationship of Austria and Hungary remained the main divisive factor in Hungarian politics for the next fifty years.[11] Magyar

Forty-eightists, who wished to loosen the ties with Austria, competed with Sixty-sevenists, who governed for most of the period. New political forces could only come to power after dropping those planks of their platform that contested the grounds of the system – this happened most notably for the miscellaneous coalition of opposition forces that won the 1905 elections but was not allowed to form a government until its leaders had struck a bargain with Francis Joseph the following year. Sixty-sevenist Liberals nevertheless joined in a chorus with the forty-eightist Independentists and other opponents of their rule, waxing lyrical about the political genius of Magyars during the Millennial Celebrations of 1896. Ethnic minority politicians, on the other hand, opposed not just the status quo, but all forms of a Hungarian nation-state. Romanian nationalist politicians from Transylvania boycotted elections until the 1900s to protest annexation to Hungary, while their peers in Hungary writ small mostly advocated federalist designs.

The territory studied encompasses historical Transylvania together with its neighbouring counties to the West, excluding Máramaros, but including Temes according to the administrative division instituted in 1876. These lands had belonged to the independent Kingdom of Hungary until the sixteenth century but had been governed separately for 350 years, to be reunited only as a consequence of the 1867 Compromise. Transylvania, the eastern part of the area, was briefly merged with Hungary in 1848 and then, more enduringly, in 1867. The Transylvanian regiments of the Habsburg Military Frontier were dissolved in 1851, but those along the southern strip of the Banat only in 1873, which were then similarly integrated into Dualist Hungary. As will be shown more in detail below, slightly more than half of the area's population was made up of native Romanians, while the rest were Magyars and various German-speakers – mainly Protestant Transylvanian Saxons in the East, and Catholic Swabians in the West. The borders running along the Carpathians separated the majority Romanian dwellers, who will receive the most attention in this book, from their kin state, which took the name Kingdom of Romania almost in lockstep with the creation of the Dual Monarchy. Today, the area studied occupies the Western half of Romania, apart from its westernmost fringe, which belongs to Hungary and Serbia.

If the area so circumscribed was not seen as one region by anyone at the time, it nonetheless approximates the expansion of Romanian language in contemporary Hungary, and through it the contested space over which Romanian, Magyar/Hungarian and, in some respects, German nationalisms clashed, while its internal diversity can be turned into an advantage through making internal comparisons. Such demarcation has been primarily imposed by my linguistic deficiencies and prior knowledge, but I could also hardly stretch the data mining and crunching that I perform here to an even larger or more complex piece of land. The exact range – as operationalized for quantitative purposes – was defined

by county boundaries, since most statistical data are available on the county level, but I will also draw in relevant Romanian examples from outside of the area.

Questions reflecting more recent understanding – such as in what ways and avatars Hungarian state nationalism and the national movements challenging it reached out to their claimed constituencies; how the millions of Hungarian subjects reacted to and interpreted these rival national programmes and the related historical-political imageries; how they became split along them or manoeuvred between them – remain very much an uncharted land for today's otherwise lively historiography of the Late Habsburg Empire. This research gap is particularly glaring because some of the most innovative work on nineteenth-century nationalism has come from researchers working on the contemporary Austrian lands.

But the situation is worse than that, as most Hungarian state policies that were meant as nationalizing at the time fare not much better in historiography and have not been studied anywhere near adequately or sufficiently. In the absence of an accurate overview of the relevant legislation and of policy designs written in a widely accessible language, to say nothing about archival-based studies of implementation in any language, international scholars rightly feel unnerved by the contradictory frustrated claims and interpretations that militant national historiographies in the successor states continue to mount, often perpetuating panels of contemporary political propaganda and confusing discourses for policy designs, legislation for enforcement and for outcomes. When hard pressed to include Hungary in bigger narratives, historians are not to blame if they just reiterate a few formulaic points, cautiously trying to cut back to size claims on both sides that exude hyperbole or apologetics.

An earlier mood among historians tended to see a particularly ruthless version of national oppression in Dualist Hungary's Magyarizing policies, which the Polish-Silesian historian József Chlebowczyk described pointedly as the 'Prusso-Magyar model of nationality policy'.[12] This characterization has lost much of its purchase in recent decades, if for no other reason than that the very idea of national oppression fell into disrepute; if there were no conscious nationals in the first place, who then should be regarded as victims of the alleged national oppression or attempted alienation? Instead, the few scholars from outside the region who research these policies today usually interpret them as typical for nineteenth-century nation building.[13]

I cannot fully share this flattening perspective. Dualist Hungary certainly was singular in at least one key respect, namely the sheer number of its citizens claimed by other self-styled nation-states or strong national movements who also did not qualify as natural constituents of the Hungarian political nation by the same shibboleths of ethnic nationalism acclaimed by Magyar elites. That the first point lent support to the argument touting Magyarizing policies as preventive measures did not make the Kingdom of Hungary special in the European context, but the second one caused it evermore serious legitimacy troubles in so far as

it insisted on figuring itself as a nation-state. If anything, the Hungarian example instructs us not so much about how nation building worked on the European peripheries, but about the limits to state nationalist ventures.

True, Hungarian cultural nationalism held a powerful appeal to the domestic non-Magyar middle classes before as much as after 1867 – witness tens of thousands of German-speaking urban families consciously transforming themselves into Magyars. In addition, Dualist Hungary possessed all the trappings of state power necessary to carry out independent nation-building policies, putting it at odds with a decentralized, federal Austria. It had its separate legal system, including a separate Hungarian citizenship law, its own parliament, judiciary and executive branch. Hungarian governments levied taxes, they had full latitude over educational matters, they oversaw the workings of county and local governments, they could withhold registration from minority associations and easily found ways to allocate funds to Magyar nationalist ones such as the Transylvanian EMKE, they could ban rallies, they could seize journals and prevent their circulation, they owned most of the railway network and they kept the civil registry after 1894. The military was the only relevant instrument of power beyond their control, although a small separate Hungarian army did exist. Apart from the lack of patriotic and linguistic training that young men underwent in other fledgling nation-states, this was all the more a thorn in the side of Magyar politicians, as the plural linguistic policies of the Common Army made those recruits enlisted from minority areas of Hungary more aware of the worth of their home languages.

If nationalizing policies that worked in other European states did not and maybe could not work in Hungary, that was, as becomes clear from the above, not so much because of any deficit of sovereignty. Hungarian state agencies and their non-state allies already faced a thorny problem, not necessarily encountered in other European lands, when trying to address rural people especially; not only did half the Hungarian population speak languages completely unrelated to Hungarian, but just a tiny fragment of them also understood the state language. Moreover, social control over rural minority groups was traditionally exercised by ethnic churches and formerly privileged institutions, which also reigned over the circuits of social communication. In the narrower area, cities were disproportionately Hungarian-speaking, and for that reason Magyar pundits projected them as hubs of Magyarization; but industrial development remained timid, and most arrivals from the countryside were themselves Hungarian-speakers. At least in the short and middle run, attempts by the Hungarian state to appear as anything other than a culturally alien force to its non-Magyar rural citizens and to achieve more than just symbolic Magyarization hinged upon co-opting the inherited ethnic elites, which was largely successful with Latin-rite Catholics – but, to the extent that it was actually pushed for, it proved an utter failure as regards Romanians and Transylvanian Saxons.

Beyond the language barrier and the inherited ethnic structures, there was another important factor limiting Dualist Hungary's infrastructural power, and one more commonly shared by contemporary European states – namely, insufficient resources. To take the subject of my earlier book as an example, in spite of its full jurisdiction over primary education, the Hungarian state dispensed with a comprehensive network of Hungarian schools in minority–majority areas. Ministers of education would announce with great fanfare their plans to expand the existing network, praising Hungarian schools as vital patriotic instruments, but they knew full well that footing the bill for thousands of state schools was way beyond their budgets, not to mention staffing them with a competent workforce. Most Romanian and the overwhelming majority of Transylvanian Saxon children continued to attend mother-tongue confessional schools funded by locals, and when the Coalition Government of 1906–10 tried to curtail their autonomy in order to harness them to teach Hungarian, it led to a deadlock in Romanian schools, partly because many of the teachers did not know the language well enough to teach it.[14]

Other contemporary nationalizing state elites with more homogeneous citizenries might rely on a sympathetic civil society to put their ideas into practice, but in the area, civil society became pillarized along ethnonational lines. Over the course of the Dualist Period, Magyar associational life was intertwined with the Dualist Hungarian state through the high share of civil servants in leadership positions, and it had little real leverage on the non-Magyar masses. However, Magyar associations not only aided the state in implementing the symbolic cultural policies that form one of the subjects of this book, but they were often also the ones who devised and lobbied for these policies in the first place, seldom making any bones about their intended effects.

Dualist Hungary's naming policies have never been studied as such, and given the high profile that they enjoyed in nationalist polemics at the time, and in particular in charges against the contemporary Magyarizing regime, it may seem curious that what empirical research exists is in Hungarian. In contrast, in those historiographical traditions that have drawn much of their legitimacy as national assets from describing their audiences as historical victims of Hungarian oppression, their memory lives on latently, but vigorously, in the form of hyperbolic stories. But both the caution of Hungarian and the silence of Romanian scholarships reflect a similar unease about cultural entanglements that threaten to contradict assumptions about national essentialism.

Through the uncustomary choice of my research subject, and this is my second ambition with this book, I also make a case for revisiting the significance of proper names for history writing. Names as carriers of ideological messages have received little attention from historians, and in general, the space between analytic philosophy's theoretical interest in proper names and the all-too-often purely descriptive and taxonomic pursuits of onomastics is a barely explored

field. In particular, my book makes a wager that a sociocultural history of nation formation that is comprehensive in its breadth can be written from this seemingly narrow and barren perspective.

Under the heading of national symbols are usually classified flags, anthems, select and emblematic dishes, dances, garments, musical pieces and landscapes. Proper names do not belong in this company, but they have also been heavily exploited for symbolic purposes and made to represent national identity and history. Remarkably, from all components of national standard languages, names are in general the most amenable to such uses. This, I think, has to do with their marginal place on the periphery of vocabulary, and, indeed, the uncertainty of whether they are part of language at all. This dubious position is reflected in the scholarly tradition, also embraced here, that treats the inventory of proper names that can be attributed to one language as a subsystem separate from common nouns (appellatives), and calls it the onomasticon.[15]

Thus, I tentatively propose that it is because of their semantic weakness, their lack of a proper lexical meaning, that proper names have been more able to convey nationalist messages than core elements of the vocabulary. There is a general agreement about the deviant semantic behaviour of proper names, which has made them a pet subject of analytic philosophers. According to mainstream accounts, a proper name does not have a sense (*Sinn*, intension), only a referential status (denotation), which fixes its referent (*Bedeutung*, extension, denotatum). In other words, there are no rules that would determine the exact things or concepts a name can stand for, but as a 'mere tag', it is simply assigned to a referent. For instance, a person's first or family name cannot be guessed from the way they look or behave.[16] It is tempting to think that this semantic void makes proper names more suitable for symbolic uses, as it translates into higher connotative potential. To utilize this potential, it was necessary either to impose new normative clues for their interpretation, to invest names with new connotations or to create new names that derived their interpretive values from the spaces they occupied.

Different categories of names were not put to symbolic uses in the same way. Animal names did not even take on such connotations, and for all the interest they offer for the study of language contact and cultural transfer, I will not include them in the present book.[17] With most categories of names, the operation could follow two distinct strategies. One of them tied a name to a person or family who had originally worn it or at any rate to some remote era, typically the nation's imaginary golden age, when it had been in use for the first time. This strategy, inherent in the trend of national given names and commemorative street naming, related modern referents to dead prototypes, and by so doing turned these names into sites of memory. This could in the course of their everyday use also naturalize the national canons and historical narratives comprising them.

The second strategy built on the indexicality of etymons proposed for place or family names, and then it pinned the ethnic character deduced from the names onto the referents. In this way, it tried to assign each place and person to one national community and one authoritative vision of national history – preferably to one's own, but sometimes to another. Often, there was thought to be no need for any philological inquiry to lay claim on a name because a visible etymology was at hand as a supposedly obvious link. Notably, many names sport a residual, so-called 'appellative' meaning in spite of their lack of a full-fledged lexical one.[18] The name of Frankfurt, which reveals its etymology for all German-speakers to see – 'the Franks' ford' – can validate the city's German character according to this strategy, whatever that means. Historically, place and family names never arose out of arbitrary strings of sounds, but always started out based on a meaning, typically motivated by some characteristics of their referents.

Both of these underlying strategies turned proper names into projection screens for visions of national history. Historical imagination drew on myths, stories – the term implies no judgement about their factual bases – credited with revelatory power and invested with great emotional involvement for the ingroup.[19] These myths structured national members' knowledge about the nation's history, they filtered and framed new information, guided social action and thus ultimately fed back into immediate reality. Two historical myths informed much of the imaginary that I will discuss here. On the one side, 'Latinity' and bimillennial self-identity as first occupants, along with the profound normative implications flowing from them, constituted Romanian nationalism's charter myth throughout the era. They were informed by the belief in Romance linguistic continuity in the former land of Dacia, ultimately of humanist origin and only coming under serious scrutiny in the period I am investigating. A Hungarian counter-myth, which I am going to call the myth of submerged Magyardom, boils down to the assertion that a significant proportion of the contemporary ethnic Romanians in Hungary, and in some areas their majority, descended from people that had once spoken Hungarian and belonged to Western churches. It is impossible to refute or corroborate this claim in practice, but it was always advanced together with clues that allegedly betrayed such roots, and these clues, some of which will be mentioned in later chapters, can be proven wrong. But once again, it is not the veracity of the myth that matters for my purposes here. The *prima facie* more plausible argument about the Serbian origins of Bosnian Muslims had similar functions, it became entangled in the same dynamic of the self and the other, and ultimately, it may have earned similarly few plaudits from ordinary Muslims when it was propounded in an arrogant nationalist dressing.[20]

According to the Lacanian political theorist Yannis Stavrakakis, the ultimate driving force behind nationalist historical imagination has been the desire to recapture the enjoyment stolen from the collective self, the core emotional content

of nationalism.[21] The myth of submerged Magyardom will command special attention on this score since it pointed to a twofold definition of Romanians and other national minorities as the enjoyment lost to the Magyar/Hungarian nation on the one side, and as its enemies who had stolen said enjoyment on the other – or in more concrete terms, as the ones who have dissimilated 'ours' and the 'ours' who have become woefully dissimilated. This ambiguity helps to explain the double-edged discourse constituting national minorities at once as brethren and as invaders, as people invited to assimilate and as undesirable, as well as the nationality policies that were projected as integrative or assimilatory but were at the same time also exclusivist and repressive.[22]

Proper names will appear not only as projection screens for historical visions in the course of this work but also as sites for negotiating, affirming and representing history-based identities. In this sense, my book explores proper names of various sorts in a similar way as a trend in historical anthropology, which would by now fill an entire library, has done to memorials, celebrations and national holidays in recent decades. This trend has not only sought to unravel the often transitory and elastic meanings ascribed to contentious or consensus-creating monuments and festivals, but it has also dug up new sources related to them that can help to assess the level of popular mobilization and enthusiasm for this or that cause, with the national being chief. This attention turned to public memory has also enabled a slew of research in the field of late Habsburg historiography, although mostly about the Austrian (Cisleithanian) half of the monarchy.[23] My approach to proper names intersects with this paradigm most closely in the study of commemorative street names, which can effectively be seen as verbal public monuments. For reasons of length, however, my study of street naming in the area has not been included in this book.

The conflict between state nationalism and its antagonistic national agendas permeated most aspects of naming and renaming in Dualist Hungary. National elites competed to establish their titles of ownership over the spheres they claimed for their nations by renaming these in their normative self-image. They waged a symbolic struggle to enforce the equation 'one nation–one onomasticon' and ultimately to achieve what Bourdieu called a 'monopoly of legitimate naming' – in this case quite literally.[24] Many nineteenth-century nationalists went to great lengths to purge what they understood as their national heritage of names from the numerous traces of historical entanglements with external linguistic resources, and they made prominent use of onomastic arguments to sustain their constitutive belief in a once ethnically pure homeland.

The chapters of the book alternate between three categories of names; given names, family names and place names. In ways that go beyond the two main strategies described above, these categories of names probably differ more between them than they share common ground, notably as to how their resources could be exploited for nationalist goals. Therefore, I will briefly discuss the peculiarities

of each where they turn up for the first time, and will later come back to reflect on the possibilities, typical contexts and limitations of their ideological uses. Bringing in parallels from nineteenth-century Europe and the world, my book will also draw attention to potential sources for future research, and will propose research designs for their study.

Available onomastic studies have eased my burden of collecting primary data for some chapters, but they can give little theoretical guidance to the sociocultural historian. Onomastics has, by and large, continued its course as the discipline that establishes etymologies and organizes its data into neat taxonomies – the same pursuits that lent it prestige in its heyday, which lasted until the First World War, when it was highly appreciated for its special contribution to the research of early history.[25] It has preserved a somewhat higher professional standing in Germany, where it has also branched out into the study of naming fashions under the label *Namensoziologie*. Recently, promising new departures have been made towards a theoretically more informed, more critical and more interdisciplinary onomastics. This belated critical turn has been chiefly productive in the field of place names, in particular in street naming, place renaming, colonialism and decolonization as reflected in toponymy and the commodification of place names. So far, however, this line of interest has been rarely coupled with genuinely historical research questions, and certainly no sociocultural histories of proper names have been undertaken on this scale.

On the other hand, I greatly benefited from my background in philology and comparative linguistics. I will not spare the reader Romanian, Hungarian and German examples, and more still are in the endnotes. Those familiar with these languages or acquainted with this kind of linguistic reconstructions may find them helpful and instructive, while others should feel free to skip them. Occasionally, I deconstruct etymologies and historical speculations based on them. This should not be taken as a gratuitous intellectual tour de force on my behalf, but as an avenue to the truth – a truth that does not reside in facts behind the myths, but in those who believed in them.

Table 0.1 shows the linguistic make-up of the area's population in terms of first- and second-language speakers. The inhabitants were overwhelmingly peasants. Romanian was the most widely spoken language over the major, central part of the area, while the Szeklerland in the East, along with a few contiguous groups of villages, as well as the north-western half of Bihar and the western half of Szatmár Counties in the West, stood apart as predominantly Hungarian-speaking. Cities again constituted separate linguistic contexts, with either Hungarian or German playing central roles in them; and the bigger a place was, the more likely it had a Hungarian or German linguistic majority. To orient the reader among the diverse linguistic micro-worlds of the land, a place-name index in the appendix indicates the relevant data of the 1880 census, and sometimes also of the 1910 census, next to each place.

Far from simply being bloodless categories created by nationalist discourses, censuses and ethnic maps, the mother-tongue groups shown in Table 0.1 were more or less also coextensive to ethnic categories of practice, operational both in elite and popular contexts. Rather than on categories, however, I prefer to focus on ethnic boundaries and distinctions, following a long and influential tradition in cultural anthropology that goes back to Fredrik Barth's 1969 essay.[26] This approach takes social constructionism for granted – ethnic boundaries exist because people accept them as valid. They are reproduced by strategies of boundary maintenance; some of them 'hard', like residential segregation and the communal control of marital choices, while others of the 'softer' type, most notably stereotyping – the discursive positioning and self-positioning of communities – and the symbolic marking of some segments of culture.

My statement that the divisions between Romanians, Magyars and Transylvanian Saxons predated the advent of nationalism has become controversial by now and begs for an explanation. It apparently puts me at variance with much of the new literature on the late Habsburg Empire, which has rather presupposed a narrow modernist view. More recently, this latter position has been also argued for in clear-cut terms by Rok Stergar and Tamara Scheer, who assure us that 'recent research has persuasively demonstrated that the nations in Central and South Eastern Europe were not a continuation of earlier ethnic communities'.[27] Such an inflexible modernist stance makes sense as long as a researcher deals with Latin-rite Catholics from the early modern times who happened to speak German, South or Western Slavic dialects (or Hungarian ones for that matter), with men typically speaking both idioms wherever German- and Slavic-speaking areas met. It would indeed be idle to attribute too great a significance to language in structuring local society under such circumstances. But it would be no less problematic to ignore the boundaries, say, between neighbours who owed allegiance to Islam, Byzantine Orthodoxy and Latin-rite Catholicism at a time when these differences were institutionally grounded and legally sanctioned, irrespective of conversions and the local forms of religious syncretism that were rampant in some areas. These were boundaries that nationalist movements often viewed as highly significant, and they magnified and built upon them.

There are no one-size-fits-all models and scenarios for modern nation formation because the social fabric onto which nineteenth-century nationalist awakeners projected their ready-made ideas about nations was also greatly varied. With his last comments on nationalism, no less prominent a modernist in nationalism studies than Ernest Gellner conceded that 'some nations have navels, while others don't'.[28] Let us add that these navels also differed between them. All this had little importance for Gellner, who insisted on what was common to all national projects, but earlier divisions become essential once we are engaged in closer scrutiny of the nationalization process.

Table 0.1 Basic linguistic attraction-dependency model of the territory according to the 1880 census (people able to speak only).

Language	Native speakers	In proportion to the entire population	Monolinguals among natives	Speakers among the non-native population
Romanian	2,837,833	53.0%	92.7%	~18–22%*
Hungarian	1,167,564	28.6%	77.9%	5.6%
German	429,788	10.5%	40.1%	5.8%

Source: The data, and all other census data from 1880, are taken from *A Magyar Korona Országaiban az 1881. év elején végrehajtott népszámlálás eredményei* [Results of the census conducted in the Lands of the Hungarian Crown, at the beginning of 1881], 2 vols (Budapest: Országos Magyar Kir. Statisztikai Hivatal, 1882).
* Due to the incomplete processing of the 1880 data, these had to be controlled on the basis of the more relevant 1910 ones; *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, new series, 61 (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1916), 296–392.

Both in envisioning and in bringing to life national communities, national activists in the area relied on pre-existing fault lines separating rural Romanians, Magyars and Transylvanian Saxons, grounded in the confluence between confession and language, and often underpinned by status differences. Confessional identity was people's only institutionalized, legally enforceable and at the same time subjectively valid identity that transcended the local. Therefore, the fact that the area's various religious communities used the vernacular – or a variety more or less close to the vernacular – in their liturgy, with the notable exceptions of Roman (and Armenian) Catholics and Jews, had a decisive influence on ethnic divisions. That the main languages were discretely contrasting (*Abstand*) languages in relation to one another, that most people were monolingual and that second-language skills were distributed asymmetrically in contact settings (see Table 0.1 above) further increased the role that language played in constituting ethnicity.

Although the high proportion of linguistically diverse villages in the area was uncommon even for East Central Europe, the various ethnolinguistic groups did not share the same space even there, but as a rule lived in ethnically segregated neighbourhoods. The rates of interfaith weddings were very low among peasants, with interethnic unions and individual conversions between Eastern and Western Christian denominations being exceedingly rare.[29]

Max Weber founded his definition of ethnicity on belief in common descent, in distant ancestors who are imagined to have already lived together as one group.[30] This, in turn, is reflected in belief in a shared, distinct culture, inherited from common ancestors. I find this Weberian formula helpful because it opens up the definition to include status differences and the enduring impact of past migrations. Status readily flows into ethnicity, and in the area, it often reinforced the concurrence of religion and language, but it could also act powerfully on

its own. For the first plot, take the case of Transylvanian Saxons – not only did their home language, their German Bible, confession and church set them apart from the Romanians, Roma and Magyars living close to them, but also, for the great majority, a separate legal standing and the relative wealth deriving from it. Saxons living in the privileged Saxon Land had not known serfdom and collectively formed one of the three estates (*natio*) in Transylvania. This was one reason, by the way, why the Saxon elite, although speaking High German to their children and giving them Germanic names, did not formulate German national-ist political messages until the 1890s, but rather concentrated on holding fast to the shreds of their former autonomy.[31]

On the second score, noble status raised ethnic boundaries that outlived the abolition of serfdom by at least a century and a half, and a good case could be made for regarding the political community of nobles – called *natio Hungarica* in both Transylvanian and Hungarian law – as an ethnic group in its own right. By nobility, one should not think of large landowning aristocrats, but rather of politically enfranchised free smallholders. The proportion of the ennobled in the population had been strikingly high in comparison with the rest of early modern Europe. Gradually co-opting Hungarian-speaking former serfs, the *natio Hungarica* ended up bequeathing important identity symbols to the modern Hungarian nation, similarly to the Polish case. Some fell between the new stools of national categories along this process, like the petty nobles of the Haţeg/ Hátszeg/Hötzing Basin, who may have known no Hungarian and may have even belonged to the Eastern rite, but could still very well claim to be Hungarian/ Magyar on account of their noble titles – or at least to prefer this designation over *rumân*, tainted by the connotation of 'serf'. At the same time, the status division between nobles and commoners often also crossed through Hungarian-speakers belonging to the same confession.

By viewing through the local lens, one can also pinpoint ethnic boundaries that were rooted exclusively in the enduring memory of arrival to a given place at different points in the past. The best-documented examples are probably the vari-ous groups of Austrian and Southern German Protestants forcibly resettled amid Transylvanian Saxons in the eighteenth century, whose late twentieth-century descendants still upheld strict boundaries, regulated by an intricate code of coex-istence, towards their similarly German-speaking, Protestant neighbours.[32] Such contexts, of which there were numerous, highlight the importance of migration for ethnicity.

Where two constituents of collective identity cross-cut each other, ethnic boundaries tended to be fuzzier, like in the case of the Romanian-speaking petty nobles mentioned above, or fairly inconsequential, as between Orthodox speakers of Romanian and Serbo-Croatian in the South or between Greek Catholic speakers of Romanian and Ruthenian/Ukrainian in the North. As the reader will have noticed by now, most ethnic differences were not caught up in

the wave of nationalization, and a few effectively faded away in its wake. A case in point for the latter are the Hungarian-speaking Szeklers, still a full-blown 'ethnie' before 1848, with neither a language on its own nor one religion in common, but complete with its myth of separate origins. Although Szeklerdom was regional in scale, it was based on legal status rather than territory, since former serfs living in the Szeklerland did not belong to it.

Two dynamics can capture the changes that reshuffled this web of ethnic distinctions in the nineteenth century. First, the national was superimposed on the ethnic, at the beginning as a powerful language of political mobilization, which led to a two-tier structure of collective loyalties. National activists built on existing ethnic identifications and stereotypes, and reinforced linguistic-confessional boundaries, investing them with new stakes. But at the same time, this propaganda collapsed actual local groups into overarching, anonymous communities and offered explanations, projected solidarities and goals on a far wider scale than peasants were accustomed to in secular matters. Peasants' inherited reference frames revolved around face-to-face rather than imagined communities, and what constituted typically Romanian or Magyar culture they also negotiated at the local level. Social proximity had decreased in concentric circles, but the widest of these had hardly spanned more than a day's distance, and any person from farther away had been seen as a complete stranger – and a potential threat at that.

So far, my understanding has by and large squared with the ethno-symbolist account of nationalism as synthesized in the works of Anthony D. Smith – I accept that ethnic differences based on religion, status, migration and language predated nationhood, that prenational symbols were sometimes recycled by activists to create broader solidarities and that ethnicity continues to undergird national ties.[33] On one key point, however, I must part ways with ethno-symbolism. While Smith suggested that the masses could not engage with nationalist accretions at odds with their pre-existing ethnic symbols and myths, my three nationalizing elites brought into circulation names and interpretations that belonged to just this kind of invented traditions, and these still found acceptance in the long run. In other words, the 'ethno' part of the ethno-symbolist approach can offer a partial explanation for earlier ethnic divisions and how they realigned along national lines, but the 'symbolic' part does not provide for the autonomy or independent dynamic of elite constructs, and it underestimates the flexibility of the peasant mind. Peasants did cherry-pick from the nationalist package and reinterpreted some of its elements, but as a group, they had limited leverage to impose new signifiers in the nationalist vein. Even where bits and pieces of peasant culture gained national significance, they did so with new meanings and on the intelligentsia's initiative and terms.

Peasants became national in response to the ideas promoted by the respective elites, simultaneously with the spread of literacy and the development of a

free-holding peasant identity.[34] Nationalist frames of interpretation could reach out to them via the church pulpit, the schoolhouse and, by the 1890s, also the penny press. Although there were wide differences regionally, between 15 and 50 per cent of Romanians were reported literate in 1910, while virtually all grown-up Transylvanian Saxons and the large majority of Catholic Germans knew how to read. Magyar peasants fell somewhere in between.

Receiving elements of the message is one thing, but assimilating them into permanent national commitments is quite another. Catalysing this process were, among other factors: the example set by outgroup nationalisms; the servitude trials and conflicts over land consolidation between Romanian smallholders and Magyar landlords;[35] the memory of the civil war of 1848–49; an associational life organized along ethnonational lines; and electoral campaigns (although in Transylvania, the Romanian National Party boycotted elections until 1903). In the Banat, the separation of Orthodox parishes and the long, drawn-out legal actions for the division of church property between Romanians and Serbs sometimes created boundaries where none had been perceptible earlier.[36]

Specific to non-dominant national movements was the nationalizing impact of everyday conflicts with the state bureaucracy. Of course, peasants of all stripes disliked the state – that continually expanding tax-levying, overregulating, monopoly-holding, conscripting and often corrupt behemoth that impinged on their lives – but non-Magyars in Hungary carried the additional burdens of an imposed state language, with all its possibilities for abuse, and of occasional discrimination and humiliation.[37] Ironically, widespread illiteracy could cushion the intensity of such encounters, as long as illiterate peasants did not even expect to understand the content of official documents.

Reconstructing the changing ethnic concepts and stereotypes of a literate elite may be tricky at times, but it certainly does not pose a barrier to interpretation. When Mihály Cserei repeatedly maligned the late Transylvanian chancellor Mihály Teleki, calling him a 'Wallach' (*oláh*) in his memoirs around 1710, he did not insinuate that Teleki or his family had come from Wallachia, but he used the pre-1848 Hungarian ethnonym for Romanians (Romanian-speakers of the Orthodox faith), on the grounds of the chancellor's dubious origins in some majority Romanian-speaking border area between Transylvania and Hungary.[38] One can also assemble this interpretation from the text, but similar quotes can be multiplied ad libitum.

The same task becomes daunting with regard to the peasantry, owing to their illiteracy and the resulting lack of ego-documents from the early stages, which drastically reduces our access to peasant ways of thinking.[39] Usually, others wrote on behalf of peasants, mostly with a powerful performative thrust, filtering their experiences through a different culture and tailoring their arguments to the upper-class reader. Once people's voices mattered, the clergy also did not hesitate to enlist their flock in the service of nationalist causes. Scores of Romanian

priests, for example, sent letters in support of the nationalist leaders indicted in a much-publicized political trial in 1894, signing on behalf of their mostly illiterate parishioners.[40] But for a long time, peasants would happily and lightly throw their voices behind distant causes that their priests canvassed for – even if, or rather because, they did not see its relevance for their lives. If one finds that these letters are conclusive about the national commitments of the undersigned, one should perhaps also consider the sixty thousand signatures that the Maltese Catholic clergy collected a few years later in protest against the threat looming for Italian as a public language, a number surpassing not only that of literate Maltese but also many times over that of Italian-speakers in the archipelago.[41]

In their reflections on their people's national consciousness, nationalist activists typically swung between the exaltation of the peasantry as bearers of the national spirit in its purest form, even if it may have been slumbering in them, and disappointment at their pedestrian mindset and their failure to observe the national proprieties. The testimony one can get from outside observers is as a rule equally elusive since few raised the question in such terms, and comments by those who did may also reveal more about their own preconceptions or fears than about the subject. Finally, in the lucky cases where they can be retrieved, peasants' words still present a confusing ambiguity; premodern elements and arguments often intermingle in them with modern ones, with no apparent logic.

My third recurrent concern in this book will be to interrogate naming patterns and imageries attached to names about how peasants began to think and behave in national ways. Here, I engage with the 'from below' approach to the study of nationhood, which does not content itself by simply assuming that the nationalist indoctrination reached its goal, but sets out to collect direct and indirect evidence from the ordinary people it addressed, accepting additional methodological challenges. Thus I propose to put naming records in the same league as statistics about draft evasion, election results, attendance at rallies and national festivals, or Ellis Island declarations of ethnicity – the types of sources that this research paradigm has revalued.[42]

One feels at a loss to pin down when exactly the peasantry's nationalization process started, but this does not seem all that meaningful a task after all. People assimilated national categories, beliefs, imageries and argumentation schemes while reacting to concrete situations, which usually had to do with ongoing, often local conflicts. Therefore, it should not be thought that peasants started behaving and thinking as conscious nationals at one fell swoop.[43] At first, they may have simply accepted being framed as such, a choice for which they sometimes had to suffer bitter consequences. Their repertoire widened gradually. As mentioned, they were also selective in appropriating the elements proposed by nationalist elites, and they might also reinterpret and rearrange these for their own purposes.[44] In addition, elite nationalisms kept on changing along the way, making nationalization an open-ended process, analogous to Tetris rather than

to the jigsaw puzzle, to borrow Edin Hajdarpašić's metaphor.[45] Truly, national communities are reimagined with each generation.

The process also produced false starts, as it regularly did in the Eastern half of the continent, starting with the Greek Uprising of 1821. The ambiguities are particularly rife with regard to 1848, a year that certainly saw a countryside resonating with nationalist slogans and engaged in ethnic bloodshed. Should one feel inclined to point out the social-economic motives and – in the case of the 1848 Romanian jacquerie in Transylvania – the chiliastic religious overtones of peasant action, the question may also be raised as to whether ordinary people were ever mobilized in the nineteenth century on purely nationalist grounds and against their better interests. For the purposes of the present study, however, the commotions of 1848 can be safely considered a false start, not crystallizing into solid national commitments, but feeding back into the process to the degree that local events were being framed, in the retelling, as a fight for national liberation.

From the perspective of names, the touchstone of a nationally conscious peasantry will be the extent to which they ingrained national historical myths and reproduced them. For that, they first needed to absorb a secular conception of time as opposed to cyclical time, sacred history and local living memory. Together with a cartographic conception of space, this reflected the widening scale of the imagination referred to earlier, but it need not make them behave as fervent ('hot') nationalists. I will not consider as 'national' basic or universal forms of linguistic loyalty ('vertical' or 'heteronymous', in Joep Leerssen's terms), neither the myth of Latin origins among Romanians as long as its political relevance remained flexible and modest.[46] The socially exclusive 'noble nationalism' and confessionally exclusive forms of Hungarian patriotism, such as the cult of the Hungarian saints and the Virgin Mary among Roman Catholics, or parallels between Old Testament Jews and Magyars among Calvinists, will similarly remain outside the scope of my definition.

If it is not an easy task in practice to draw a neat dividing line between premodern and modern identities, that is in part because the peasantry's first positive response to national propaganda was to mark their bodies, already the traditional place for ethnic marking. Newly freed Magyar serfs drew their Sunday costume closer to the noble attire, which initially may have had nothing to do with nationalism; but as a concomitant, it distanced them from their Romanian neighbours. Tricoloured ribbons appeared on peasant dress. As an outcome of the process, local peasant communities became Romanian and Hungarian in a new fashion, or Saxon as the case may be. Although nationalism was primarily meant for mobile and urban rather than rural and sedentary people, peasants, too, came to take it for granted that they should be governed by their conationals in some sort of an autonomous political entity. They got imbued with a national solidarity transcending social and geographical divisions, took pride in

the civilizational achievements and military victories of their kin-states and paid allegiance to their 'mother tongue', including abstract linguistic authorities and, occasionally, in diasporic settings, even going through the pain of relearning the ancestral language. Critically, they also mastered new interpretations and symbolic uses of proper names.

The book is divided into three major parts, according to the three levels of the analysis undertaken. In the first part, I will explore the prenational cultural groundwork by describing how the mostly illiterate peasantry's concepts, practices and attitudes related to names and naming differed from what came to be accepted as the educated nationalist doxa. I will uncover the manifold linguistic entanglements that left marks on names later to be politicized. I will also make attempts to crack the notorious silence of the village and to gather first-hand evidence about the onset and dynamics of the peasantry's nationalization process. I will evaluate the rising popularity of nationalist historical visions by comparing the expansion of national given names – Romanian Latinate, Hungarian historical, pagan Magyar and Germanic – among the elite and the peasantry, and I will take a closer look at vernacular place-name etymologies to find out about what cultural memory peasants tied to their places.

Upper-class ideas and practices will take centre stage in the second part. This will feature public intellectuals' thinking in their quest to discover national essence in the inherited cultural material, and projecting fantasies about family- and place-name histories to support historical myths in a nationalist mould. Particular emphasis will be placed on their strategies of accounting for external influences on family and place names. Here I will also interpret various forms of onomastic self-fashioning – most notably, family-name changes. I will review the wave of family-name Latinizations carried out by Romanian forty-eighters, a practice that came to a halt in the next generation with a paradigm shift in the ideology of the Romanian linguistic standard. I will engage more deeply with the social history of family-name Magyarizations. Although people of Romanian and Transylvanian Saxon birth or ancestry did not figure prominently among family-name Magyarizers, I will examine their clusters in the hope of finding clues either about administrative pressure or about the potential social avenues of assimilation into Magyardom. The last chapter of this part discusses dilettante scholarship, grassroots toponymic activism and Magyar tourist associations' bid to replace the place-name cover.

The third part will show Hungarian governments and administration tackling linguistic diversity, engaged in official practices towards the symbolic incorporation of names, and enacting policies of renaming. I start out by analysing the regulation of given names in official use that happened as the Hungarian state took over the registration of births, deaths and marriages, through designing an equivalence list for the given names current among minorities. Next, I turn to the transcription of family names across languages, which became a hotly contested

practice as Romanian family names continued to be respelt in Hungarian public documents. Finally, the many aspects and ramifications of the topic moved me to dedicate one-fifth of the book to the state-run campaign of settlement-name Magyarizations, which spanned the last two decades of the era.

Notes

1. Hungarian National Archives (henceforth, MNL OL) BM K156, box 55, 292.
2. R. Talbert, *Rome's World: The Peutinger Map Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [2010] 2014), no. 1732 (TP 6A4); and F. Pesty, *A Szörényi Bánság és Szörény vármegye története* [History of the Banate of Severin/Szörény and Szörény County], Vol. 2 (Budapest: M. T. Akadémia, 1878), 325–36.
3. N. Stoica de Haţeg, *Cronica Banatului* [The chronicle of the Banat], 2nd edn (Timişoara: Facla, 1981), 58.
4. B. Petriceicu-Hasdeu, *Etymologicum magnum Romaniae: dicţionarul limbei istorice şi poporane a românilor* [Dictionary of Romanians' historical and folk language], Vol. 1 (Bucharest: Minerva, 1972), 248–49.
5. Quoted in M.M. Deleanu, *Manuscrisul de la Prigor (1879–1880): comentariu lingvistic şi juridic-administrativ* [The Prigor Manuscript (1879–80): a linguistic and judicial-administrative commentary] (Reşiţa: Eftimie Murgu, 2005), 78.
6. A.D. Xenopol, *Une Enigme historique: Les Roumains au Moyen-Age* (Paris: Leroux, 1885), 135.
7. I. Nădejde, 'Istoriea romînilor (Vol. I) de dl. A.D. Xenopol' [The History of Romanians, Vol. 1, by A.D. Xenopol], *Contemporanul* 6 (1887–88), 328.
8. I. Bălan, *Numiri de localităţi* [Settlement names] (Caransebeş: 'Bibl. Noastre', 1898), 6.
9. D. Dan, 'Din toponimia romînească: studiu istorico-linguistic' [From the field of Romanian toponymy: historico-linguistic study], *Convorbiri literare* 30(2) (1896), 323–35 and 504–15.
10. Á. Berecz, *The Politics of Early Language Teaching: Hungarian in the primary schools of the late Dual Monarchy* (Budapest: Pasts, Inc., Central European University, 2013).
11. I use *Magyar* in the ethnic sense and *Hungarian* in the civic, geographical sense for the post-1918 nation, as well as to denote the language, with the important proviso that the same distinction does not exist in Hungarian.
12. J. Chlebowczyk, *On Small and Young Nations in Europe* (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1980), 181.
13. A representative piece of this turn is J. von Puttkamer, 'Kein europäischer Sonderfall: Ungarns Nationalitätenproblem im 19. Jahrhundert und die jüngere Nationalismusforschung', in M. Fata (ed.), *Das Ungarnbild der deutschen Historiographie* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004), 84–98.
14. Berecz, *Politics of Early Language Teaching*.
15. I use the term 'inventory' when referring to the ensemble of types, and 'body' or 'corpus' for the ensemble of tokens.
16. S.A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Oxford: Blackwell, [1972] 1980).
17. For the topic, see my 'Haszonállatok hívónevének kölcsönzése román, magyar és német anyanyelvű állattartók között a 20. század második feléig' [Borrowing of names for

domestic animals among Romanian-, Hungarian- and German-speaking livestock farmers until the second half of the twentieth century], *Névtani Értesítő* 40 (2018), 129–37.

18. W. van Langendonck, *Theory and Typology of Proper Names* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2007), 92–93.

19. My usage of the term 'myth' is indebted to Raoul Girardet through Lucian Boia; L. Boia, *Pentru o istorie a imaginarului* [For a history of the imaginary], trans. T. Mochi (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2000).

20. E. Hajdarpasic, *Whose Bosnia? Nationalism and Political Imagination in the Balkans, 1840–1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 32–35 and 80–81.

21. Y. Stavrakakis, 'Enjoying the Nation: A Success Story?', in idem, *The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 198.

22. See the typology of language policies in I. Sachdev and H. Giles, 'Bilingual Accommodation', in T.K. Bhatia and W.C. Ritchie (eds), *The Handbook of Bilingualism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 363.

23. An early representative volume that laid out the future directions of research is M. Bucur and N.M. Wingfield (eds), *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001). One brilliant exception on Hungary is B. Varga, *The Monumental Nation: Magyar Nationalism and Symbolic Politics in Fin-de-siècle Hungary* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016).

24. P. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 239.

25. Y. Malkiel, *Etymology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 36; and R. Rose-Redwood, D. Alderman and M. Azaryahu, 'Geographies of Toponymic Inscription: New Directions in Critical Place-Name Studies', *Progress in Human Geography* 34 (2010), 455.

26. F. Barth, 'Introduction', in idem (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget; London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), 9–38.

27. R. Stergar and T. Scheer, 'Ethnic Boxes: The Unintended Consequences of Habsburg Bureaucratic Classification', *Nationalities Papers* 46 (2018), 577.

28. E. Gellner and A.D. Smith, 'The Nation: Real or Imagined? The Warwick Debates on Nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism* 2 (1996), 367–68.

29. M. Brie, *Căsătoria în nord-vestul Transilvaniei (a doua jumătate a secolului XIX – începutul secolului XX): condiționări exterioare și strategii maritale* [Marriage in north-western Transylvania (the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries): external factors and marital strategies] (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2009); Gh. Șișeștean, *Etnie, confesiune și căsătorie în nord-vestul Transilvaniei* [Ethnicity, confession and marriage in north-western Transylvania] (Zalău: Caiete Silvane, 2002); C. Pădurean and I. Bolovan (eds), *Căsătorii mixte în Transilvania: Secolul al XIX-lea și începutul secolului XX* [Mixed marriages in Transylvania: nineteenth and early twentieth centuries] (Arad: Editura Universității 'Aurel Vlaicu', 2005); and *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*, new series, vol. 7 (Budapest: Magyar Kir. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1905), 56–57.

30. M. Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, trans. E. Fischoff et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1968] 1978), 385–98.

31. For a succinct history of the Transylvanian Saxon elite's political self-positioning under Dualism, see A. Möckel, 'Kleinsächsisch oder Alldeutsch? Zum Selbstverständnis der

Siebenbürger Sachsen von 1867 bis 1935', in W. König (ed.), *Siebenbürgen zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1994), 129–45.

32. See especially M. Bottesch, 'Identität und Ethnizität der Landler: zum Selbstverständnis der Landler', in M. Bottesch, F. Grieshofer and W. Schabus (eds), *Die siebenbürgischen Landler: Eine Spurensicherung* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2002), Vol. 1, 155–77.

33. A.D. Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (London: Routledge, 2009).

34. J.-P. Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 143–217.

35. I. Kovács, *Desființarea relațiilor feudale în Transilvania* [The abolishment of feudal relations in Transylvania] (Cluj: Dacia, 1973), 101–53.

36. A. Schenk and I. Weber-Kellermann, *Interethnik und sozialer Wandel in einem mehrsprachigen Dorf des rumänischen Banats* (Marburg: Marburger Studienkreis für Europäische Ethnologie, 1973), 32–33.

37. Friedrich Lachmann's memorandum to the Viennese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in E.R. Rutkowski, 'Österreich-Ungarn und Rumänien 1880–1883, die Proklamierung des Königreiches und die rumänische Irredenta', *Südostforschungen* 25 (1966): 274; and F. Nagysolymosi Szabó, *Erdély és a román kérdés* [Transylvania and the Romanian question] (Marosvásárhely: self-published, 1910).

38. M. nagyajtai Cserei, *Históriája* [Chronicle] (Pest: Emich, 1852), 98 and passim.

39. S. Mitu and E. Bărbulescu, 'Romanian Peasant Identities in Transylvania: Sources, Methods and Problems of Research', *Transylvanian Review* 22 (supplement 3) (2013), 269.

40. N. Josan, *Adeziunea populară la mișcarea memorandistă (1892–1895): mărturii documentare* [Popular adherence to the Memorandist movement: documentary evidence] (Bucharest: Știinţifică, 1996), 115–304.

41. G. Hull, *The Malta Language Question: A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism* (Valletta: Said, 1993), 46.

42. For a brief overview of the field, M. Van Ginderachter, 'Nationhood from Below: Some Historiographic Notes on Great Britain, France and Germany in the Long Nineteenth Century', in M. Van Ginderachter and M. Beyen (eds), *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 120–31.

43. Cf. P.M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2016), 274 and 312.

44. K. Stauter-Halsted, *The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848–1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

45. Hajdarpasic, 206.

46. J. Leerssen, 'Medieval Heteronomy, Modern Nationalism: Language Assertion between Liège and Maastricht, 14th–20th century', *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis/ Revue belge d'histoire contemporaine* 34 (2004), 581–93.