

POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP IN POWER, 1858–1862



In the 1850s, the network of liberal political friends had cooperated to overcome personal, political, and professional challenges. They suffered police harassment and professional discrimination, and most core members had been forced into exile by 1858. As James Brophy and Anna Ross have shown, however, government repression in Prussia had its limits.¹ There was enough room between the claims and the realities of official power in the 1850s for conservative state leaders and moderate liberals to seek accommodation—on some points. In the mid-1850s, network members tried to participate in this process. Their reasoning was that if they could gain influence over princes and government ministers, they could convince these leaders to enact domestic reforms and achieve national unification. The Prussian government often rebuffed the political friends' efforts, but it did not entirely foreclose the prospect of future cooperation.

In October 1858, it seemed that the political friends had a new opportunity to test this reasoning. The establishment of a permanent regency in Prussia under Prince Wilhelm and his circle of moderate advisors ended Otto von Manteuffel's conservative cabinet and marginalized the archconservative courtiers around the ailing king, Friedrich Wilhelm IV.² Many liberals believed that a "New Era"—marked by the rule of law, constitutional rights, and a desire for national unity—had dawned.³ The network of political friends sought office in Prussia because they thought that the prince regent and his allies from the "*Wochenblatt* party" would continue on the course of moderate liberalism and constitutional monarchy that they had advocated since the mid-1850s.⁴ Once they had made gains in Berlin and Karlsruhe, network members advanced their most concrete plans for *kleindeutsch* unification under a constitutional, Hohenzollern monarchy. In their plans, these pro-Prussian liberals engaged with the wider nationalist movement in Germany—particularly with the ideas of the *Trias*.

The monarchical principle was central to the political culture of nineteenth-century Central Europe, to most European liberals, and to the network of political friends, providing the basis of what was considered political legitimacy.⁵ Yet,

as the political theorist Joan Cocks has suggested, the terms of political vocabulary are “also problems and possibilities in themselves . . . intellectual puzzles without definitive solutions”; further, she contends that attempts to define “any of these terms will spark its own revision, refinement, extension, or counter-conceptualization.”⁶ Most liberals who called for the formation of a German nation-state in the 1850s and 1860s envisioned a powerful constitutional monarch overseeing the machine of state.⁷ The network members sought to use monarchy to reconcile the legitimism of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries with calls for a constitutional nation-state. Members of the network participated in the nineteenth-century transition from the monarch’s primacy as dynast to the monarch’s primacy as a member of the nation and representative of the state.⁸ They thereby worked to build a “modernized,” national monarchy on the political foundations of the past, and their projects offer a glimpse of an imagined nation-state and national monarchy very different from the German Empire founded in 1871.⁹

Princely and non-princely members’ efforts to reach this goal demonstrated their assumptions about the relationship between monarchy, sovereignty, and nationalism in a rapidly changing Central Europe. How network members approached monarchy in this context in the 1860s was closely connected to their belief that smaller monarchs could “sacrifice” their prerogatives to a centralizing nation-state but still retain their individual sovereignties—as acknowledged at the Congress of Vienna and codified in the Confederal Constitution.¹⁰ Sovereignty had become, in the words of the seminal liberal encyclopedia, the *Staatslexikon*, “the cardinal question of modern constitutional law.”¹¹ Network members and Confederal leaders therefore endeavored to locate the source of sovereignty and determine whether it sprang from the nation, the state, or the monarch himself.¹² Could legitimate monarchy be adapted to national demands? Could many monarchs lend their prerogatives to a single national executive, without threatening the stability of Germany and Europe?

In network thinking, sovereignty sprang from the body of the monarch through his special relationship to the Christian God. He could, however, allow his sovereignty to be collected by a central authority for the good of the nation—that is, to the executive of a new nation-state.¹³ To ensure the princely purity of this system, a fellow monarch would then administer, through a national government, the prerogatives of the other reigning princes in judicial, diplomatic, and military matters. Reformers asserted that this sort of collective national monarchy would not diminish the individual princes, nor would it threaten the associated independence of their respective states. It would not violate international law by destroying the Confederation, nor would it summon the specter of republican revolution by defacing monarchy. German monarchs would remain—paradoxically—free sovereigns, despite substantial restrictions on their military and diplomatic authority. Like other European liberals, the

political friends believed they could achieve reform without revolution and win over conservatives.¹⁴ Network members' reform plans sparked controversy across the Confederation, however, and met decisive resistance from its conservative leaders, who advocated different understandings of monarchy and nation.

Liberal hopes in the New Era were soon disappointed. Factionalism within the Auerswald-Hohenzollern cabinet, which represented only a subsection of Old Liberals, and the resistance of a resurgent "conservative Fronde" at court, halted domestic and Confederal reform in 1861.¹⁵ Prince Regent Wilhelm's campaign to force a massive military spending bill through the Prussian legislature ignited a constitutional crisis that divided liberals in the Landtag and the network. Despite their detailed plans, members of the network were forced to choose between backing the prince regent (from 1861, King Wilhelm I) or endorsing the break-away liberal-nationalist opposition in the Landtag: the German Progressive Party (Fortschrittspartei).¹⁶ Bismarck's appointment in 1862 as minister president, or better, "minister of conflict," further exacerbated tensions in the Prussian legislature, within the German Confederation, and among the political friends.¹⁷ If debates among network liberals in the 1850s had been aimed at forging consensus, in the early 1860s, they were becoming adversarial.

The next two chapters analyze disagreements in the network between 1858 and 1867 that often involved the scope of liberal accommodation with post-revolutionary conservative government. Because the friends were now directly involved in state policymaking, the larger political narrative of this period becomes more important to the story of the liberal network. Tensions in the network reflected tensions in German society during a transformative period characterized by increased press activity, heated debates over constitutional rule, organized nationalist agitation, and war. Under these circumstances, the political friends asked themselves: where could liberals seek accommodation with conservative leaders before they ceased to be liberals? How should they guide government policy in an era of crisis toward domestic reform and national unification? Who could still be regarded as a political friend?

In this chapter, we explore how this network of moderate liberals worked through these and other thorny questions as both friends and political activists at the height of their official influence. The first part examines network efforts to secure official influence in Prussia between 1858 and 1862. I then analyze two concrete examples of what the network planned to do in this more favorable environment, in Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich I of Baden's Confederal reform plans of 1859–1860, and in the Coburg military convention of 1861. The chapter closes by assessing the re-emergence in September 1862 of debates in the network over the limits of accommodation with state power in pursuit of the nation-state—and the limits of political friendship.

Entering the New Era, 1858–1860

In early 1858, Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, brother to the incapacitated King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, established a temporary regency.¹⁸ This regency awakened among German liberals an enthusiasm similar to that which had greeted Friedrich Wilhelm IV's ascension in 1840.¹⁹ Within months, the establishment of a permanent regency became unavoidable for the cabinet of Otto von Manteuffel and the ailing king's courtiers. The prince regent began a "purge" of his brother's conservative advisors and state ministers, among them the Gerlach brothers, Julius Stahl, and eventually Manteuffel himself.²⁰ Network members mobilized to acquire posts in an incoming moderate-liberal ministry, achieving their greatest success between 1858 and 1862. There seems to have been no debate among the political friends over the merits of seeking office in the state that had so recently hounded most of them into exile. Prussia remained their ideal vehicle for national unification, and it would be led by moderate-liberal ministers with whom the network had forged contacts a few years earlier.

In March 1858, Karl Mathy, Karl Francke, and August von Saucken met secretly with Duke Ernst in Gotha to weigh Max Duncker's chances of entering Prussian service in the New Era.²¹ One month later, Rudolf von Auerswald summoned Duncker to Berlin from his self-imposed exile in Württemberg.²² Auerswald became the de facto leader of the new cabinet in June 1858 under the aegis of Karl Anton von Hohenzollern, a mediatized relative from the Catholic branch of the Prussian royal family.²³ Auerswald had served as lord mayor of Königsberg in the early 1840s and governor of the Prussian Rhineland between 1850 and 1851. He had also nurtured powerful contacts at Prince Wilhelm's court in Koblenz and the royal court in Berlin.²⁴

Auerswald and Hohenzollern had already engaged with network members in the mid-1850s, as part of the *Wochenblatt* group's interactions with the Literary Association.²⁵ Both held moderate liberal views such as those found in the prince regent's November Program (1859), wherein Wilhelm called for Prussia's "moral conquest" of Germany and the end of reactionary religious and political policies.²⁶ Like network members, New Era leaders favored constitutional rule, brakes on the power of the state bureaucracy, and German unity. Ominously, the November Program also referred to the need for a greatly expanded army and the prince regent's belief that the state should remain autonomous from popular demands.²⁷ The gap between the royal intent of the program and its reception by many liberals—network members included—foreshadowed the disagreement and disappointment among the political friends about the course of the New Era.

In 1859, Hohenzollern, Auerswald, and August von Bethmann Hollweg were hoping for reform, searching for moderates to replace officials from the Manteuffel ministry and counter the remaining conservative courtiers around

the so-called *Kreuzzeitung* (*Neue Preußische Zeitung*) and the *Berliner Revue*.²⁸ Auerswald offered Max Duncker two possible roles in which, he claimed, Duncker could retain his “freedom.”²⁹ The first option was appointment as legation councilor (*Legationsrat*) in the foreign office, a mid-level post in a prestigious ministry. The second option was to become director of the Central Press Office (Zentralpreßstelle), which Manteuffel had established in the mid-1850s as part of his policy of “press management.”³⁰ The press office oversaw official and semi-official dailies, distributed pro-government articles, and dealt with privately owned periodicals across the Confederation.³¹

The network prepared the ground for Max Duncker’s rising prospects. August von Saucken, J.G. Droysen, Ernst of Coburg, and Christian von Stockmar all recommended Duncker at the prince regent’s court, and Duncker had managed to put his political writings before the prince and princess of Prussia at opportune moments.³² As in the 1850s, certain friends counseled both Max and Charlotte Duncker on whether to move to Berlin to await an official offer. Karl Samwer and Gustav Freytag, for example, supported the move. Both considered it an opportunity to expand network influence that likewise offered Max Duncker the possibility of gaining a more powerful position later.³³ Karl Mathy, on the other hand, who was closest to the Dunccker family, considered both options too uncertain to warrant Duncker sacrificing the professorship at Tübingen.³⁴ Hermann Baumgarten went further by asserting that it would be futile to work with Confederal leaders to achieve national unification.³⁵

Charlotte Duncker, for her part, believed that her husband accepting a post in Berlin was necessary politically to serve Prussia and thereby Germany, despite the fact that he would have to sacrifice his scholarly endeavors.³⁶ She advised her spouse to accept only the role as legation councilor if he wanted to gain influence over the prince regent.³⁷ As head of the press office, Duncker would be overshadowed by senior officials and his independence would be diminished. The press appointment was a difficult “half position,” Charlotte Duncker pointed out, because “the prince certainly prefers to listen—in his own way—to a legation councilor more than a professor.” She added that a long memorandum from a diplomat would be more “agreeable to [the prince’s] Prussian heart,” especially if Duncker also comported himself as “a military man.”³⁸

Charlotte Duncker recognized more clearly than most other members that uniformed officers and diplomats held more sway with Wilhelm, the “prince general,” than did professors and publicists.³⁹ She therefore combined her roles as spouse and political friend to advise her husband to adapt to courtly society, which was dominated by noble officers and elite civil servants; otherwise, Max Duncker’s counsel, however wise it might be, would be ignored by the prince regent. Charlotte Duncker had learned from Heinrich von Sybel’s experience in Munich. Max Duncker ultimately chose to settle in Berlin before receiving an official offer with the blessing of the government in Stuttgart, leaving Charlotte

Duncker behind to close the house.⁴⁰ She only joined him a few months later, after completing her household duties. Because of her gendered role as wife and manager of the household, Duncker was unable to help her spouse and fellow network member while he adjusted to Berlin, except through her letters.

When Max Duncker, disregarding his spouse's advice, finally accepted the position of director of the Central Press Office in early 1859, the prince regent granted him the coveted title of privy state councilor (*Geheimer Regierungsrat*) and an honorary professorship. Duncker worked immediately to exploit his access to Rudolf von Auerswald and Karl Anton von Hohenzollern for the network. He passed letters and memoranda to the cabinet from Duke Ernst of Coburg, who wished particularly to improve his relationship with the Hohenzollern dynasty. Ernst made Duncker responsible for softening his views for the ministers' consideration. One such view held that the prince regent should accept an imperial crown from a possible summit of pro-Prussian monarchs.⁴¹ Duncker likewise shared memoranda and letters from Heinrich von Sybel, Karl Samwer, Karl Mathy, and Hermann Baumgarten with New Era leaders.⁴² Independent of her spouse, Charlotte Duncker circulated letters between Duke Ernst, Mathy, Samwer, and Auerswald in order to expand network influence.⁴³ Far-flung members, such as Baumgarten and Sybel, also asked the Duncckers to send news about the Berlin cabinet and the prince regent's intentions.⁴⁴

Demands for political news and access to state leaders showed how highly network members rated their influence, even after limited successes. Yet Duncker's appointment was time-consuming, his duties and bureaucratic rank unclear. Charlotte Duncker later recalled that her husband's new post required a difficult balancing act, "mediating between public opinion in Germany and the Prussian government."⁴⁵ In practice, Max Duncker had to synthesize reports from each government ministry for syndicated articles in official and semi-official papers. He reported daily to the state ministry on the mood in the German press toward Prussia, while advising state ministers and the prince regent on public relations, even though his rank and official duties did not grant him the right to royal audiences or direct access to ministers. He was technically a central office manager in the foreign office—hardly someone with his hands on the levers of power.⁴⁶

To make matters worse, the Duncckers had political enemies in high places: Foreign Minister Alexander von Schleinitz and his undersecretary, Justus von Gruner, most notably, along with "traditional" opponents among conservative courtiers and journalists such as Hermann Wagener and the Gerlachs—who accused Max Duncker of persecuting their *Kreuzzeitung*.⁴⁷ This situation was the result of peculiar circumstances. The press office was less than five years old when Duncker took over, so its place in the byzantine structure of the Prussian bureaucracy remained unclear. The Hohenzollern court was renowned for its factionalism and the vendettas between branches of the state bureaucracy.⁴⁸ Above all,

the New Era cabinet, whose public image Duncker was tasked with minding and defending, seemed positively lethargic in the face of these obstacles.

Max Duncker was kept extremely busy—perhaps intentionally so—by Gruner and Schleinitz. He left day-to-day management of his staff to an assistant so he could focus on his reports to the prince regent and his ministers, especially after the outbreak of the Second Italian War in April 1859.⁴⁹ The war created tensions among German leaders over whether to aid the Habsburg Empire against the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia and its powerful ally, the Second French Empire. Though obliged to defend Confederal territory, leaders of the smaller German states argued that the center of the conflict, Lombardy, lay beyond the borders of the Confederation and thus was not their concern. The Austrian cabinet, led by Karl von Buol, hoped to press Confederal troops—particularly Prussian contingents—into the war. Network members, like many German liberals, felt conflicted.⁵⁰ They considered Piedmont-Sardinia's attack on the anti-national Habsburg Monarchy to be a war of national unification akin to their own *kleindeutsch* project.⁵¹ To them, an Austrian defeat in Italy meant a Prussian victory in Germany. It also appeared “to offer conclusive proof that a liberal-constitutional system was the only viable one for Italy,” and German liberals hoped that this conclusion might prove convincing on their side of the Alps.⁵² Yet, network members also feared that, after defeating Austria, Napoleon III might ally with Denmark to launch a simultaneous invasion of the Rhineland and Holstein.⁵³

Max Duncker thus worked under a range of professional pressures in a tense international climate. On the one hand, his unwavering public support for the Auerswald-Hohenzollern cabinet endeared him to its leaders.⁵⁴ Through Rudolf von Auerswald's and Christian von Stockmar's introductions, Duncker became acquainted in 1860 with the future heir to the Prussian throne, Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (later Emperor Friedrich III), writing political reports to the prince alongside his official duties.⁵⁵ On the other hand, when Charlotte Duncker began to handle much of her husband's personal correspondence, freeing him to focus on official duties, this arrangement angered network members who expected direct replies from Max Duncker: they incorrectly assumed that Charlotte Duncker was less informed.⁵⁶ Such members hoped to leverage the Dunckers' new connections in Berlin to acquire more positions for other members. Max Duncker, overwhelmed by official duties, responded with silence.⁵⁷ A tension began to emerge in the network between personal friendship and political opportunism.

Berthold Auerbach's prospects also rose as the New Era dawned. His experiences at the monarchical courts of Coburg and Berlin, and the reactions of his political friends, demonstrated how political friendship in the network reflected German liberals' anxieties over religious difference. In the summer of 1858, Duke Ernst II

of Coburg told Gustav Freytag and Karl Mathy that he wished to meet the celebrated author of the *Black Forest Village Stories*—over champagne. Freytag granted his sovereign’s wish.⁵⁸ He confided that Auerbach’s current life was a “jumble.” Auerbach’s second wife, Nina Auerbach (née Landesmann), was deeply unhappy, the Auerbach’s son was sick, and so the family had decamped to take the waters in Kösen.⁵⁹ Freytag dispatched Mathy, Auerbach’s “oldest acquaintance,” to Kösen to suggest that the novelist consider meeting the duke, then join his court. Auerbach agreed to an audience with Ernst and insisted on bringing his spouse along to Gotha. Freytag felt the need to warn the duke that Nina Auerbach was a “pretty but Jewish woman.”⁶⁰ He then divulged that Auerbach lived on 2,000 talers per year, which the duke might match or exceed “to enroll him under Your Highness’s banner.”⁶¹

Accompanied by Freytag, the Auerbachs traveled to Gotha. Berthold Auerbach went to the duke’s court alone, where he made “a very good impression,” despite at first declining to dine with the ducal family.⁶² The invitation was a sign of favor from the duke, and the presence of a Jew at his table was a clear signal that Ernst rejected customs discouraging contact between Christians and Jews.⁶³ The duke then invited Auerbach to spend the night at his palace. Sitting for hours by the window in his room, Auerbach mused that “it occurred to me over and over how I used to be a poor, gloomy lad at ‘shul’ in Hechingen, and what a wonderful mystery life is.”⁶⁴

After leaving yeshiva in Hechingen, Auerbach had been educated in the Christian *Gymnasium* and university system, and he became a staunch German nationalist. He also wrote fiction meant to endear rural folk to his educated co-nationals.⁶⁵ Auerbach had long advocated for ecumenism through nationalism and Enlightenment ethics, which, he believed, could be conveyed through any “reformed” religion. He supported the Reform movement in Judaism that sought to unite “enlightened” Jews and Christians as Germans.⁶⁶ Auerbach had thus found the “proper” basis to form a personal relationship with the duke, to participate in the Enlightenment logic behind Freytag’s emphasis on the equalizing power of “true” friendship among educated citizens and members of the nation.⁶⁷

But the Auerbach family remained subject to quiet contempt; the network was not isolated from the wider ambivalence toward Jewishness and Jewish emancipation among Christian liberals.⁶⁸ Freytag’s parenthetical reference to Nina Auerbach’s Jewishness as a negative quality betrayed an element of what Fritz Stern called “behind-the-back-antisemitism” in the network of political friends.⁶⁹ This attitude was common among Christian elites in nineteenth-century Germany. Freytag maligned his friend’s Jewishness through backhanded compliments about his wife. Freytag likewise equated the “traditional,” “irrational” aspects of religion to women—another common practice in the nineteenth century, particularly among members of the Christian and Jewish bourgeoisie.⁷⁰ More

importantly, though, the subtext of Freytag's remark was that Nina Auerbach was both sexually alluring and spiritually repellent, just as the "uncanny" bourgeois Jew was perceived by Christian counterparts as outwardly appealing but essentially alien.⁷¹ Much as he did in his fiction-writing, Gustav Freytag tapped into misogynist, Judeophobic, and antisemitic codes about Jews, and particularly Jewish women, which he did not need to elucidate to the duke in his letter.⁷² The prejudiced words of the bourgeois novelist and the more accepting actions of the prince demonstrated how political friendship facilitated moments of both inclusion and exclusion for Jewish Germans.⁷³

Network princes shared artistic interests among themselves and competed to recruit intellectuals, regardless of religious identification. Berthold Auerbach befriended Duke Ernst of Coburg after the meeting and made contacts within the Hohenzollern family in Prussia. He also attended court balls in Weimar, beaming that he and Grand Duke Carl Alexander had "truly become friends."⁷⁴ The Auerbachs then traveled to Gotha to visit Freytag. Duke Ernst hosted the couple at balls and dinners. Berthold Auerbach became convinced of Ernst's noble character, describing him as "a brave, free-thinking man," with whom he spent "many pleasant hours with cigars."⁷⁵ Smoking cigars and giving them as gifts were important points of homosocial camaraderie for network men—smoking was forbidden for elite women—and both practices were often recorded in letters and diaries.⁷⁶ These cross-status, inter-faith interactions were remarkable, especially in Auerbach's case, given the general exclusion of Jews from elite society in the German Confederation, and later in Imperial Germany.⁷⁷

With the dawn of the New Era, Berthold Auerbach decided to sidestep his political friends' campaign to induct him into the Coburg court. Max Duncker, whom Auerbach had contacted to endorse the *kleindeutsch* "Eisenach Program" of the newly established Deutscher Nationalverein, wanted to bring him to Berlin.⁷⁸ Although network members criticized the "staggering" and "stagnation" of the Auerswald-Hohenzollern ministry, they held out hope that, by attracting more members to Berlin, they could enhance their official standing, offset the influence of the conservative military officers around the king, and rouse the cabinet from its apparent lethargy.⁷⁹ Auerbach, for his part, recorded his desire "to go from loneliness into the forest of men [in Berlin]. . . . It is a great joy to me to have my old friend Max Duncker here. . . . We are living in faithful old camaraderie . . . [and] everything feels as if it were in the making: full of promise for the future."⁸⁰ Auerbach's rosy appraisal stemmed perhaps from his aloofness from day-to-day politics. He focused instead on literature as a form of political service to the foundation of the future nation-state.⁸¹ By contributing to the spread of German culture and (liberal) nationalism, Auerbach believed, he was helping to lay the groundwork for national unification.

Max Duncker obtained audiences for Auerbach with Prussia's leading state ministers Rudolf von Auerswald and Karl Anton von Hohenzollern. The latter,

Auerbach recorded, greeted him as a “fellow countryman.” They then spent hours talking before Auerbach decided to send the royal minister copies of his books.⁸² Carl Alexander of Weimar, Auerbach’s newest patron, introduced him to his sister, Princess Augusta, and her husband, Prince Regent Wilhelm of Prussia.⁸³ The Hohenzollerns subsequently invited Auerbach to tea at least five times.⁸⁴ This royal reception amazed the self-conscious Auerbach, as he confided in his cousin: “I cannot describe how it feels whenever I think back on my past, afflicted life that is now so distinguished by honor and joy.” More importantly, Auerbach continued, Prussian leaders chose to honor him openly—as a writer, a Jew, and a southern German liberal.⁸⁵

Auerbach knew that his experience at court in Coburg and in Berlin signaled official favor, not only for himself but also for the network and the wider *kleindeutsch* movement. Despite all this, he feared that the attention that he received in Berlin might suddenly vanish. The Dunccker’s power extended only so far, and the fickleness of royal patronage had not escaped him, either.⁸⁶ After many meetings and the approval of the royal family, Auerswald offered Auerbach a position as personal librarian to the prince regent. Auerswald insisted that the post would leave the author time to write. He believed that burdening Auerbach with official duties would be tantamount to a “theft from the nation.”⁸⁷

As in Coburg, Auerbach was skeptical about the benefits Auerswald’s offer would bring: “I am accustomed to dreaming, and here everything is wide awake.” Auerbach was doubtful “that I, the writer, the Jew, should reach such a distinguished position, that my life’s necessities should be assured, and especially that my sons will be Prussians, belonging to the state of the future, and that I can smooth their way through life.”⁸⁸ In the end, Auerbach declined the offer. He wished to preserve his independence—he claimed. In this way, Auerbach favored the informal patronage, rather than formal employment, common in the republic of letters of the eighteenth century.⁸⁹

Berthold Auerbach’s sudden rise during the New Era was all the more remarkable because in the 1840s his writing had been censored as dangerously democratic. Prussian leaders now sought to recruit a former associate of Karl Marx, Friedrich Hecker, as well as Ferdinand Freiligrath.⁹⁰ Auerbach had moved to the political center since 1848, and an accommodating, moderate-liberal government moved to promote him into elite society. Yet, taking a position at the Prussian court, which other members of the network understood as purely a political and social move, carried additional weight for Auerbach as a Jewish German. Auerswald’s offer made Jewish integration into contemporary, Christian-dominated society and a future nation-state seemed attainable to him. Auerbach’s Christian political friends failed to appreciate, however, the tremendous social obstacles that he would have to overcome in high society, particularly those generated by conservatives who attacked him in the press as a “court Jew.”⁹¹ Ultimately, Auerbach rejected taking part personally in his political friends’

approach to national unification through state influence. To a southern German and member of a religious minority, this path to the nation-state seemed narrow. He believed that he could do more good for the nation through literature than by serving the Hohenzollern family.

While Max Duncker was grasping for a promotion in Berlin and Auerbach was considering his options in northern Germany, Heinrich von Sybel's experience in Munich also demonstrated how, after winning official appointments, network members struggled to exert political influence at larger, royal courts. In 1859, after only a few years in Bavaria, Sybel was fighting against Catholic leaders to maintain his place at court. His position in Munich had been so undermined, he told Max Duncker, that he could not risk participating in the nascent *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.⁹² Associating with a liberal periodical, Sybel insisted, would destroy his relationship with King Maximilian II.⁹³ He had already sacrificed participation in "day-to-day politics" in favor of scholarship and teaching in order to enhance the "culture of the land" and his own "intellectual life." Sybel's recently published volume of the *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit* offered a liberal reading of the French Revolution and Revolutionary Wars.⁹⁴ These tasks, he claimed, were useful against hostile Ultramontane elements in the kingdom.⁹⁵ Sybel nonetheless entreated Duncker to have Auerswald intervene with Maximilian to re-establish his access to the monarch.⁹⁶ Despite his amenable, scholarly behavior and Duncker's efforts, Sybel remained isolated. The choice between scholarship and praxis was a false one, and Catholic opponents balked at Sybel's advocacy of pro-Prussian liberalism in any form.⁹⁷ After all, history to leaders of political Catholicism across Europe simply meant "experimental politics."⁹⁸

Although he remained unwilling to participate directly in contemporary politics, Sybel still endeavored to keep his political friends in Berlin abreast of the mood in Munich toward France and Austria.⁹⁹ He also passed news to Hermann Baumgarten, who had accepted a professorship at the polytechnical school in Karlsruhe. Baumgarten conveyed Sybel's views and news to Duncker, as well.¹⁰⁰ Duncker, for his part, shared news with Sybel from Karl Samwer in Coburg and forwarded Sybel's letters to the Prussian crown prince and king.¹⁰¹ These contacts caused Sybel's clerical enemies to denounce him as a missionary of "Gotha-ism" and "Prussian-dom," alienating him further from the king.¹⁰² Although the Peace of Villafranca (July 1859) had ended the Second Italian War, the intensifying constitutional crisis in Prussia soon overshadowed Sybel's previously stated concerns: he wanted to re-enter politics.¹⁰³

In 1861, network members presented Sybel with two options to leave Bavaria: a professorial chair at the University of Heidelberg in Baden, or a chair at the University of Bonn in the Prussian Rhineland. Competing campaigns by different network members to do Sybel a professional favor ended up undermining the network's overall ability to cooperate on national politics. After years as

an unofficial advisor on German politics to Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden, Franz von Roggenbach joined Friedrich's cabinet as foreign minister in May 1861.¹⁰⁴ This appointment was the result of lobbying by Duke Ernst of Coburg, Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Weimar, Karl Samwer, and Karl Anton von Hohenzollern (the latter at Max Duncker's behest).¹⁰⁵ Roggenbach suggested that, since Sybel wanted to leave Bavaria, Friedrich should bring the Borussia historian to Heidelberg.

Friedrich agreed. Roggenbach arranged for an audience between the grand duke and Sybel in early 1861. After the successful meeting, Sybel sent Friedrich some of his lectures and offered to ship him the next volume of his *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*. In the accompanying letter, Sybel then shifted to politics, warning the monarch that "the more slowly and uncertainly our German affairs develop, the more . . . truly princely and truly patriotic sentiments are revitalized; I have the pleasure to see [this] in you at every moment."¹⁰⁶ Then, referring to the French Revolution—a national rebellion against royal despotism, in his eyes—Sybel implied that ignoring the German Question would only encourage revolution. Confederate princes had to cooperate with moderate liberals if they wanted to preserve their thrones. By mixing assurances of faithful service and political advice in a single letter, Sybel pursued a strategy often deployed by other network members when using their influence as best they could. He used written correspondence to solidify his impressions of the audience arranged by a trusted network intermediary. Sybel's assurances of political consensus and his references to shared memories of physical togetherness also underwrote trust and relationship-building through letter-writing in the network.

Despite this promising interaction, Sybel ultimately accepted an offer from the University of Bonn, not Heidelberg. Though Sybel had rejected the grand duke of Baden's offer, Friedrich nevertheless tried to use Sybel to expand his unofficial influence. After learning that Sybel had accepted the professorship in Bonn, Friedrich wrote to him, offering to arrange an audience with King Wilhelm of Prussia, wherein Sybel could thank the king for the appointment and share his impressions of Munich and his views on the German Question, all in order to "strengthen the king in his good intentions."¹⁰⁷ Friedrich also offered to introduce Sybel to Rudolf von Auerswald, August von Bethmann Hollweg, and his brother-in-law, the Prussian crown prince, who, Friedrich believed, needed "the right men" around him.¹⁰⁸ Sybel declined. Neglecting his teaching obligations in Bonn so early in his tenure, he replied, would be irresponsible—besides, he was suffering from an eye infection.¹⁰⁹ Sybel then offered to provide the grand duke with a draft proposal to the Confederate diet, denouncing its lack of progress on national consolidation.¹¹⁰ Sybel sought to guide the grand duke's German policy without taxing his own connections by representing Friedrich in Berlin. For his part, the grand duke sought to patronize Sybel in order to bolster his contacts in Berlin, where he and Roggenbach were attempting to gain acceptance of their

coolly received Confederal reform proposal.¹¹¹ The two network members found themselves at cross purposes, and correspondence between them ceased.

The interaction between Heinrich von Sybel and Friedrich of Baden demonstrated once more the difficulty of cross-status political friendship and how members often exhausted network resources by pursuing separate—and even competing—campaigns of influence. Franz von Roggenbach and Grand Duke Friedrich wanted to recruit Sybel for the University of Heidelberg to spread pro-Prussian views in Baden, whereas Duke Ernst of Coburg and Max Duncker wanted to send Sybel to Bonn to increase their *kleindeutsch* influence at Prussia's majority-Catholic university. For his part, Berthold Auerbach rejected network efforts to secure him a position at the Coburg and Hohenzollern courts, partly because other network members had ignored the particular resistance that he faced as a Jew among Christian elites. It was not simply the work of the court positions that threatened to overwhelm Auerbach, but also the social environment. In contrast, Max Duncker's entry into the New Era government, and his reassignment to the more influential role as political advisor to the Prussian crown prince, were successful because the network united around a single strategy to advance Duncker's political career. To be sure, disorganization and misunderstandings undermined otherwise successful network efforts in the early 1860s. Nevertheless, the three cases—of Duncker, Auerbach, and Sybel—demonstrate how German monarchs and ministers worked to recruit network literati as part of the slow, uneven accommodation between individual post-revolutionary governments and moderate *kleindeutsch* liberals. In the meantime, the New Era ministry continued, laden with the expectations of liberals and *kleindeutsch* nationalists. Network members perceived from their new places of influence an opportunity to advance concrete plans for a liberal, *kleindeutsch* unification of Germany.

Reforming the German Confederation

The New Era government presented the liberal political friends with not only employment opportunities, but also challenges about how to implement their idea of a peaceful, liberal unification of Germany through monarchical consensus. While they advanced their political, personal, and professional positions, the friends also cooperated to advance detailed plans for the reform of the German Confederation. The most important plans for national consolidation were developed by network members Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden and Duke Ernst of Coburg, whom the influential *Staatslexikon* lauded as the only “German princes who openly endorse the efforts of the German national party.”¹¹² War between Austria, France, and Piedmont-Sardinia in 1859, combined with the dramatic expansion of liberal press activity since 1856, spurred network members to more

concerted efforts to think through the role of monarchs in national consolidation.¹¹³ The endeavors of these popular liberal monarchs and their political friends often dealt with their hope for a collective national monarchy through consensus among Confederate leaders. The network presented Confederate leaders with grand plans for political consolidation, before settling for a piecemeal approach to their ideal form of monarchical unification.

Network members in Baden planned a sweeping reform of the German Confederation that challenged the foundations of monarchical sovereignty in Central Europe. Although Franz von Roggenbach only joined Friedrich I of Baden's cabinet in 1861, he had already exerted considerable influence over the grand duke for years.¹¹⁴ Roggenbach and Friedrich's conception of the relationship between monarchical sovereignty and command, between the person of the monarch and the exercise of military power, later informed Duke Ernst's convention with the Prussian king. With the lingering euphoria around the Prussian New Era marred by tensions between the German states over whether to aid Austria in the coming war in Italy, Roggenbach believed that it was an opportune moment to present his plan for *kleindeutsch* unification.¹¹⁵ In March 1859, he enclosed his *Bundesreformplan* in a private letter to the grand duke of Baden. Roggenbach argued three main points: that his federation could be established without jeopardizing the post-Napoleonic international order, that this new federal government could exercise its power legitimately, and, ultimately, that it could reach deep into the everyday affairs of its constituent states and individual citizens.

The preamble of Roggenbach's reform proposal reviewed the foundation of the German Confederation in 1815. In his view, the Confederation was the imperfect product of a European attempt to compensate the mediatised "deprived sovereigns" of the Rhenish Confederation.¹¹⁶ Austria, Prussia, and, above all, the victimized smaller monarchs "freely" entered the Confederation to preserve their prerogatives.¹¹⁷ The Germany that the revolution and Napoleonic troops left behind was legally unstable, politically splintered, and diplomatically precarious, "an invariably attractive prize," Roggenbach lamented, "poised next to much more powerful neighbors."¹¹⁸ The smaller states feared their neighbors and sought guarantees for their freshly acquired territory and sovereignty. The German Confederation obliged.

Roggenbach argued that the goals of the Confederation—the safety and independence of Germany—were not necessarily wrong, but that Austro-Prussian wrangling had encouraged the smaller states to pursue their narrow interests at the expense of national unity.¹¹⁹ Failures to cooperate between the two German Great Powers during the Crimean War, and particularly during the Second Italian War, underscored this situation and discredited the Confederation in the eyes of Baden's diplomats.¹²⁰ Austria received the lion's share of blame from Roggenbach, however, because the national diversity of the Habsburg Monarchy allegedly bred

conflict that was exacerbated by its precarious Italian holdings.¹²¹ Austria, he felt, had entered the Confederation simply to drag the rest of Germany into Austrian wars. Prussia, on the other hand, had entered the Confederation to avoid abandoning Germany to the influence of anti-national Austria.¹²² Roggenbach continued that Prussia could maintain its position as a Great Power without the Confederation, whereas Austria required Confederal guarantees to prop up its “artificial monarchy.”¹²³ The other states (particularly those of the *Trias*) watched and exploited what power they had to advance their petty interests. Roggenbach wanted to break this dynamic.

Roggenbach’s contentions must be contextualized carefully. His emphasis on the national duty of a Protestant, all-German Prussia to unite the German states and banish Catholic Austria was common among northern German liberals after 1848–49.¹²⁴ Roggenbach’s emphasis on the supposedly natural right of the Prussian state to unify Germany, too, was common legitimating rhetoric among pro-Prussian liberals and anti-revolutionaries in general.¹²⁵ The “artificiality” of the multinational Habsburg Monarchy served as a foil, underscoring the bourgeois naturalization of a single, paternalistic Prussian sovereign over the German nation. Each nation, Roggenbach believed, should have one monarch, one head of the body politic. The Habsburg emperor could not rule over a German nation-state because he ruled other nationalities, each presumably with the right to a national monarchy. Roggenbach’s insistence on the naturalness of this situation reflected liberals’ insistence that Germany’s national unification and its turn to constitutional monarchy did not mean revolution and republicanism.¹²⁶

The Austrian Empire persisted only as a parasite on the German national body, Roggenbach believed. To him, the Confederation and its main exploiter, Austria, were dangers to national security and hindrances to the internal development of the commerce and culture essential to national progress in the liberal worldview.¹²⁷ Roggenbach also employed a notion that was common among supporters of Prussia across the political spectrum: Prussia was the only masculine state among the otherwise feminine lands of German-speaking Europe.¹²⁸ The embodiment of the vigorous, martial state—the “natural” warrior king of Prussia—was, thus, the only German prince with claim to the title. The rest, for Roggenbach, were either scheming gingerbread princes or antique giants.¹²⁹

To resolve the Austrian question and attempt to appeal to *großdeutsch* nationalists, Roggenbach outlined a complex treaty system. The agreement that he proposed, to be signed by Prussia and the other Confederal *states* with Austria, would ultimately become a “Treaty of Guarantees and Alliance,” guarding Austrian territory after the peace of Villafranca (1859), providing military support against internal disturbances, and assuring the Austrian government of the continued goodwill of Prussian leaders.¹³⁰ The rest of the states would then sign a treaty with Prussia in which they agreed to form a new federation that would centralize most diplomatic, military, and commercial powers into a new “Federal

Authority,” but the sacrifice of individual sovereignties had to be “sharply limited.”¹³¹ Roggenbach contended that the essence of state sovereignty would not be reduced; it would simply be “exercised” differently. “States” would exercise their sovereignty by sacrificing their rights to a central authority—sovereignty itself would not diminish in member states. It would still spring from the individual polities and simply flow to a federal executive.

Roggenbach proceeded to fill in the details. States would surrender international diplomacy and wartime military command to the Federal Authority. They would also place their governments, officials, and citizens under the jurisdiction of a federal court and enact state laws to conform with a new federal constitution.¹³² The final provision was already in force with the Confederal prohibition against constitutions and laws at odds with its own constitution. Other provisions, however, such as ministerial responsibility and the wide jurisdiction of a federal court, were new—notwithstanding antecedents in the Reich Constitution of 1849, and even in the institutions of the Holy Roman Empire.¹³³ The Federal Authority would also create currency, station federal agents in any state, declare war and peace, hear complaints from citizens against individual states, and adjudicate disputes between individual states at the federal court.¹³⁴ The Federal Authority would have the ability to arrest, try, convict, imprison, and execute *anyone* accused of “federal treason” on its own authority and with its own officials.¹³⁵

Roggenbach clearly assigned agency to states and nations, which was a common feature of midcentury liberal thinking.¹³⁶ He eschewed mentioning monarchs in much of the preamble and the more sweeping articles of his draft. Roggenbach may have proclaimed that Prussia saves, and Austria schemes—this was one of his bolder claims—but his level of abstraction deserves attention because he did not write of state ministers or monarchs. This choice of words was part of a broader political impulse in Europe, circulating since the Enlightenment, to break the image of the monarch as God’s anointed head of politics and society. Liberals sought to substitute the people of the nation—here, bourgeois men—as the leading historical actors who would steer the state through deliberation in the legislature, service as responsible state ministers, and expertise as advisors to pliant princes.¹³⁷ The (nation-)state was sovereign, not the monarch.¹³⁸ Yet German liberals needed the princes to accept this iconoclastic campaign if they hoped to found a liberal nation-state without revolution. Network members’ understanding of sovereignty flowing to a nationalized monarchy was revolutionary in the context of the Confederal Constitution.¹³⁹ Roggenbach refused to acknowledge the implications of his proposal for individual sovereigns because, in the end, he needed their consent. Perhaps believing that state leaders would eventually see reason and cede power to a federal state, Roggenbach delayed discussing the near absolutist demands of his future federation on Confederal princes to later sections of his draft.¹⁴⁰

The confusion over where power actually resided in the new “federation” came fully into view in the final sections of Roggenbach’s proposal, where he had to explain the role of the Prussian king in his plan to create a new federal power. He remarked toward the end of the draft that the old Confederation would not disappear.¹⁴¹ The dissolution of the Confederation of 1815 would violate international treaties, turning Roggenbach’s reform into an international revolution. Roggenbach argued, therefore, that Confederal laws would remain in force in Austria, as well as in the Danish and Dutch Confederal states, but would cease to apply to the states of the new federation with Prussia. Thus, Roggenbach found a premodern answer to a modern legal complexity: he embraced anomaly.¹⁴² He contended that the federation would be the legal successor of the Confederation and guarantor of its international obligations.¹⁴³ This supposed compromise with international legality was a convoluted borrowing from the *Doppelbund* of *Trias* thinking in which the smaller German states would form a new, “narrower” federation within the old, or “wider,” Confederation with Austria and Prussia.¹⁴⁴ Yet, unlike the double Confederation of the *Trias*, the Roggenbach federation would somehow reside within the shell of the old Confederation. He emphasized that his federation would be a “convention of sovereign *states*,” whereas the basis of the Confederation was agreement between sovereign *monarchs*.¹⁴⁵ States, in effect, entered the Confederation behind their monarchs. Yet, in Roggenbach’s federation, the states themselves formed the union. He tried to reconcile the influence of southern German liberals’ openness to popular sovereignty—who argued that the princes were representatives of the state—with a more conservative understanding of monarchy.¹⁴⁶ A union of states could not be a member of a monarchical compact such as the Confederation, unless it was ruled by a single sovereign, not an abstract Federal Authority or “leading federal power.”¹⁴⁷

Which state—or better, who—was the “leading power” of the federation? “The king of Prussia,” Roggenbach declared, “exercises all rights and powers that are allocated to the Federal Authority. . . .”¹⁴⁸ A federation of states would not be headed by one state but by the Crown of the most powerful state. Roggenbach unknowingly created this dissonance by ascribing agency and authority first to states, then to monarchs, then to the Federal Authority. He sowed confusion about the legitimacy of the federal government and ruffled legitimist feathers across Germany. Roggenbach argued that sovereignty flowed from the monarch to the states, then from the states back to the Federal Authority. Constituent sovereignties would collect for the king to deploy as head of the Federal Authority and monarch of the largest state. The point of Roggenbach’s seemingly contradictory line of authority from many individual princes to one national monarch was that monarchical sovereignty remained, at the federal level, in the hands of a prince. The king of Prussia would also have the right to call and dismiss the State and National Councils—bodies of the federal legislature akin to the British Commons and House of Lords. He could also pardon felons and oversee all areas

touching on federal authority.¹⁴⁹ Other monarchs would, thus, have no hope of opposing Prussian power if the National Council were prorogued. The Prussian king would wield complete military and diplomatic powers, the hallmarks of nineteenth-century monarchical sovereignty, whereas constituent monarchs and the people's representatives would exercise only indirect influence over the executive in the bicameral legislature.¹⁵⁰

Roggenbach's proposal also addressed the problem of a future war. After the completion of the treaties forming the basis of the federal constitution, the constituent states would sign a new federal war constitution.¹⁵¹ It would provide the basis on which states would reach individual military conventions with Prussia. Again, the *states* of Germany, meaning their monarchs, would reach identical agreements with the king of Prussia. There would be no singular treaty between all other states and Prussia that would elide the notion on which Roggenbach insisted: that sovereignties would flow into the reservoir of the Federal Authority individually to be dispensed by the person of the Prussian king.¹⁵²

The new war constitution and subsequent military conventions would provide the Federal Authority with "the exclusive right to organize and legislate, along with the supervision of the German army."¹⁵³ The Federal Authority, vested abstractly in the Prussian Crown and embodied literally in the person of the Prussian king, would have the power to appoint, in wartime, all corps commanders, divisional commanders, and general staffs.¹⁵⁴ What would disappear in Roggenbach's plan was the assignment of officers—a sovereign prerogative and important tool in monarchical patronage and international relations. Apart from the diplomatic right to declare war and peace, the Federal Authority would control state army contingents tasked with responding to external and internal "threats."¹⁵⁵ The vagueness of the term "threats" likely signaled that the new federation would fulfill the international obligations of the old Confederation: to suppress rebels and revolution. The Federal Authority would allow the king to reach into individual states and shape the final, and, increasingly, the first instance of civil suppression.¹⁵⁶ Thus, monarchs would surrender control of their armies, as well as a major part of their police forces, to the Prussian king.

Questions of officer appointments and military justice proved difficult to settle. Suffice it to say here that this proposal stepped indelicately on an important institution—military command—through which monarchs interacted with the nobility. That relationship represented a bastion of royal service to the state, particularly in Prussia.¹⁵⁷ More traditional monarchs balked at such interference, as did some liberals: both groups feared this change might shift control of internal policing to the Junker-dominated Prussian army. Roggenbach's new Federal Authority might thereby affect the daily affairs and privileges of every citizen-subject in every state: judicially, through a federal court; legislatively, through the directly elected National Council; and executively, through the supreme military command of the Prussian king.

The plan demonstrated that Roggenbach and his liberal political friends, after years of difficult accommodations with conservative state power, were still pursuing a strategy that hinged on persuading Germany's monarchs and state ministers to form a *kleindeutsch* nation-state. However, like most network members, Roggenbach either failed to understand what monarchy meant to most German leaders or understood but failed to offer a vision that appealed to *großdeutsch* nationalists or Prussian conservatives. Roggenbach did not consider democrats, whose notions of monarchy were as unappealing to moderate liberals as moderate liberals' collective national monarchy was to conservatives. In their need to convince Confederal leaders to accept their advice, the political friends faced a narrow path to national unification.

In the wake of the Italian War of 1859, Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden incorporated nearly all of Franz von Roggenbach's draft into his government's draft proposal of 1860–61, which he and Roggenbach circulated to other members of the network.¹⁵⁸ Roggenbach reported to Max Duncker that he and Friedrich of Baden had received mixed messages about the plan from both the Prussian foreign ministry and the prince regent, though both remained open to reform originating from a smaller state.¹⁵⁹ Nevertheless, Roggenbach admitted that a Baden plan would still likely be met with skepticism.¹⁶⁰ He mobilized Duncker and other network members for a second time to sound out the Prussian government discreetly about its members' receptiveness to a Baden proposal to the Confederal diet.¹⁶¹

Although King Wilhelm had initially endorsed a general Baden outline for Confederal reform, the detailed proposal's official reception in Berlin was cool.¹⁶² Max Duncker's inability to gauge the attitude of the Prussian government toward reform demonstrated his lack of influence at the highest levels and failure to coordinate within the network. In a memorandum to the crown prince in May 1861, Duncker referred to fears in the Wilhelmstraße that the crown prince would fall prey to "fantastical plans" through his connections with Baden, especially after Roggenbach's appointment as foreign minister.¹⁶³ High officials in Prussia regarded the Baden government in general, and Roggenbach in particular, as sources of dangerously fanciful reformism.¹⁶⁴ Albrecht von Bernstorff, Prussia's new foreign minister, worried that Friedrich and Roggenbach's reformed Confederation "would be more republican than monarchical."¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, Bernstorff did incorporate a few of Roggenbach's proposals into his reply to *Trias* unification plans in December 1861.¹⁶⁶

These Prussian officials, however, merely restated their ruler's sentiments. In an earlier letter to Friedrich of Baden, Wilhelm had criticized the "theorizing small states," arguing that the lesser states should simply join him against the possibility of French invasion.¹⁶⁷ "Theorizing" among leaders of the smaller states meant Confederal reform, and the Prussian king challenged the legitimacy of

his son-in-law's efforts. Wilhelm also tapped into fears among German liberals that their efforts might be dismissed by rivals as "childish *Projectmacherei*."¹⁶⁸ The limits that Grand Duke Friedrich's plans would place on Wilhelm's own rights were too tight. The king therefore suggested submission to Prussia as a *temporary* defensive measure against France. The smaller princes would have to surrender their sovereignty on Wilhelm's terms, not their own.

Taking stock, we can see that Friedrich of Baden and Franz von Roggenbach, unlike most Prussian leaders, located sovereignty in the machinery of state, meaning here constitutional, parliamentary government. In this way, Roggenbach reinterpreted absolutist-era reformers, such as Carl Svarez, who considered an ideal monarch to be the "principal of civil society," what Hobbes called the state's "artificial soul," and what the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht called the "head *within* the state."¹⁶⁹ Sovereignty inhered in the monarch, but his place inside the apparatus of state suggested that the monarch's God-given prerogatives were contained and administered by the state. Once national unification was achieved, the king merely had to be there in the system, not active in its direction.¹⁷⁰ Roggenbach adopted the king of Prussia as the legitimating ghost *within* the machine of his liberal, federal government. In his proposal, sovereignty would be collected in the nation-state to serve practical ends: first, because it would transfer agency from monarchs to states; and second, because those states, now governed constitutionally, would help realize national unification. Roggenbach adapted liberal notions of monarchs as necessary agents of historical progress who would be overcome with the foundation of a centralized nation-state.¹⁷¹ Conservative leaders were unlikely to accept such a premise at all: they insisted that states were emanations of the monarch's divine-right sovereignty; they were not independent agents in themselves. For them, sovereignty could only be lent so far. Otherwise, the princes themselves might disappear, and republican revolution might deluge the conservative monarchical order of post-Napoleonic Europe.

Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden's attempt at Confederal reform foundered on the views of the leaders of larger Confederal states, whose understanding of monarchy fueled their continuing suspicion of sweeping reforms. In the face of such opposition, network members began to understand that a gradual approach to national consolidation was more realistic. By September 1860, Karl Mathy had already asked Charlotte Duncker to see whether Berlin would be willing to entertain a commission within the Zollverein to develop Confederal reforms.¹⁷² The others restricted themselves to altering the Confederal War Constitution, which had become an important topic among German liberals, to the benefit of the Prussian monarchy.¹⁷³ They seem to have concluded that military authority, the keystone of monarchical power, should be their focus.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, certain aspects of Roggenbach's ambitious Federal Authority would find modest expression in a treaty Duke Ernst of Coburg concluded with Prussia in 1861.

Shortly after Austria's military defeat in Italy in 1859, Duke Ernst II of Coburg signaled—on his own initiative—his willingness to sacrifice his sovereignty for national unity. He explained to Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden: “For me, it is only about the people making sure which of the German princes boldly take the important questions of the day in their hands and are capable of breaking out of their miscellaneous dynastic interests.”¹⁷⁵ Confederal intractability on reform during the Italian War of 1859 had frustrated Duke Ernst. He stated that with “the complete lack of goodwill among most of the Confederal governments, it seemed necessary for me to take a practical step to effect a solution to the questions in my admittedly limited sphere of power.”¹⁷⁶ Ernst's focus on the “lack of goodwill” among the German governments indicated the network's continued, though diminishing, faith in princely consensus to achieve national goals.¹⁷⁷ Duke Ernst sought to advance *kleindeutsch* unification and demonstrate his readiness to relinquish his rights for the “common good.” In his subsequent military convention with Prussia, Duke Ernst disavowed Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden's sweeping reforms, which Wilhelm of Prussia had dismissed as “theoretic.” Yet, the convention sparked controversy not because it was practical but because it was highly symbolic.

Coburg and Prussian officials signed the military convention in June 1861, at the same time the Prussian government introduced War Minister Albrecht von Roon's hotly disputed army bill to the Landtag. That bill ignited years of constitutional struggle over the right of the legislature to review military spending and divided liberals.¹⁷⁸ The agreement drew on traditions of informal military cooperation between smaller German governments and the Prussian army.¹⁷⁹ The preamble of the convention acknowledged that the king of Prussia and the duke of Coburg accepted the treaty because they were firmly convinced that Germany had to strengthen its common military capacities.¹⁸⁰ They therefore pleaded with other governments to bind themselves to one of the German Great Powers to promote military cooperation and national consolidation.

The question of sovereignty and its transferability emerged immediately. The document was filed as a military agreement between the Coburg government and the government of Prussia.¹⁸¹ In reality, it was an agreement between monarchs as commanders, not an agreement between state governments. What was framed as a modern agreement between states for the German nation was a translation of traditional princely consensus-building in the Holy Roman Empire.¹⁸² The distinction was important, especially when the more conservative monarchs and state ministers challenged the convention. They did so because it curtailed monarchical prerogatives, not state power as such, just as they had the Baden reform plans a year earlier.

The convention provided that the Prussian king, as supreme commander of the Prussian army, would accept the financial and material upkeep of the Coburg Confederal military contingent.¹⁸³ In exchange, the duke of Coburg

would become a Prussian general in command of the Coburg contingent: “His Highness the duke stands in relation to the contingent as a commanding general, and His Highness will approach all relevant general edicts, regulations, ordinances [*sic*] through the Royal War Ministry.”¹⁸⁴ The Prussian army would train Coburg troops to Prussian standards. All uniforms, riding equipment, and other materiel would become Prussian military property. The signatories took pains to portray the armies as united in personal union with the Prussian king, but the implementation of Prussian state laws and military standards represented the de facto incorporation of Coburg troops into the Prussian army.

The Prussian king and his laws held sway in this convention. In his role as commanding officer, the duke had to communicate with the king through the war ministry. The duke of Coburg could no longer, technically, communicate with the king as an equal sovereign and confederate. At best, Duke Ernst became an unusual kind of subordinate. Yet, was supreme command—military sovereignty—shared between the king and the duke? Did this division alter the essence of the duke’s divine-right prerogatives, the independence of his duchies, and the foundations of political legitimacy in Central Europe?

As in Roggenbach’s reform plan, the implications of the duke’s sovereign “sacrifice” became clearer in the details. The king of Prussia, as the new supreme Coburg commander, exercised important rights that stood between the reigning duke and his subject-citizens—in the field and at home. The king could now engage with individual Coburg subjects at the most consequential levels—those of material support and court rulings. The convention also codified extra-Confederal Prussian police powers in a smaller German state. The absolutist campaign to abolish the social and legal barriers between the monarch and his subject-citizens, as a hallmark of princely power and state hegemony, resorted in the convention to an early modern “layering” of princely sovereignty.¹⁸⁵ The duke’s flowed to the Prussian king, as it would have in Roggenbach’s reform proposal.¹⁸⁶ Yet, once the duke’s sovereign rights passed to the king, they could not easily be retracted.

For one thing, the Prussian king had to approve senior officers’ appointments within the Coburg contingent and could reassign officers at will, though the duke’s preferences would be given the “most feasible deference.”¹⁸⁷ Officers, doctors, and paymasters were freed of all ducal taxes and obliged to pay into Prussian pension schemes and widow-orphan funds. More importantly, Coburg troops would swear an oath of allegiance to the king of Prussia.¹⁸⁸ By pledging themselves to the Prussian king as if they were Prussian subjects, Coburgers swore to obey a foreign leader over their own monarch. Coburg officers, doctors, and paymasters also had to obtain the Prussian king’s consent before accepting foreign military honors. In a society that prized decorations and understood the powerful relationships they represented, these Coburgers had to apply to a power beyond their own ruler.¹⁸⁹

The insistence on the king of Prussia's control over officers, doctors, and paymasters matched Roggenbach's fixation in his reform proposal on regulating the relationship between the monarch, as supreme commander, nobles, and bourgeois citizen-soldiers. Nobles and a noble ethos continued to dominate officer corps, especially in Prussia, well into the 1860s—and beyond.¹⁹⁰ The army was the traditional institution through which territorializing monarchies coopted local nobles, and through which nobles expected to influence high politics and gain access to the monarch.¹⁹¹ However, paymasters—army bureaucrats, basically—and doctors were more likely to be middle-class professionals. The Prussian king gained the right to insert himself between the duke and his most “important” subjects through the institution that most projected monarchical prestige and political power.

The providence of the Prussian king extended broadly into areas of military justice. He not only exercised all martial prerogatives for Prussian subjects assigned to the Coburg contingent, but he was also the final arbiter over life and death for Coburg soldiers. The duke retained the right of first review in cases involving units or individual enlisted men. In cases involving officers, doctors, and paymasters, the king of Prussia would rule by consensus with the duke. For officers convicted of civil offenses, the king and the duke had to reach a consensus on pardons. For officers convicted of military crimes, only the Prussian king could grant pardons. At the highest level of military justice, only the king of Prussia could spare lives or reverse ducal decisions.

The king of Prussia could likewise intervene in the administration of the Coburg duchies through the deployment of the army for internal policing. The convention stated that the duke of Coburg maintained full control over his now-Prussian contingent in whole or part for “policing purposes.”¹⁹² The contingent, however, might contain Prussian soldiers and officers who would take part in quelling possible unrest in Coburg. When confronting “armed tumults,” the Coburg contingent had to proceed according to Prussian riot ordinances and state sedition laws. The duchies were also obliged to pass legislation conforming to Prussian laws against civil unrest. Coburgers would be treated like Prussians, as the Prussian army mixed in foreign politics with the highest measure of violence and without Confederal execution orders. This innovation well exceeded the limited jurisdiction of the Confederal diet to discipline state officers serving in its contingents.¹⁹³ The overriding mandate of the German Confederation—to quash revolutionary activity—passed to the Prussian king. The duke of Coburg, much as Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden had in their reform proposals, embraced anomaly, and “divided sovereignty” in his pursuit of the nation-state.¹⁹⁴

What is historically important is that Duke Ernst sought to set an example for the other German monarchs who, liberals knew, were reluctant to surrender their “particularist sovereignty.”¹⁹⁵ He wanted to show how they too could “sacrifice”

their personal sovereignty, their supreme judicial authority and monopoly on violence, to a larger monarch to advance German national security and the eventual realization of the nation-state.¹⁹⁶ In dividing his sovereignty, Ernst combined a deeply religious, eschatological estimation of sacrifice to the liberal idea that the nation-state was the end-station of historical progress. The duke's part in this relationship, however, remained vague and precarious. As a senior Prussian officer, he submitted himself to the possibility of court martial, imprisonment, or even execution. He was subject to another monarch, but as sovereign he remained the origin of Coburg legal authority and the embodiment of his states' connection to the Confederation. This contradiction was not lost on Ernst's contemporaries.

In a letter to Grand Duke Carl Alexander of Weimar in July 1861, Friedrich of Baden appraised Duke Ernst's military convention with Prussia from two perspectives. On the one hand, Friedrich thought the convention represented a convenient solution to problems facing smaller states—Friedrich likely meant the financial burden of maintaining Confederal contingents. On the other hand, Friedrich believed that, in the context of *kleindeutsch* conflict with *Trias* advocates, such extra-Confederal agreements might cause disintegration in the nationalist camp. He warned Carl Alexander that “We should not give our opponents the opportunity to engage us with our own weapons, and so we must cautiously measure our forces, and only then, if we have prepared the field, join battle.”¹⁹⁷ Friedrich was concerned, not with the idea of Ernst's submission to Prussian power, but with its timing. Network members still hoped to push *kleindeutsch* reforms through the Confederal diet. Any convention that could be construed as mediatization undermined their credibility among the smaller states.

Other monarchical reactions were more dramatic. Duke Bernhard II of Saxe-Meiningen, Ernst's Thuringian neighbor, found Duke Ernst's convention unforgivable. The duke had not consulted the other members of their dynasty—which included the ever-suspicious Bernhard—before relinquishing a portion of his sovereignty.¹⁹⁸ Ernst's decision could not be considered simply personal. Since he was a reigning monarch, his decision affected all dynasts as potential heirs. It threatened their presumptive majesty. Bernhard regarded the current monarch as a custodian of the Crown, and Ernst could not relinquish any rights of said Crown without the consent of its possible heirs.¹⁹⁹

King Georg V of Hanover, notoriously jealous of his prerogatives and opposed to any changes to Confederal law, captured the attitude of the most conservative German monarchs in reacting to news of the Coburg-Prussian compact.²⁰⁰ He warned Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria against splitting the leadership of Confederal forces between himself and Prussia, reminding the emperor that infringing on monarchs' supreme command would be like laying “an axe to the roots of the individual princes' sovereignty.” Georg continued: “One of the major elements of sovereignty is, as you know, military authority . . . without it, the sovereign princes would be mere vassals or satellites of both Great Powers.”²⁰¹ His

arboreal metaphor hints at a conception of monarchy and the state as products of a divinely ordained cosmos, of natural development—this thinking was popular among German conservatives.²⁰² For the king of Hanover, without overall command, even the rulers of middle German states would lose their sovereignty and suffer mediatization. The duke of Coburg's convention, therefore, threatened the basis of European society. If the legitimate order were upset, it would only invite revolution and social chaos. Preserving divine-right monarchy, as well as the independence of the smaller German states, outweighed national interests for King Georg.

Other leaders in the middle states expressed Georg's negative assessment in more menacing terms. For Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, de facto minister president of Saxony and a leading voice in the *Trias* movement, the duke's convention with the king of Prussia revealed the latter's desire to dominate the smaller German states.²⁰³ An Austrian diplomat recorded that Beust said that, although the military convention benefited an already powerful Prussia, it did not affect the "unviability" of the small states, "since they are often really a caricature of state political life . . ." ²⁰⁴ Beust's statement not only expressed *Trias's* interests in mediatizing smaller neighbors; it also conflated military authority with the *raison d'être* of reigning monarchs and the "viability" of the countries they ruled—a variation on the Hanoverian king's legitimist argument. Since Ernst of Coburg had surrendered his military sovereignty, he and his state could no longer enjoy any independence.

Network members also reported rumblings about Duke Ernst's political activities as a Prussian general, further illustrating how contemporaries struggled to understand the concept of a sovereign Prussian duke-general. Max Duncker wrote to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, pointing to the convention with Coburg as one of the all-too-few successes of the New Era ministry.²⁰⁵ Duncker admitted, however, that in its own right, the convention signified little: more conventions needed to follow between Prussia and Waldeck-Pyrmont, Altenburg, and Weimar. The Saxon and Meiningen governments had contested the agreement, he added, but the French government might also oppose the treaty. Duncker alluded here to "*Rheinbündlerei*," or the cooperation of German princes with Napoleon I in the Rhenish Confederation (1806–13), in the shared interests of France and the middle states.²⁰⁶ Max Duncker deemed objections from Paris and Dresden to be auspicious signs: whatever angered the enemy in France and the particularists in Saxony must be good for Prussia and, therefore, good for Germany.

In the late 1880s, Duke Ernst argued in his memoirs that a prince's first duty was to maintain German national strength in Europe.²⁰⁷ A monarch's loyalty was to the conceptual nation and not to his population as such. This understanding, based on hindsight, contrasts with how the duke often based his legitimacy on a direct, personal connection to each of his subjects.²⁰⁸ Ernst alluded to this con-

tradition when he described dissent in Coburg over union with the Prussian king. He reported cries such as, “The *Landeskinder* are being sold to the king of Prussia!”²⁰⁹ The *Landesvater* (father of the land) derived his position from the patriarchal protection of his *Landeskinder* (children of the land). Submission to another monarch upset widespread notions of the “family state” and unsettled bourgeois members’ expectations of “manly” monarchs in control of themselves, their families, and their *Landeskinder*. This charge was especially loaded for German liberals, such as Ernst, because they imagined monarchical authority as the “natural” historical outgrowth of, and contemporary analog to, the authority of the family patriarch.²¹⁰

Duke Ernst’s fiat diplomacy also clashed with liberal ideas about citizen participation—of the propertied and educated—in major government decisions and reflected his insistence on deference from his liberal political friends in other areas of organizing. Ernst defended the convention as a “good patriotic sacrifice,” if a rather paternalistic one.²¹¹ His subjects had to submit to Prussia and Germany by *his* decree. The goal of the nation-state triumphed over the traditional duties of the monarchical patriarch and the consideration a liberal ruler owed his citizen-subjects—and his political friends. As Ernst described reactions to his pact in his memoirs, King Georg of Hanover and Friedrich von Beust, like the disgruntled Coburgers, cared more about the realities of uniforms and courts martial than the fiction of the nation. Duke Ernst also claimed retrospectively that he had agreed to a temporary measure to cede only a small portion of his monarchical prerogative.²¹² Indeed, the duke’s two duchies together had only about 150,000 inhabitants spread over less than 2,700 square kilometers. Its Confederal contingent provided a reserve of about 1,800 troops. In the fraught climate of the Confederation at this time, however—with mounting fears of French invasion from the west, Danish inroads from the north, and Italian attack from the south—most Confederal leaders were unlikely to applaud the convention when it involved military matters and smacked of mediatization.

Duke Ernst thus attempted to overcome the tradition of noisy independence among the smaller German states, but he remained a part of a Central European system that required legal and military authority to be united in a fully sovereign *Landesvater*. He had to maintain his monopoly on violence and its expression in military matters. Nevertheless, it is important to note again that the duke’s prerogatives were not ceded to the Prussian state. They were surrendered to the *person* of the Prussian king. Duke Ernst’s sacrifice for the good of the German nation, though couched in modern phrases, was an agreement between princely commanders—the very foundation of the German Confederation. Duke Ernst and King Wilhelm thus adapted post-Napoleonic legitimacy to the cause of national consolidation.

Other members of the network imagined the Coburg convention as an example for other smaller states in the 1860s. Indeed, Weimar had drafted a similar

agreement, and, by 1864, Altenburg and Waldeck-Pyrmont had concluded military conventions with the Prussian king.²¹³ In 1866–67, the Coburg military compact served as a model for military agreements that provided a crucial foundation for the North German Confederation.²¹⁴ The conceptual complexity of the agreement could not obscure the fact that Prussia was arrogating power in the Confederation. Most Confederal monarchs rejected Ernst's model for the peaceful consolidation of German military power. Both the liberal network's grand and piecemeal efforts in the early 1860s to achieve national unification had failed to attract much support in the halls of power. The political friends soon faced greater problems and harder decisions.

The End of the New Era and the Limits of Accommodation

Even as network members in the smaller states developed serious plans for national unification and enjoyed some limited successes, Max Duncker's position in Berlin remained vulnerable. Charlotte Duncker and Karl Mathy noted that although Max Duncker's nerves had been damaged by working in the Central Press Office, he had continued to impress Auerswald and Hohenzollern with his apologies for the cabinet. Unfortunately, he had also neglected requests for news and favors from core network members such as Heinrich von Sybel and Karl Francke.²¹⁵ Duncker also failed to quash scathing articles in the conservative press against Duke Ernst and his extended family in London.²¹⁶ Network members outside the Prussian government were further dissatisfied with its lack of reform and the prince regent's insistence on his royal prerogatives over the constitutional rights of the Prussian Landtag.²¹⁷ Charlotte Duncker was left to repair network relations, emphasizing the friends' common "political religion" and their long history of mutual support.²¹⁸

Max Duncker managed to please state officials and political friends alike in June 1860 at a meeting in Baden-Baden between select Confederal monarchs and Napoleon III. Just one year after defeating the Austrians in Italy, the French emperor had requested a personal meeting with the Prussian prince regent, Wilhelm, on Confederal territory. To avoid the impression that the Prussian government was considering an alliance with Napoleon and to demonstrate German unity, Wilhelm invited other major Confederal monarchs to join him. *Kleindeutsch* advocates lauded Wilhelm's demonstration of Hohenzollern power and influence in the Habsburgs' absence—evidence of his "moral conquest" of Germany as Baden reform plans languished.

Despite his position in the Press Office and the unclear chain of command, Duncker exercised considerable influence on the Prussian delegation.²¹⁹ Meetings between Napoleon III and Wilhelm were cordial but non-committal. Princes from the small German states shadowed the separate meetings between

the French, Bavarian, and Baden monarchs to dispel any appearance of “*Rheinbündlerei*.”²²⁰ Duncker conferred regularly with Wilhelm and Auerswald, and the former accepted Duncker’s draft for his closing speech almost word for word.²²¹ In the final meeting at Baden-Baden, Confederal leaders, foreshadowing the Fürstentag of 1863, issued a vague declaration about monarchical unity and the need to consolidate the Confederation. Network reactions to the summit were mixed. Ernst of Coburg, for one, was upset that he had not initially been invited.²²²

Max Duncker quickly capitalized on his improved standing. In January 1861, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV died, and the prince regent ascended the throne as King Wilhelm I, bolstering his symbolic and legal authority.²²³ Writing to the new king in early 1861, Duncker decried the burdens associated with his Press Office position. He had to contend with the effects for the government of Wilhelm’s decision at the start of the New Era to relax restrictions on the press—a key policy for liberals. Defending the “state administration” from “bitter criticism” in the domestic press had exhausted his energies, Duncker claimed.²²⁴ Duncker gently tendered his resignation, adding that he still wanted to serve his sovereign but would not presume to tell Wilhelm how to use his civil servants. Making an important distinction, Duncker adopted the formal language of fealty to the Prussian Crown, not necessarily expressing loyalty to Wilhelm as a person. The latter was how bourgeois members tended to interact with network princes. Political friendship was socially leveling, but minor monarchs seemed more approachable compared to the fearsome image of the powerful, older king.²²⁵

It was not long before Duncker was able to leverage his previous service to the Prussian government, his acquaintance with the crown prince, and the decisive intervention of Auerswald, Hohenzollern, and Duke Ernst of Coburg. The result was Duncker’s appointment as political advisor to King Wilhelm’s only son, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, in June 1861.²²⁶ This time, Duncker raced to outmaneuver his critics. He immediately began restricting access to the crown prince by mandating a new routine, reminiscent of Freytag’s plans in the 1850s to insulate Duke Ernst from unwelcome distractions. Duncker felt compelled by the “difficult and manifold duties that these times will place on His Royal Highness” to tutor the prince in regal deportment, considering it a “matter of conscience.”²²⁷ Claiming that he wanted only to preserve the crown prince’s strength and energy, but actually in order to gain influence over him, Duncker advised Friedrich Wilhelm to avoid direct involvement in most issues and limit his audiences to those with written applications only—in effect, ceding control over his schedule to his advisor.²²⁸

Max Duncker, like Gustav Freytag, implemented the liberal theory that monarchs, properly tutored in “correct political perception” and “true political virtue,” would enact liberal policies.²²⁹ Duncker’s particular emphasis on upright behavior reflected German liberals’ belief that the fall of the Bourbon monarchy

during the French Revolution—leading to the Terror—was occasioned by a population resentful of royal immorality and government waste.²³⁰ In the view of bourgeois liberals, princes differed little from the poor in their need for tutelage in the manners of moral politics.

In practice, Max Duncker's main duty was to brief the crown prince on political developments through regular reports on domestic, Confederal, and international politics.²³¹ Before Max Duncker's formal appointment as advisor to the crown prince, both Dunccker had shared publications by their political friends, such as Sybel and Auerbach, with the crown prince, along with memoranda and reports by Duke Ernst of Coburg, Karl Samwer, Franz von Roggenbach, and Friedrich of Baden.²³² The principal subjects that Max Duncker himself broached with the royal heir were the constitutional crisis, the consolidation of the Confederation, and the goals of the teetering New Era ministry.

In his reports, Duncker supported the Prussian Crown in its conflict with the Landtag; he believed that the army budget and associated taxes on previously exempt East-Elbian estates would undermine noble power and thereby political conservatism in Prussia—to the advantage of liberal reformers.²³³ Duncker also believed that an expanded army could better protect the Confederation from potential Danish and French aggression, lessen Russian influence at court, and thereby speed *kleindeutsch* unification. Here, Duncker differed from most network members who resented royal claims on the remaining rights won during the Revolutions of 1848/49.

Max Duncker did adhere to orthodox opinion within the network on the second topic: only Confederal monarchs could accomplish the peaceful unification of a liberal *Kleindeutschland* because Trias projects were dangerous.²³⁴ Members favored a British-style parliament with associated limits on royal power for the future state. The crown prince agreed with liberals on responsible ministers—at the time—and embraced a bourgeois lifestyle in public.²³⁵ On the third point, Duncker defended his patrons in the New Era until Hohenzollern and Auerswald had both resigned by early 1862. The Prussian constitutional crisis had intensified considerably, and the dispute over the new military budget pitted the legislative power of the purse against the most potent aspect of monarchical sovereignty: military command.²³⁶ The crisis was crucial to the fracturing of the network after the collapse of the New Era government. A caretaker cabinet followed under Adolf zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, whose leading rule was taken over by that of August von der Heydt, a long-serving trade minister and moderate, statist conservative.²³⁷

With the downfall of the New Era cabinet, Max Duncker recommended ministerial replacements to the crown prince from among his political friends.²³⁸ In early 1862, Duncker began to present Otto von Bismarck as someone to break the gridlock that had brought down Hohenzollern and Auerswald. He had been in contact with Bismarck from at least December 1861 regarding German pol-

itics.²³⁹ Duncker reported to the crown prince that if the king did not promote the moderate-liberal foreign minister, Albrecht von Bernstorff, a Bismarck ministry would be preferable to the current, “half-hearted” Heydt cabinet.²⁴⁰ Duncker quickly claimed that, barring the formation of a new liberal ministry, Bismarck’s appointment would represent “an important win” for both the Prussian legislature and the Crown.²⁴¹ He also advised Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm that Bismarck should receive invitations to crown councils, and he enthused over Bismarck’s plan to create new professorships—tangible boons to Duncker’s political friends.²⁴²

After Bismarck assured King Wilhelm that he could deliver military reform without a majority in the Prussian Landtag, the king appointed him minister president on 23 September 1862.²⁴³ The new minister president received Duncker two days later “with memories of our classmate camaraderie,” and the hope “that our new relationship will never lack the openness of that old companionship.”²⁴⁴ Duncker praised Bismarck’s ministry to the crown prince, whose wife and mother distrusted the new leader.²⁴⁵ He then asserted that Bismarck was “on the road to a liberal, national policy—on a military road,” that was. Duncker made this claim even though Bismarck had been appointed to break liberal parliamentary resistance to the proposed military budget at all costs.²⁴⁶ Bismarck’s so-called liberal foreign policy—by which Duncker meant a path to *kleindeutsch* unification—led him to impute goodwill to Bismarck’s domestic policy toward the legislature. In Duncker’s view, Bismarck “seriously wants rapprochement,” with the king’s consent. Bismarck’s standing with the king, Duncker declared, was far better than Heydt’s or Auerswald’s had ever been.²⁴⁷

Here—and this point merits emphasis—Duncker made one of German liberalism’s earliest accommodations with Bismarck’s anti-parliamentarianism in exchange for national unification. He endorsed the primacy of German unity over Prussian constitutional freedoms. Duncker turned right for avowedly liberal reasons, he claimed, and sought to steer the crown prince toward the policies of the “white revolutionary” by emphasizing national potentiality over domestic reality.²⁴⁸ Nonetheless, after the collapse of the New Era cabinet, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm exercised little influence over his father, the king.²⁴⁹ Perhaps Duncker believed that creating some sort of understanding between Bismarck and the crown prince might increase the latter’s influence.

More importantly, Max Duncker undergirded his evaluation of Bismarck with shared memories of boyhood camaraderie. Both the liberal advisor and the conservative minister assumed personal feeling reflected political agreement or at least an avenue to accommodation—a budding political friendship, Duncker hoped.²⁵⁰ According to the logic of political friendship, if Duncker held any fond memories of Bismarck, there had to be a common outlook resulting from that emotional affinity. Bismarck, who was skilled at the manipulation of emotion for political ends, likely considered Duncker yet another representative of misguided

“*Geheimrathsliberalismus*”—a persuasive emissary to liberals in the legislature, but ultimately someone with dangerous, divisive notions of political reform.²⁵¹

Most core members of the network, including Franz von Roggenbach, Karl Samwer, Gustav Freytag, and Duke Ernst of Coburg, had no personal connection to Bismarck. Moreover, they saw in him an unrepentant reactionary from 1848 and their days at the Erfurt Parliament.²⁵² Duncker’s rejection in 1863 of the network consensus against Bismarck angered these members, particularly Samwer and Ernst, and the relative openness of the 1860s gave network members more opportunities to vent their frustrations and less reason to tolerate recalcitrant political friends. Samwer and Duke Ernst began undermining Duncker’s position with the crown prince in favor of Ernst von Stockmar, son of the recently deceased Christian von Stockmar.²⁵³ After Duncker had endorsed the second dissolution of the Prussian Landtag in mid-1863, Samwer seethed with anger: “I have buried Max Duncker. . . . I consider him merely an apostate, admittedly a very stupid apostate, but after all a conscious enemy of that cause for which we fought alongside him for years.”²⁵⁴ Samwer felt Duncker had betrayed him and the network personally and politically. He painted this betrayal in militantly religious hues, hoping other members would join him in finally “burying” Duncker.²⁵⁵ Max Duncker’s accommodating of liberalism to the Prussian state and its conservative leaders was denounced with unusual vengeance.

Karl Samwer also condemned Duncker to social isolation for his political heresy. Samwer’s religious language suggested the totalizing power of political world-views for some liberals in the Christian—especially Protestant—vocabulary that German nationalists had adopted.²⁵⁶ The members of the network had combined their influence to place a leading member near the heart of Prussian power, to mold the royal heir and future emperor, but now Duncker’s policy positions had taken an unsettling turn to the right. Even Rudolf Haym, who generally supported Duncker, conceded: “For a long time, I have had no hope for a political springtide. Never have we suffered such a betrayal of the state, [this] dangerous, extremely hazardous, maniacal reaction.”²⁵⁷ Above all, the conflict between Duncker and Samwer represented an early example of the divisions between liberals over how many constitutional rights should be exchanged for national unification. Instead of dating to the end of the 1860s, as Jörn Leonhard has contended, the case of Max Duncker’s “apostacy” places the emergence of this schism in the early 1860s.²⁵⁸ Network members reflected this process in their internal struggles to define the limits of liberal accommodation to state power in pursuit of national unification. Constitutional monarchy was the common ground on which Duncker and Samwer had built their political friendship from the Revolutions of 1848/49 onward, the surest road to a liberal German nation-state. Now it was crumbling beneath their feet.

Conclusion

The network of moderate liberals reached the peak of its official influence in the early 1860s. The beginning of the New Era in 1858 under Prince Regent Wilhelm and his cabinet fueled members' hope that domestic reform and a responsive Prussian monarch would lead the "moral conquest" of the German Confederation and found a *Kleindeutschland*. The decline of state repression after 1858, marked by the uneasy accommodation between moderate liberal professionals and conservative state officials, allowed members of the network to leverage their shared resources: many were able to enter state service and higher professional posts in Prussia and Baden. Once in these positions, the political friends worked to advance *kleindeutsch* ideals by advising monarchs and their ministers.

Network members' negotiations with state leaders in the early 1860s were exemplified by Max Duncker, Berthold Auerbach, and Heinrich von Sybel. Duke Ernst II of Coburg, Karl Samwer, and Gustav Freytag sought to exploit their new connections in Berlin to advance network policies. Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden named Franz von Roggenbach to the foreign ministry. Many core members thus became imbricated in the decision-making of larger, more powerful, and more complex courts and cabinets. Their roles obliged network members to defend unpopular government policies, and this sowed conflict within the network.

At the same time, the new influence of network members allowed them to develop serious plans for Confederal reform and military consolidation under Prussia. Between 1858 and 1863, network members endeavored to locate the sources of sovereignty in the German Confederation. They accepted that sovereignty sprang from each monarch through his special relationship with the Christian God. Divine sanction undergirded the legal sanction of Confederal and state laws and dynastic regulations. Network members and Confederal leaders then identified monarchs' supreme military command as *the* expression of this sovereignty. The Confederal Constitution and Vienna Final Act obliged monarchs to maintain control over the instruments of state violence. The essence of Confederal monarchs' sovereignty had to remain unaltered; otherwise their states would risk losing the independence ascribed to them. To many Confederal leaders, diminishment of princely prerogatives threatened the legitimacy of monarchical rule in Europe and invited revolution.

Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich I of Baden's Confederal reform plans showed that network notions of negotiated unification rested on the establishment of a collective national monarchy. Their proposal demonstrated their idea that individual princes' prerogatives could be combined in a single "Federal Authority" with far-reaching powers. They assured anyone who would listen that the shifting of judicial, diplomatic, and military prerogatives would not tarnish

the essence of the monarchs' sovereignty. Sovereignties would be lent to a central authority, yes, but the ultimate wielder of federal power would be the king of Prussia. Roggenbach and the grand duke made few appeals to *großdeutsch* nationalists—and even fewer to democrats—and most conservative leaders outside the network largely rejected the liberal image of lending and collecting. They argued that, in reality, monarchical sovereignty could not be transferred, could not leave its source, without losing its essence and destabilizing Central Europe.

Duke Ernst II of Coburg responded to this challenge by signing a military convention with the king of Prussia. He ceded overall command of his troops to the king and became a commanding general in the Prussian army. A foreign leader now held sway over the lives and deaths of Coburg subjects through courts martial and laws against civilian unrest. Duke Ernst portrayed the agreement as a selfless act of patriotism, a roadmap to German unity for other Confederal princes to follow. Sacrificing military supremacy was, for Ernst, a valiant expression of national devotion. Conservative Confederal leaders disagreed vehemently. For them, Ernst's convention was a betrayal of monarchical legitimacy that questioned the very foundation of state independence. In the early 1860s, the liberal political friends' contradictory argument that monarchs could share their sovereignty with a federal state while remaining sovereign in the eyes of international treaties and the Confederal Constitution persuaded few German princes.

With the end of their reform plans and start of the Prussian constitutional crisis in 1861, members outside Berlin decried the perceived inaction of New Era ministers with whom the Dunccker had become close. These members were disappointed with the prince regent, soon to become King Wilhelm I, who intended to rule as a warrior king, not reign as a parliamentary monarch. Bismarck's appointment as Prussian minister president in September 1862 divided the network into two camps. The first camp, around Max Duncker, believed that a powerful king at the head of an expanded army was the surest means to deter foreign invasion and build Prussia's national prestige. This combination, they held, would hasten the peaceful formation of a liberalizing nation-state under Hohenzollern hegemony. Members in the second camp, who coalesced around Duke Ernst and Karl Samwer, disagreed with this view. To them, Bismarck was a reactionary who had no intention of forging a nation-state. The two camps went on to engage in increasingly adversarial debates with each other, and eventually accusations of personal and political betrayal flew between them. As the next chapter demonstrates, political friendship failed to facilitate political organization in a rapidly changing society. In their simultaneous division and unity, fragility and resilience, the network of political friends can nevertheless tell us much about German liberalism on the edge of the nation-state.

Notes

1. Brophy, "Political Calculus of Capital," 152–53; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 4. See also Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 8–9, 221; Clark, "After 1848," 171–97.
2. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 194–95.
3. Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 88.
4. Behnen, *Preufische Wochenblatt*, 9.
5. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 8; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 9–10; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 4, 7; see San Narciso, Barral-Martínez, and Armenteros, introduction to *Monarchy and Liberalism in Spain*, 2–4; Fillafer, "Habsburg Liberalism and the Enlightenment Past," 42–43; Achtelstetter, *Prussian Conservatism*, 6.
6. Cock, *On Sovereignty*, 11.
7. Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 195; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 22. See also Stollberg-Rilinger, *Der Staat als Maschine*, 20.
8. Møller, "Domesticating a German Heir to the Danish Throne," 131; Paulmann, "Searching for a 'Royal International,'" 145–77.
9. Møller, "Domesticating a German Heir to the Danish Throne," 131.
10. The willingness of many individual monarchs to relinquish their sovereignty for national consolidation undercuts Christian Jansen's claim that the voluntary surrender of princely prerogatives belonged to the realm of the "undoable" in the German Confederation of the 1860s. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 471.
11. Held, "Souveränität [sic]" in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 13: 442–43. The same entry defined sovereignty as a changeable state with nothing above or comparable to it. In a more contemporary context, Joan Cocks has defined sovereignty in its simplest form as "the power to command and control everything inside a physical space." Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 2.
12. Michael Broers and Robert M. Berdahl, for example, contend that political philosophy in Restoration Europe was preoccupied with the origin of sovereignty—whether it came from the monarchs or the people. See Broers, *Europe after Napoleon*, 15; Berdahl, *Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, 5–7.
13. I use "he" to describe the typical German monarch because women could not reign under Salic law.
14. Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 15, 113; see Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 85–86; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 6.
15. Biefang, "National-preußisch oder deutsch-national," 370; Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 89.
16. See Biefang, "National-preußisch oder deutsch-national," 370–76; Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 93–95; Sheehan, *German History*, 101; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 378.
17. Gall, *Bismarck*, 1: 197.
18. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 178–80.
19. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 383; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 185; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 287–288; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 52; Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 177.
20. Hamerow, *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction*, 240.
21. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 290; BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 483–84; SAC, LA A 6900 [unfoliated].
22. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 310; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 193.
23. In the Holy Roman Empire and the German Confederation, mediatization was the incorporation of a self-ruling prince and his lands into the territory of another ruler. Mediatized princes (*Standesherrn*) generally retained their estates, certain legal privileges, and local police

- powers. Major waves of mediatization occurred toward the end of the Holy Roman Empire and the Napoleonic period in Germany (1803–1814), when more than 200 German states were absorbed by the remaining 39 that joined the German Confederation. On the contested place of the mediatized princes in the German Confederation, see Gollwitzer, *Standesherrn*.
24. Sheehan, *German History*, 476–77, 863; Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 109.
 25. See chapter 2 and Behnen, *Preussische Wochenblatt*.
 26. Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 273–74; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 80–81; Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 130–31; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 621–22.
 27. Leopold von Gerlach, for instance, defined public opinion as “nothing other than the opinions of the people one fears.” See Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 72.
 28. On the *Kreuzzeitung* and *Berliner Revue*, see Bussiek, *Mit Gott für König und Vaterland!; Albrecht, Antiliberalismus und Antisemitismus*; Hahn, *Die Berliner Revue*. See also Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*; Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, *Auszeichnungen*.
 29. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 195; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 310.
 30. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 167; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 261; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 508–509.
 31. For such directives, see Rudolf von Auerswald to Max Duncker, 4 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 18, Bl. 5–6; Auerswald to Max Duncker, 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 18, Bl. 17. On the Prussian Press Office, see also Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 171.
 32. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 191–92; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 22 February 1859, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 85; Augusta of Prussia to Max Duncker, 16 October 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 202; Max Duncker to J.G. Droysen, 6 June 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 75–76.
 33. Samwer to Max Duncker, 26 July 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 46–49; Gustav Freytag to Charlotte Duncker, 30 November 1858, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 125.
 34. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 8 April 1858, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 76–79; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 27 April 1859, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 81–82; Charlotte Duncker to Anna and Karl Mathy, 15 May 1859, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 106–108; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 310, 315.
 35. See Max Duncker to Hermann Baumgarten, 10 June 1858, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19b, Bl. 7–9.
 36. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 14 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 284–85.
 37. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 14 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 284–85.
 38. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 15 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 286–87.
 39. On Prince Wilhelm of Prussia’s predilection for all things military, see Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 200–201, 205–206. Wilhelm was also known as the “Grapeshot Prince” (*Kartätschenprinz*) because of his leading role in the brutal suppression of Baden rebels in 1849.
 40. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 196; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 315–16.
 41. Ernst of Coburg to Max Duncker, 24 May 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 72 [unfoliated]; Max Duncker to Ernst [draft], 16 July 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 72; Max Duncker to Ernst, 21 July 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 72; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 316.
 42. Karl Anton von Hohenzollern to Max Duncker, 22 April 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 62, Bl. 24; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 325–27; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 3 July 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52 J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 126–27;

- Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 15 July 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52 J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 139; Karl Mathy, Diary Entries, BArch, N2184/75, 539, 567, 583; Max Duncker to Hermann Baumgarten, [25 July] 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 19b, Bl. 19–20; Max Duncker to Baumgarten, 25 January [1860], GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 19b, Bl. 27–28; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 211–12; Müller, *Our Fritz*, 7, 63.
43. For example, see Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy, 20 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 37; Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 21 September 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 35–36; Charlotte Duncker, 9 August 1859, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 117–119; Samwer to [Charlotte Duncker], 10 April 1862, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 55–56.
 44. See Hermann Baumgarten to Max Duncker, 2 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 13–14; Heinrich von Sybel to Max Duncker, 25 December 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 62.
 45. GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 319.
 46. Alexander von Schleinitz to Max Duncker, 4 August 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 3, Bl. 8–9. His title was “*Leiter der Zentralpreßstelle*.”
 47. GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, 321–22; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 102; Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 668.
 48. Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 396–67, 506; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 237.
 49. On the Central Press Office, see *Preußens Pressepolitik*, eds. Holtz and Neugebauer.
 50. Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 89–91. Duke Ernst of Coburg, for example, argued that Confederal contingents should provide “armed mediation” in favor of Austria in order to defeat the “revolutionary despotism” of Napoleon III. See Rosenberg, *Die nationalpolitische Publizistik*, 1: 67–68. Hermann Baumgarten suggested the war might be used to bolster Prussian leadership among the middle states, resist French imperialism, and curry favor with Britain. See again Rosenberg, *Nationalpolitische Publizistik*, 1: 34–35, 1: 45.
 51. Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 579–80; Wippermann, “National-Politische Bewegung,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 10: 387.
 52. Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 2.
 53. Sybel to [Baumgarten], GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 69–70; Memorandum to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, mid-November 1860, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88 Bd. I, Bl. 42–50; Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 181; Max Duncker to Friedrich of Baden, 15 January 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 17, Doc. 1. See also Siemann, *Gesellschaft im Aufbruch*, 253. The situation in Schleswig-Holstein was never far from the minds of German liberals.
 54. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 198, 264. Hohenzollern and Duncker remained friends for years after the collapse of the New Era ministry: see GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 62. Alexander von Schleinitz to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 3, Bl. 8–9.
 55. See, for example, Max Duncker’s reports and memoranda to the crown prince, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 4–12a, 22–36, 42–50.
 56. Samwer to Charlotte Duncker, [1860?], GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 113, Bl. 57–59. Bonnie Smith has explored how the wives of historians in the nineteenth century were active participants in their husbands’ scholarly correspondence, research, and writing. Charlotte Duncker adapted this custom to epistolary politicking. Smith, *Gender of History*, 83–85.
 57. Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 11 June 1860, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 6–7; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 26 November 1861, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 153.
 58. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 503; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 3 August 1858, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelpey, 97–99.

59. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 3 August 1858, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelley, 98–99; Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 29 August 1858, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 110.
60. Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 3 August 1858, GSA 19/339 [unfoliated]. Tempelley removed the antisemitic comment from the published version of the letters. See Freytag to Ernst, 3 August 1858, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelley, 97–99.
61. Freytag to Ernst, 3 August 1858, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelley, 97–99.
62. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 506.
63. Even the wealthy, powerful Rothschild and Bleichröder families suffered slights against their Jewishness because close social contact with Jews “remained potentially debasing” for elite Christians. See Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 16. For more on Jewish-Christian social isolation, see Kaplan, *Jewish Middle Class*; Baader, *Gender, Judaism, and Bourgeois Culture*.
64. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 28 February/1 March 1859, *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 114.
65. Kaiser, *Social Integration and Narrative Structure*, 36, 43; Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 12.
66. See Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*, 3–4, 11. On Christian dissenting movements, see also Weir, *Secularism and Religion*; Graf, *Politisierung*.
67. David Garrioch, “From Christian Friendship to Secular Sentimentality,” 16; Siegel, *Entfernte Freunde*, 16–20; Asen, “Zur Verortung von Paaren,” 326–27.
68. Stoetzler and Achinger, “German Modernity, Barbarous Slavs and Profit-Seeking Jews,” 741; Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 54–56, 82–83.
69. Stern, *Gold and Iron*, 465.
70. Kaplan, *Jewish Middle Class*, 3–4, 8, 60, 117; Baader, *Gender, Judaism, and Bourgeois Culture*, 72.
71. Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*, 334; Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*, 17; Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 16–17, 32, 163.
72. Stoetzler and Achinger, “German Modernity, Barbarous Slavs and Profit-Seeking Jews,” 748. Shulamit Volkov has argued that antisemitism represented a “cultural code” by the time of the German Empire. Volkov, “Antisemitism as a Cultural Code,” 243–64. On the images of Jews in Christian Europe, see Livak, *Jewish Persona in the European Imagination*.
73. David Sorkin has argued that Auerbach represented the epitome of “the full integration to which German Jewry aspired,” but Auerbach’s relationship with his Christian political friends shows the limits of their willingness to accept Jewish difference. See Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 154–55.
74. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 28 February/1 March 1859, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 114.
75. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 28 February/1 March 1859, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 114.
76. See, for instance, Karl Samwer to Heinrich von Sybel, 14 January 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 39, Bl. 20–21; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 18 July 1855, in *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelley, 42; Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128.
77. Jensen, *Gebildete Doppelgänger*, 67. See also Bajohr, “*Unser Hotel ist judenfrei*”; Clark, “Religion and Confessional Conflict,” 83–105.
78. Auerbach to Max Duncker, 5 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 15, Bl. 1–3; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 338; Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 182–83. On the Nationalverein, see Biefang, ed., *Der Deutsche Nationalverein*; Na’aman, *Der deutsche Nationalverein*.
79. Samwer to Sybel, 8 December 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Heinrich von Sybel, B I. Nr. 39, Bl. 16–17; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 21 September 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max

- Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 35–36; Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 11 June 1861, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 6–7; Sybel to Max Duncker, 9 November 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 128–129; Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 29 May 1861, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 282; GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 356; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 231. By 1861, the Prussian king's main advisors were all deeply conservative military officers: Gustav von Alversleben, Edwin von Manteuffel, and Albrecht von Roon. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 156–57; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 396, 450–41.
80. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128.
 81. Skolnik, *Jewish Pasts, German Fictions*, 28–29; Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 225–26.
 82. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128; Berthold Auerbach to Rudolf von Auerswald, 2 March 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Rudolf von Auerswald, Nr. 21 [unfoliated].
 83. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128; Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 18 March 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 129.
 84. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128; Rose, *Jewish Question/German Question*, 232.
 85. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 19 February 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128.
 86. Auerbach to Max Duncker, 22 March 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 15 [unfoliated]; Auerbach to Max Duncker, n.d. (“3 o'clock in the afternoon”), GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 15.
 87. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 18 March 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128–29.
 88. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 18 March 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 128–29.
 89. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 30 March 1860, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 131; Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 21.
 90. Bettelheim, *Berthold Auerbach*, 116, 132, 156, 158, 160, 197; Katz, “Berthold Auerbach,” 220–21.
 91. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 233; Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 14–15.
 92. Karl Mathy and Duncker had been funneling private and old Literary Association funds to Karl Brater, editor of the new daily. See Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 19 March 1860, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 122; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 25 April 1860, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 125; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 9 June 1860, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 125–126; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 4 July 1860, BArch, N2184/14, Bl. 128; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 16 May 1861, BArch, N2184/14, 143; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 206.
 93. Sybel to Max Duncker, 19 August 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 56–57. King Maximilian read Sybel's memoranda closely between 1859 and 1861. See Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 369.
 94. Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit*. Sybel also read to the king from Freytag's work: see Sybel to Freytag 19 February 1862, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Heinrich von Sybel, Nr. 14, Bl. 40.
 95. Sybel to Max Duncker, 1 September 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 58–59.
 96. Sybel to Max Duncker, 12 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 18.
 97. Julius Ficker, an influential, *großdeutsch* Catholic historian, attacked Sybel in the press for his anti-Austrian reading of the Holy Roman Empire. Their ongoing debate over the proper interpretation of the importance of the old empire to German nationhood became known as

- the “Sybel-Ficker controversy.” See, for example, Rosenberg, *Nationalpolitische Publizistik*, 1: 343–44.
98. Joseph de Maistre, qtd. in Armenteros, *French Idea of History*, 2–3. Maistre was central to the formation of political Catholicism in Europe. See also Armenteros and Lebrun, introduction to *Maistre and His European Readers*, 8.
 99. For example, see Sybel to Max Duncker, 26 June 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 45–48; Sybel to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 63–65; Sybel to Max Duncker, 21 February 1860, VI HA NI Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 66–67.
 100. Baumgarten to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 11–12; Baumgarten to Max Duncker, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 17–18; Max Duncker to Baumgarten, 1 April 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 19b, Bl. 5–6.
 101. Max Duncker to Sybel, 24 July 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 51–52. See Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 15 July 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 135–46.
 102. Sybel to Max Duncker, 31 December 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 100–101.
 103. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 81; Sybel to Max Duncker, 14 December 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 98–99.
 104. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64, 114–22, 169–70. See also “Der Bundesreformplan des Freiherrn v. Roggenbach,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 116–53.
 105. Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 25 August 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 9–16; Ernst of Coburg to Friedrich of Baden [copy], 6 May 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 13, Bl. B11; Carl Alexder to Friedrich of Baden, 16 May 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 15, Doc. A38; Karl Anton von Hohenzollern to Friedrich of Baden, 19 April 1861, *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 251–53.
 106. Sybel to Friedrich of Baden, 5 May 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 33, Doc. 1.
 107. Friedrich of Baden to Sybel, [early] November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd 33, Doc. 5.
 108. Friedrich of Baden to Sybel, [early] November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd 33, Doc. 5.
 109. Sybel to Friedrich of Baden, 9 November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 33.
 110. Sybel to Friedrich of Baden, 9 November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 33.
 111. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 211, 213–14.
 112. Wippermann, “National-Politische Bewegung,” 389.
 113. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 90; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 323.
 114. As a child, Friedrich of Baden’s military tutor had been Roggenbach’s father. Friedrich and the younger Roggenbach had both attended Heidelberg University. See Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64.
 115. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 116; Müller, *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation*, 276–77.
 116. “Der Bundesreformplan des Freiherrn v. Roggenbach,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 116.
 117. “Der Bundesreformplan,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 118.
 118. “Der Bundesreformplan,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 116.
 119. Indeed, as Wolfram Siemann argues, this diarchy was key to the Confederation’s design. See Siemann, *Metternich*, 440.
 120. Müller, *Deutscher Bund und Deutsche Nation*, 281–82.
 121. “Der Bundesreformplan,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 117–18.
 122. “Der Bundesreformplan,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 118.
 123. “Der Bundesreformplan,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 122.

124. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 81, 141, 161; Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 100.
125. The progress toward the telos of the nation-state was also part of the natural unfolding of history for most liberals. See Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 39. See also Langewiesche, "Nature of German Liberalism," 98–99.
126. The idea of the natural progression of politics and society was key to Enlightenment thought and early liberalism. See Gall, "Liberalismus und 'bürgerliche Gesellschaft,'" 329–32, 340; and Langewiesche, "Nature of German Liberalism," 98.
127. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 117–19; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 128. See also Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3: 143–45, 3: 149–50.
128. Kreklauf, "Gender Anxiety," 174.
129. Theodore Hamerow described the small Thuringian states as "Gingerbread principalities" in *Social Foundations of German Unification*, 1: 305.
130. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 123; Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 116.
131. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 122–23.
132. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 131, 1: 133, 1: 137–39, 1: 141, 1: 149–51.
133. See footnotes to "Bundesakte" and "Schlußakte" in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber.
134. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 143, 1: 140, 1: 145–46, 1: 149.
135. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 139.
136. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 61.
137. Max Duncker contended as much in 1858 and 1859. He argued that the monarch's sovereign powers were the surest means to advance unification, as long as the prince was surrounded by experienced advisors. See Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 186–87.
138. See, for example, Held, "Souveränität" in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 13: 444–45.
139. Joan Cocks has asked what happens to sovereignty if it can flow or drain away: Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 26. A partial answer might be found in national political consolidation in the nineteenth century.
140. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 121. Roggenbach claimed, shortly after he submitted his draft, that the individual princes must lead national consolidation, lest revolution ensue. For him, the "German Question" was largely a dynastic question; the success or failure of national unification rested with its princes. See Franz von Roggenbach to Friedrich of Baden, 26 November 1859, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 157.
141. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 135.
142. Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 4.
143. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 133, 1: 135.
144. Müller, *Deutscher Bund und Deutsche Nation*, 155–57. See also Flöter, *Beust*, 20–21; Burg, *Die deutsche Trias in Idee und Wirklichkeit*.
145. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 124. My emphasis.
146. See, for example, Rotteck, "Liberalismus," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 10: 670–71; Held, "Monarchie," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 10: 174.
147. Roggenbach ignores the question of what the role of the four city states would be in this union. He may have assumed they would be mediatized during the process of unification by one of their neighboring states.
148. "Der Bundesreformplan," in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 142.
149. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 117. Here, Roggenbach shared British liberals' conviction in the 1850s and 1860s that their ideals "were so powerful and progressive that they would win out in Europe without recourse to war." See Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 9.
150. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 118.

151. The new constitution had the same name in the German as the Confederal document, itself a development of the seventeenth-century Imperial War Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. On the Holy Roman variant, see Stollberg-Rilinger, *Holy Roman Empire*, 59.
152. “Der Bundesreformplan,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 130.
153. “Der Bundesreformplan,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 131.
154. “Der Bundesreformplan,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 138.
155. “Der Bundesreformplan,” in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 138.
156. Craig, *Prussian Army*, 83; Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 197, 232.
157. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 232; Berdahl, *Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, 3.
158. Friedrich of Baden sent copies of the plan to Carl Alexander of Weimar, Duke Ernst, the Hansa cities, and “unimportant Waldeck.” See, for example, Morier, *Memoirs and Letters*, 1: 243–46; Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 20 September 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 17–20; Carl Alexander of Weimar to Friedrich of Baden, 21 July 1860, *Großherzog Friedrich*, 1: 86; Heinrich von Sybel to Friedrich of Baden, 17 November 1861, GAK, FA Korr. 13, Bd. 33, unfoliated.
159. Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 25 August 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 9–16.
160. Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 25 August 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 9–16.
161. Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 25 August 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 9–16.
162. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 148.
163. Memorandum to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, 6 May 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 80–82.
164. Biedermann, “Nation,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 6: 389, 6: 391.
165. Albrecht von Bernstorff to Albert von Flemming, 11 November 1861, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 299–300.
166. Sheehan, *German History*, 875; Flöter, *Beust*, 351–52.
167. Wilhelm of Prussia to Friedrich of Baden, 1 January 1860, *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 176–77.
168. The term comes from the anonymous entry for “Parteien,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 11: 311.
169. Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 28–30. Emphasis in original. For a summary of the role of the Hobbesian prince, see Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 33.
170. Roggenbach’s suggestion here approximated the parliamentary monarchy favored by German democrats rather than the powerful constitutional monarch usually supported by moderate liberals.
171. For example, see Pfizer, “Fürst,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 6: 202; Pfizer, “Liberalismus,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 9: 713. Pfizer’s thinking—and that of most European liberals—was bound up with European imperialism and its “civilizing mission.” Liberals imagined a hierarchy of peoples based on European definitions of technological, cultural, and political “development.” See also Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Germany*.
172. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 21 September 1860, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 35–36.
173. For example, see Heinrich von Sybel to Max Duncker, 1 January 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 202, Bl. 102–105; Franz von Roggenbach to Max Duncker, 11 February 1862, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 104, Bl. 29–30. For Sybel’s idea of a national *Volksvertretung* to reform the Confederal Constitution: Charlotte Duncker, Diary Entry, [mid-January] 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 45–47. See the exhaustive entry for the Confederal War Constitution in the *Staatslexikon*: Zarachiä, “Bundeskriegsverfassung,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 4: 482–521.

174. By April 1861, Friedrich of Baden had likewise limited his reform proposals to the centralized military command of the Confederation. See Friedrich of Baden to August Lamey, 7 April 1861, GAK, 52 Lamey Nr. 1, Doc. 16.
175. Ernst of Coburg to Friedrich of Baden, 5 December 1860, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 239.
176. Quoted in Scheeben, *Ernst II.*, 123. Ernst had also shared drafts of the convention with Carl Alexander of Weimar and his officials. See HStAW, NI. Bernhard von Watzdorf, Nr. 145, Bl. 13–17.
177. Duke Ernst's assumptions about princely solidarity and rule by consensus drew on notions of princely collegial consensus as the basis for decision-making in the Holy Roman Empire. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Holy Roman Empire*, 17, 31, 56–57.
178. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 225–26; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 130.
179. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 95.
180. Coburg-Prussian Military Convention, 1 June 1861, SAC, LA A 7314.
181. SAC, LA A 7314.
182. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Holy Roman Empire*, 17, 31, 56–57.
183. Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 504; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 20.
184. SAC, LA A 7314.
185. Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 280.
186. On questions of mobile sovereignty, see Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 26; Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 287–89.
187. SAC, LA A 7314.
188. Coburgers, like Prussian soldiers, would have to take an oath to obey the Prussian monarch, not the Prussian constitution. The Prussian king alone pledged to uphold the constitution: Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 394.
189. For examples of member appraisals of dynastic decorations, see Gustav Freytag to Charlotte Duncker, March 1856, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, 69–70. Berthold Auerbach explicitly connected the wearing of decorations to public endorsement of the bestowing monarch. He also discusses the honor and the joy that a Coburg order brought him in Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 20 December 1861, *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 212.
190. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 198; Craig, *Prussian Army*, 83.
191. On army officers' loyalty to princely commanders, see Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 39–40, 42.
192. SAC, LA A 7314.
193. See Zarachiä, "Bundeskriegsverfassung," in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed, 4: 503–504.
194. On overlapping sovereignties and uneven territoriality in premodern European empires, see Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 4, 30, 279–80.
195. Zarachiä, "Bundeskriegsverfassung," *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed, 4: 483, 4: 515.
196. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 116.
197. Friedrich of Baden to Carl Alexander of Weimar, 18 July 1861, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, ed. Oncken, 1: 267–68. Friedrich's martial phrasing also indicates the centrality of military imagery to princely conceptions of political conflict, and especially intra-Confederal disputes over the possible form of national unification.
198. Report from Austrian envoy to Saxony, Joseph von Werner, 16 July 1861, *QdPÖs*, 1: 749–50. Many of the Thuringian dukes belonged to the Ernestine branch of the House of Wettin, the head of which was king of Saxony.
199. This notion echoed medieval conceptions of kingship, where the king acted as the legal guardian of the Crown and its inalienable rights, obligations, and properties. See Kantorowicz, *King's Two Bodies*.
200. Margaret Lavinia Anderson has written that Georg V of Hanover "considered himself king by

- divine right, and public policy, the will of God, revealed to him through prayer.” Georg had also carried out a coup in 1855 in which he abolished the state constitution. See Anderson, *Windthorst*, 67, 74–76.
201. King Georg V of Hanover to Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria, 3 July 1860, *QdPÖs*, 1: 329.
 202. Radicals, liberals, and apparently princes chose nature metaphors in order to “naturalize” their particular politics. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 256–57; and Gall, “Liberalismus ‘und bürgerliche Gesellschaft,’” 329, 340.
 203. Beust was technically “*Vorsitzender des Gesamtministeriums*” and, as such, first among equals. On Beust’s reform plans, see Flöter, *Beust*.
 204. Report from Joseph von Werner, 27 June 1861, *QdPÖs*, 1: 732.
 205. Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 2 January 1861, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 37.
 206. For examples of *Rheinbündlerei* accusations by network members, see Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 16 May 1861, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 143; Max Duncker, Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 9 December 1864, GStAPK, BPH 52J, Bd. 2, IV., Bl. 187; GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 7a, Bd. 1 [unfoliated]; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, Diary Entry, 14 May 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 7a, Bd. 1. Karl Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 13 November 1860, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 130–131.
 207. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 53.
 208. Scheeben, *Ernst II.*, 17.
 209. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 116.
 210. Rotteck, “Monarchie,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., 10: 658.
 211. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 116.
 212. Ernst, *Aus meinem Leben*, 115.
 213. HStAW, Nl. Bernhard von Watzdorf, Nr. 145, Bl. 2–9.
 214. On the establishment of the North German Confederation, see Ernst von Stockmar to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, 17 December 1866, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52 EII. Nr. 2. [unfoliated]. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm thought, after the conclusion of the armistice with Austria and its allies in 1866, that governments allied with Prussia should sign military conventions with Prussia in the Coburg mold: Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, War Diary 1866 Entry, 24 July 1866, GStAPK, BPH Rep. 52 F I. Nr. 13. For Baden, see Hermann Baumgarten to Max Duncker, 3 July 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 17–18. For Braunschweig: Heinrich von Sybel to Max Duncker, 7 July 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 122–23. See also chapter 2 in Wiens, *Imperial German Army*.
 215. For example, see Sybel to Max Duncker, 11 May 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 119; Francke to Ernst of Coburg, 20 March 1861, in *Politischer Briefwechsel*, ed. Schultze, doc. 351.
 216. Ernst von Stockmar to Max Duncker, 28 July 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 136, Bl. 1–3; Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy, 19 July 1859, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 114–115; BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 7–9.
 217. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 146–52, 228, 393; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 513–17; Sheehan, *German History*, 877–79.
 218. For example, see Charlotte Duncker to Karl Mathy, 29 March 1861, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 140–41.
 219. GStAPK, VI. HA, Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 244, Bl. 17–18.
 220. Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 213–14. For examples of *Rheinbündlerei* accusation, see Freytag to Ernst, 30 January 1860, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelvey, 132; Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 16 May 1861, BArch, N2184/12, Bl. 143; Sybel to Max Duncker, 7 July 1861, GStAPK, VI.

- HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 137, Bl. 122–123; Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, Diary Entry, 14 May 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52 F I. Nr. 7a, Bd. 1.
221. GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 345; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 214–15.
222. Ernst of Coburg to Friedrich of Baden, 12 June 1860, GAK, FA Korr. 13 Bd. 13, Doc. 11; Carl Alexander of Weimar to Friedrich of Baden, 21 July 1860, in *Großherzog Friedrich*, 1: 191. Haym wrote that Ernst eventually attended. See Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 214.
223. Prince Wilhelm once argued to August von Saucken that, as regent, he held limited powers because his brother was still king: August von Saucken to Charlotte Duncker, 8 February 1859, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 117, Bl. 15. According to Leopold von Gerlach, Friedrich Wilhelm IV had left a note at his death asking his brother not to swear the required oath to the constitution. See Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 2: 786.
224. Max Duncker to William of Prussia, 14 March 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 55–58.
225. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 206.
226. Auerswald to Max Duncker, 14 June 1861, GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 3, Bl. 46; GStAPK, VI. HA, NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 358, 360; Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 237. Freytag told Mathy that Samwer was hurt that Duncker had taken the post from him: see BArch, N2184/76, Bl. 27.
227. Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, 7 October 1861, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 15–17.
228. On the fear of nervous exhaustion in the nineteenth century, see Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 13–14.
229. Held, “Monarchie,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 10: 177.
230. “Parteien,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., 11: 315.
231. The reports numbered in the hundreds: see GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1–3.
232. For instance: Reports to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88 Bd. 1, Bl. 80–82, 135–46, 394–95, 444–47, 482–83; Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 2 November 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88 Bd. 1, Bl. 233; Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 1 February 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 288; Reports to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 2, Bl. 47–52, 74, 116–17, 217–21, 336–37, 348–49, 473–78, 520; Reports to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 3, 274–81, 331.
233. Memorandum to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 15 November 1860, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 22–36.
234. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 180–85.
235. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 10–11, 64, 119–200.
236. Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 225, 393. The influential sixteenth-century jurist, Jean Bodin, described sovereignty simply as the “perpetual power to command.” Qtd. in Cocks, *On Sovereignty*, 30.
237. Sheehan, *German History*, 878; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 38; Brophy, “*Salus Publica Suprema Lex*,” 124, 127–28. Heydt supported what Dieter Langewiesche has called “the conservative Fronde” against liberal ministers during the New Era. See Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 89. See also Pfanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 156–57.
238. BArch, N2184/75, Bl. 583.
239. Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 11 December 1861, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 264–65.
240. Max Duncker to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 15 March 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 333–37.
241. Reports to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 16/30 April 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 360–65.

242. Telegram, 12 June 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 397; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 406–409.
243. Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 168; Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 160.
244. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 17 July 1862, GStAPK, BPH, 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 469–72.
245. See *Im Ring der Gegner Bismarcks*, ed. Heyderhoff; *Letters of the Empress Frederick*, ed. Grey.
246. Gall, *Bismarck*, 1: 197; Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 169, 1: 178; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 25 September 1862, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 469–72.
247. Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 29 September 1862, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 475–76; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 10 October 1862, GStAPK, BPH 52J 88, Bd. 1, 480–81. See also, Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 164.
248. Gall, *Bismarck*; Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 281, 336.
249. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 150; Börner, *Wilhelm I.*, 155–56.
250. Duncker's assumption drew on what David Barclay has identified as “patterns of friendship and political sentiment” among German elites since the Napoleonic Wars. See Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 68.
251. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 285–86; Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 199. Claudia Kreklau has argued that Bismarck employed “emotional blackmail” throughout his political career. See Kreklau, “Gender Anxiety,” 171. Dierk Walter argues that the first months of Bismarck's tenure were marked by earnest negotiations between parliamentary liberals and the new cabinet on the army bill. Bismarck likely hoped that Max Duncker would prove useful in this initial, conciliatory approach. See Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 448.
252. Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 25 February 1864, SAC, LA A 7212, Bl. 166–68; Samwer to Ernst of Coburg, 22 September 1865, SAC, LA A 7220, 35–36; Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 31 December 1864, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 199. Samwer also believed that Bismarck was always “half-drunk.” See Pflanze, *Bismarck*, 1: 198.
253. On the renewal of the campaign against Max's influence on the crown prince of Prussia, see Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 3 February 1864, GStAPK, VI. HA, N1. Duncker, Max, Nr. 9b, Bl. 316. Freytag indicted Duncker to Mathy as well: Karl Mathy to Gustav Freytag, 17/19 June 1863, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 32–34.
254. Karl Samwer to Karl Mathy, 10 August 1863, BArch, N2184/22, Bl. 45–46.
255. One example of the high regard with which Karl Mathy was held by the group is Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 30 January 1860, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Tempelty, 133. For Haym's representation of the Samwer-Duncker conflict over Bismarck's policy, see Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 311.
256. See, for example, Hoover, *Gospel of Nationalism*; Kaiser, *Pietismus und Patriotismus*.
257. Haym to Max Duncker, 9 April 1863, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 212.
258. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 516. Dagmar Herzog has argued, however, that this sort of reaction to political challenges was essential to German liberalism since at least the 1820s—what Leonhard calls the “incubation period” of liberalism—at least when it touched on Jewish emancipation or women's rights. See Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 4; Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 251–52.