

FRIENDLY PRECONDITIONS



This chapter focuses on the prerequisites for political friendship in the network of moderate liberals. It addresses members' experiences from the period of Restoration Germany through the Revolutions of 1848/49 to the "Punctuation" at Olmütz in 1850, as well as their family, religious, educational, professional, and early political lives. Class subsumes many of these overlapping categories. Separating the social, political, and religious strands is difficult in a liminal period when the meaning of liberalism, the bourgeoisie, and conservatism remained blurry.¹ Yet, investigating the nascent boundaries of class and oppositional politics shows how, by the late 1840s, shared experiences at home, at university, and in their early professional careers had laid the foundations for the network of political friends. Their early biographies are important because they formed the basis for the later system of social and political expectations in the network. As Michael Freeden and Javier Fernández-Sebastián have argued, liberalism "also reflected a series of shared political and personal experiences" that rested on social norms and material means.²

The network was composed of a relatively small, scattered, and homogenous elite. Their situation reflects those of Christian Jansen's democratic networks and Andreas Biefang's activist bourgeoisie in the 1850s and 1860s.³ Network members were overwhelmingly university-educated men from bourgeois, Protestant homes.⁴ Most were raised in northern Germany and went on to study and later work primarily there. The political friends predominantly attended Prussian universities, then entered journalism, academia, or government service. Two were novelists. There were, however, variations from this norm. Franz von Roggenbach, for instance, was a southern German from a Catholic noble family tied to the Baden court.⁵ Duke Ernst II of Coburg and Charlotte Duncker also stood apart from the otherwise middle-class and masculine profile of the network. Yet, adherence to liberalism was essential. By the early 1840s, all members identified as German nationalists and constitutional monarchists, although most had contacts in radical circles until the Revolutions of 1848/49.⁶ Network mem-

bers represented the “Old Liberals” and “Gothaer” after 1849 before they split themselves between the German Progressive Party, founded in 1861, and the National Liberal Party, founded in 1867.⁷

This chapter proceeds chronologically. It first offers a brief consideration of the German Confederation as the basic political structure in which the future political friends grew up and spent much of their adult lives. I then outline the future members’ bourgeois family environments before addressing their time at university, where they encountered new friends, liberal doctrines, and state repression.⁸ Chapter 1 moves on to cover their early careers in the civil service, academia, and the press in the 1840s. In this era of the Restoration, the political friends found fresh opportunities for socializing and publishing, despite government harassment, forming individual relationships that they wove together in the late 1840s to create the network. The final part of this chapter explores members’ shared experiences from the March Revolution of 1848 until the Olmütz agreement of November 1850. These years forced these liberals to clarify their political convictions, deepen their personal relationships, and form the network in order to overcome the personal, political, and professional challenges of both late Restoration and Revolutionary Central Europe.

The Basis of the German Confederation

The creation of the German Confederation in 1815 offered the thirty-five remaining monarchs of the former Holy Roman Empire and Napoleon’s Rhenish Confederation something new: *de jure* as well as *de facto* sovereignty.⁹ The Confederal Constitution recognized their full rights and guaranteed the independence of their associated states.¹⁰ The Confederation was formally a union of monarchs and four free cities, not a confederation of German states as such.¹¹ It was foremost an agreement among sovereign princes, the reigning, legitimate dynasts in collegial compact. The preamble of the constitution reiterated the centrality of princely rule *dei gratia* as signatories anointed the new Confederation “In the name of the most Holy and Indivisible Trinity.”¹² These monarchs drew their power directly from their special relationship to God. Sovereignty and just rule through Christian grace was the legal foundation of Confederal states and the bonds between confederates. This doctrine rejected the Enlightenment and revolutionary principle that a monarch derived power from the people or the constitution.¹³

Despite such proclamations, the German Confederation remained in many ways a late example of the “layered and divided sovereignty” common to early modern empires.¹⁴ The Confederal Constitution remained incomplete. Signatories expanded the treaty in 1819–20 in the Vienna Final Act.

The Final Act described the Confederation as “a union of German sovereign princes and free cities under international law, for the preservation of the independence and inviolability of Confederal states, and for the maintenance of the internal and external security of Germany.”¹⁵ Signatories stressed state independence at the expense of the national unity previously emphasized in the Confederal Constitution: the monarch was the protector of the state, not the state itself.¹⁶ This shift would seem to support Thomas Nipperdey’s argument that the Confederation favored the conceptualization of sovereignty and independence in states, minimizing the princes.¹⁷ The Final Act indeed emphasized state independence, and though the term “*Verein*” hinted at future unification, the term also implied the free consent and collegial orientation of a monarchical club. State independence depended upon a ruler’s sovereign status. If the former ceased, so must the latter.

Nevertheless, part of the princes’ sovereignty lay in their right to cede the exercise of some prerogatives to central organs for national security. Would-be reformers of the German Confederation worked to exploit this exception in the 1860s. The Final Act transferred some diplomatic and military functions to the Confederation, such as the right to send and receive Confederal ambassadors and to organize and command shared military efforts.¹⁸ The will of the leaders of the Great Powers to maintain the balance of power obliged individual monarchs to defend each other’s territories within Confederal borders and to participate in “executions” against those in violation of the Confederation’s laws. Confederates were also prohibited from concluding foreign military alliances against one another and were obliged to finance the Confederation’s frontier fortresses.¹⁹ Laws regarding military cooperation, however, remained incomplete in the Final Act. Leaders eventually ironed out the military details in 1821 with the Confederal Military Constitution.

Individual monarchs’ prerogatives were *paralleled* in Confederal diplomatic powers and *shared* in a complex sense by Confederal military obligations. Monarchs were restricted, however, by the Final Act, though Article 53 forbade most Confederal interference in state institutions.²⁰ Since conservative leaders such as Clemens von Metternich and Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia increasingly imagined the Confederation as a bulwark against liberal reforms and revolution, the Final Act included some key requirements for internal politics.²¹ According to the Constitution of 1815, each state was obliged to implement a constitution and to establish a representative body, at least along the lines of the estates of the Old Regime.²² The Final Act reiterated this requirement with important caveats. For one, sovereign princes had to “arrange” for a constitution. In the wording of the agreement, state constitutions became the free gift of a monarch to his subjects, rather than an agreement between ruler and ruled.²³ Power flowed from God to His ordained representative on earth, and then through the monarch to his institutions and to His/his subjects. As lordly

gifts—in the divine and monarchical sense—constitutions could be altered or revoked at will by monarchs.²⁴

Confederal monarchs ostensibly had to grant constitutions, but Confederal law circumscribed their freedom to cede prerogatives to representative assemblies.²⁵ Although a sovereign prince could only lend certain rights to an elected chamber, these undefined rights were never fully ceded. The monarch merely presented his decisions to the estates for their “assistance.”²⁶ The ideal elected assembly was advisory, and again the monarch demonstrated his sovereignty by choosing to share some of his rights. State constitutions could not hinder the exercise of monarchical power, particularly in the fulfillment of Confederal obligations, nor could state assemblies usurp the princes’ ultimate powers—above all, their military command.²⁷ The granting of constitutions in most German states was not entirely reactive, however; constitutions created some space for political debate and limited interactions between elected representatives and princely governments.²⁸ The German Confederation thus functioned in so far as its monarchs were willing to cooperate—an arrangement on which liberals later hung their hopes for national consolidation. This monarchical order underlay political life in the individual states of Central Europe, where it aimed to forestall revision and revolution. Nevertheless, on the ground, society was changing. The early lives of the future members of the network reflected this interplay between order and innovation in the years before 1848.

Bourgeois Homes and *Bildung*

The mentors of the network were generally older and more experienced courtiers or state parliamentarians; the core and secondary members of the network tended to be younger. Among their mentors, Christian von Stockmar, a Coburg éminence grise, was born in 1787, and Alexander von Soiron was born in 1806. Core members, such as Karl Samwer, Karl Mathy, and Max Duncker, were born between 1806 and 1818. Common memories and lore from the Napoleonic Wars helped bind the political friends. For example, Mathy was apparently kicked by a Russian cavalry horse at the age of four as tsarist troops passed through Mannheim.²⁹ His biographer, Gustav Freytag, later implied that this incident sparked Mathy’s nationalism. Members born in the 1820s, such as Roggenbach and Baumgarten, knew only the Restoration, though they lived in a German Confederation suffused with bloodless images of a just and Romantic war against Napoleon.³⁰

Place of birth was also important for the future group of political friends because most of their families stayed put. Many were raised in northern Germany, although only Heinrich von Sybel, Gustav Freytag, and Max Duncker were born in Prussia. Despite the pro-Prussian goals of the future network, most members spent their youth outside the Hohenzollern realm. The sizeable minority of

mostly southern Germans, such as Mathy, Baumgarten, and Roggenbach, suggests that, although a liberal Prussophile was rather rare in Stuttgart or Freiburg, northerners integrated their southern compatriots into the network with relative ease. Both groups nevertheless spent much of their careers downplaying German regional diversity in favor of a standardized, Prussian-led image of the nation. Sybel and Duncker's Borussian histories, as well as Freytag's fiction and nonfiction, exemplified this strand of liberal-nationalist thought in the network.³¹

Many of the friends grew up in mixed border areas. Francke and Samwer hailed from an area that became synonymous with national strife: Schleswig-Holstein. Grievances against the Danish government and Danish nationalism emerged in the 1840s as German speakers faced hiring discrimination and university quotas.³² Freytag spent time in Breslau, but otherwise the small Silesian border town of Kreuzburg anchored his early life. His family was upper middle class and deeply Protestant. Freytag interpreted childhood memories of hearing Polish, encountering members of the *szlachta*, and witnessing Catholic popular piety to create a stereotype of indigent, superstitious Poles, whom he saw as antithetical to rational Protestantism and German-ness.³³

Sybel was born to a Protestant family of pastors and civil servants in the confessionally mixed Rhine Province. The Protestant Sybels benefited from anti-Catholic discrimination in the new Prussian province. The majority of Rhineland judges and high civil servants were Protestants and, particularly in the 1820s and 1830s, imported from the east.³⁴ The family hosted a circle of local intellectuals and officials, and Sybel's father was ennobled in 1831.³⁵ In majority-Catholic Baden, under a Protestant monarchy, Mathy's family was Protestant. His father was granted a professorship and was later appointed a court preacher—both signs of royal favor.³⁶

Thus, many future friends were surrounded by confessional and national conflict from their childhoods through adulthood. Church–state conflict over episcopal appointments, school oversight, and “mixed” marriages ignited as much conflict in the Prussian Rhineland—for example, the Holy Robe controversy of the 1840s—as it did in Baden.³⁷ Confessional and political conflict in the Prussian Rhineland and Posen (Poznań) during the 1830s agitated liberals and worried state ministers. The most spectacular case was the “Cologne Troubles” and their reverberations in Posen from 1837 to 1841; in both instances, the Prussian government imprisoned, without trial, the respective Catholic archbishops.³⁸

Despite the fact that confessional struggle surrounded members of the future network as young people, their later political friendships accommodated confessional and religious heterogeneity—perhaps because they were otherwise so similar. Many members had personal stories of religious diversity, either from mixed families or from living in confessionally mixed areas. Some members' families had converted to Protestantism. Mathy's father had been a Jesuit priest before converting and marrying Mathy's mother.³⁹ Max Duncker's mother came from

Berlin's Jewish elite and converted to marry Duncker's father, cofounder of the eponymous Duncker & Humblot publishing house.⁴⁰ Such conversions reflected the porosity of religious barriers within the German bourgeoisie in the *Vormärz*. Not until 1867 was there negative reference to Duncker's "Jewish history."⁴¹ Berthold Auerbach considered himself a "German of the Jewish faith" and life-long proponent of the Jewish Reform movement.⁴² His religious identification became remarkable to other members only in the 1860s, although references to the "Jewishness" of his wife were not uncommon beforehand.⁴³ Franz von Roggenbach and Alexander von Soiron's Catholicism was invisible in network correspondence. Both remained in the Church despite incessant confessional conflict in Baden, particularly the disputes with Catholics in the state legislature that ended Roggenbach's ministry in 1865.⁴⁴ Early experiences of cultural diversity were common among German-speaking liberals in Austria, as well.⁴⁵

It is not possible here to review Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish iterations of the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century *Bildung*.⁴⁶ The key point is that domestic religiosity in the liberal spirit of the Enlightenment infused members' childhoods.⁴⁷ Liberal interpretations of religious injunction were combined with strict self-control, study, and the cultivation of proper manners, in which women took the leading domestic role.⁴⁸ The ideal domestic role of the father reflected political beliefs about the role of the monarch in the state—both acted as guarantors of social harmony and progress within the limits of established (male) authority. Many German liberals explicitly made this connection between the *Hausvater* and *Landesvater*.⁴⁹ Mathy's Kant-reading father, for instance, taught his son the moral imperatives of work and of national devotion.⁵⁰ Max Duncker grew up in a Pietist household that valued prayer and hard work—*ora et labora*—providing a stern introduction to the middle-class insistence on competition, achievement, and good manners in a "life by rules."⁵¹ Enlightenment individualism melded with Romantic notions of national community to teach that each citizen's domestic cultivation of piety, morality, and patriotic feeling was a victory for the nation, the state, and society.⁵² Most political friends, among them Haym, Duncker, Sybel, and Mathy, underwent a process of emotional subject formation in Protestant *Innerlichkeit* and Pietism's imperative of personal and later patriotic renewal, developing an affective vocabulary for later political friendships.⁵³ Both literature and religion provided members of the educated elite with their emotional vocabulary.⁵⁴ After this exposure to bourgeois domestic religiosity, many future members supported rationalist dissenting movements in the 1840s.

Widespread print media was central to self-cultivation through extensive private reading.⁵⁵ Network members were avid readers: with and without their parents' consent, their reading subjects ranged widely. There were boundaries, of course: girls were considered morally imperiled readers, while middle-class adults considered novels a threat to boys' formal education in Latin and Greek, as well as to the moral lessons supposedly entombed in them.⁵⁶ Yet Walter Scott

sparked many members' historical imaginations and fascination with the medieval past. Mathy, Sybel, and both Dunckers mentioned reading Scott as children.⁵⁷ Walter Scott's historical fiction, echoing Herder's theories, was predicated on the dramatic rise, fall, and restoration of nations.⁵⁸ *Bildungsromane* and popular histories asked readers to imagine their lives as coterminous with the nation, conflating individual (mis)education with the future of the nation-state.⁵⁹ The legacy of Sentimentalism, as well as *Sturm und Drang* and Romantic fiction, also pressed readers to evaluate and seek "authentic" emotions as plot devices in the proper development of persons and nations.⁶⁰ German nationalists thus adapted Romantic religiosity and the Weimar classicists' interpretation of friendship to connect their individual emotional relationships to the expansion of a liberalism that incorporated feelings of religious brother- and sisterhood.⁶¹

Three brief examples illustrate some deviations from the norms outlined above. Berthold Auerbach was born Moses Baruch in 1812 in Nordstetten. Most Black Forest Jews gained basic rights only in the 1840s, and they remained prohibited from resettling until 1862.⁶² Anti-Jewish violence was common, such as in the "Hep Hep" riots of 1819 and during the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.⁶³ Auerbach's small hometown inspired his famous *Black Forest Village Stories*. His father was a trader, and his maternal grandparents were innkeepers. The family embraced some tenets of the Haskalah, and his paternal grandfather had been a rabbi—the profession for which Auerbach initially trained.⁶⁴ Auerbach's parents reserved Torah study for the young Auerbach, sending him to yeshiva at thirteen. After failing to pay tuition, Auerbach transferred to *Gymnasien* in Karlsruhe then Stuttgart, where he began using the name Berthold.⁶⁵ Although he faced Judeophobia and antisemitism throughout his life, access to the Christian education system gave Auerbach the basis on which to form friendships with Christian German liberals—even prejudiced ones. On that basis, Auerbach's Jewishness was accepted, or at least ignored, by his Christian friends.⁶⁶

Charlotte Duncker was born Charlotte Gutike in Halle in 1819. She grew up in an educated, middle-class household. Gendered conceptions of education, however, disadvantaged her in later network interactions. Her father was a prominent professor at Halle, and Duncker received an education conforming to Biedermeier notions of girlhood. She was tutored in French, piano, voice, and handicrafts—skills that men believed would make women charming hostesses and diligent wives.⁶⁷ Duncker, however, yearned for lessons in history and geography. She was able to study furtively alongside her brother while he was tutored at home. Like young Freytag and Auerbach, Charlotte Duncker also wrote fiction.⁶⁸ Since men generally considered women's published writing inappropriate, her work was kept private.⁶⁹ Duncker struggled in the 1850s to overcome this exclusion from formal education, which also threatened her political friendships.

Born in a castle in the Thuringian Forest in 1818, Ernst II of Coburg had a very different childhood from that of Auerbach and Charlotte Duncker, but

one similar to those of Friedrich of Baden and Carl Alexander of Weimar. Despite the beginnings of the embourgeoisement of royal families in the early nineteenth century, young princes continued to be taught that they were qualitatively different people.⁷⁰ They were anointed by God to rule one day, and this special connection underlay their families' claims to legitimate power in Restoration Europe. Family life was, by bourgeois standards, distanced. Rigid tutoring and court coaching trained child-dynasts for future roles as divine-right monarchs, state administrators, generals, or suitable marriage partners. The legacy of "enlightened" absolutism, however, demanded academic tutoring approximating that of bourgeois boys.⁷¹ Ernst had daily lessons in modern languages, history, math, and geography before being sent to university. Yet, as in his tutoring and military instruction, Ernst remained a person apart from the more meaningful relationships developing between young commoners. Tension between princely members' station and their longing to build intimate political friendships with non-princely liberals created difficulties in the network for years.

Although they shared similar upbringings, these individuals were not predestined to be liberals or friends. Their first direct interaction with liberal and nationalist organizing occurred at university. After finishing *Gymnasium*, the future political friends went on to spend time—and often a very long time—at university. A university education was crucial to proper *Bildung* and the social skills that liberals believed would lead to a society of free persons who could then found a nation-state.⁷² Major centers such as Heidelberg and Berlin drew the well-to-do from across German-speaking Europe and beyond. Many members studied similar subjects, at similar times, and in similar places. When they began meeting at university in the late 1830s and 1840s, the political friends shared assumptions and outlooks from their childhoods. They also had their first encounters with the power of the German states.

These young men entered university as members of a fast-expanding *Bildungsbürgertum* at the height of state repression after 1815. At a time when only a quarter of graduates from a *Gymnasium*—already an elite milieu—entered university, admittance nonetheless doubled in the 1820s before declining in the 1830s and 1840s.⁷³ Many university students hoped to join overcrowded official bureaucracies or university faculties. The wait for a salaried position in the Prussian judiciary at the time was about nine years, and professorial prospects were not much better.⁷⁴ The Vienna Final Act and the Karlsbad Decrees of 1819 curtailed freedom of the press and association, expanded censorship, banned student fraternities, and established a Central Investigation Commission in Mainz to root out popular dissent.⁷⁵ The "Six Acts" of 1832 banned free speech and political association after the Hambach Festival, in which many students and professors participated.⁷⁶ Austrian foreign minister Clemens von Metternich and King

Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia sought to limit university professors' ability to endorse civil rights or question the legitimist state as bureaucratic liberalism fell into official disfavor.⁷⁷

This authoritarian attitude spread to larger Confederal states, such as the Kingdom of Hanover. In 1837, the "Göttingen Seven" of liberal professors, led by Friedrich Dahlmann, denounced King Ernst Augustus in the press after he unilaterally suspended the constitution. The university dismissed all seven of the professors, and the Hanoverian government forced three—Dahlmann among them—into exile.⁷⁸

These official efforts notwithstanding, even the most powerful states lacked the human and material resources to suppress all dissent.⁷⁹ Although new laws showcased the repressive power of many German states, their alternating promulgation, softening, abolition, and reinstatement suggests an uneven process in which monarchs and state ministers entered strategic compromises with post-Napoleonic liberalism—however limited or impermanent.⁸⁰ Revolutions in France and Saxony in 1830, along with the first English Reform Bill and the establishment of a Belgian constitutional monarchy in 1832, kindled educated Germans' hopes for reform, and particularly for the introduction of constitutions.⁸¹ The granting of constitutions in German states during and after the Napoleonic era, mainly in southern lands such as Baden, spurred the political visions of liberals and democrats across the German Confederation. They debated the ideal form and content of written constitutions well into the Revolutions of 1848/49 and beyond: did sovereignty spring from the monarch or "the people," who were "the people," what civil rights should they enshrine, what powers should be assigned to the monarchy or to an elected legislature, should suffrage be universal or restricted to the propertied and educated?

The leading generation of network members received their education under the repression and the hopes of the 1830s. Max Duncker went to the University of Berlin in 1830. Heinrich von Sybel also attended Berlin in 1834. Freytag entered university in Breslau in 1836 before heading to Berlin as well. Berthold Auerbach was admitted to Tübingen in 1832. Karl Mathy, the oldest of the core cohort, went to Heidelberg in 1824. Karl Samwer and Karl Francke attended the German-speaking University of Kiel, then under Danish rule, in the mid-1830s. Ernst of Coburg and Friedrich of Baden attended the universities of Bonn and Heidelberg in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Bonn was Prussia's university for Catholics at the time and likely provided Friedrich with an opportunity to appeal to the Catholic majority of his future realm. The younger generation, including Hermann Baumgarten and Ludwig Ägidi, began much later, meeting older members as academic and political mentors. Rudolf Haym, for instance, attended the University of Halle only in 1839. He then studied in Berlin before returning to Halle to work under Max Duncker, who became his life-long political mentor.⁸²

It is indicative of confessional patterns that none of the network members attended universities in majority-Catholic states or studied outside the Confederation. Most future members had little exposure to southern Germany. Their connections south of the Main remained few well into the 1860s, making Mathy and Baumgarten crucial nodes in the sharing of network resources. Sybel moved to Munich in the 1850s at the invitation of the Bavarian king but failed to coax anyone else along. Most members, conversely, passed through Berlin or Bonn at some point. Prussia—and the Prussian higher education system—offered the future members shared experiences. It is unclear if the choice of Prussian universities reflected a pre-existing preference, or if it fed their belief in the national mission of Prussia—perhaps it was simply the sheer size and repute of Prussian higher education. Future network members' accumulation of social capital, including shared institutional experiences and memories, was thus concentrated in majority-Protestant universities in the north. They remained, like their liberal counterparts in other parts of Europe, relatively confined to familiar cultural spaces.⁸³

Pivotal to the network friends' early political socialization were student fraternities.⁸⁴ These institutions began in the Napoleonic era as nationalist social and political clubs. German leaders tended to view fraternities—and student societies in general—as hotbeds of political unrest.⁸⁵ Exploiting the assassination of the conservative playwright and publicist August von Kotzebue in 1819, the Karlsbad Decrees outlawed fraternities. Nevertheless, Auerbach joined a Tübingen fraternity. Mathy joined one in Heidelberg that fought with an unnamed “Borussian” fraternity, fostering interpersonal hostilities down to 1848. Mathy and Francke became “*Verbindungsgenossen*” in the same fraternity.⁸⁶ Duncker was also a *Burschenschaftler*. The fraternities of Auerbach's days were calmer and bristled less than those of the German Empire.⁸⁷ Focusing instead on ostensible equality among members, earlier fraternities cultivated “symbolic friendship” through communal drinking, fraternal kissing, and patriotic singing in order to advance German unification.⁸⁸ Max Duncker happily recorded that Mathy, though a serious student, “was also no spoilsport at wine and patriotic song.”⁸⁹ Many of these student organizations were not radical in the democratic or socialist sense. Instead, they advocated for liberal constitutionalism.

Student fraternities developed alongside shooting, singing, and reading clubs with nationalist overtones in the *Vormärz*.⁹⁰ The Hamburg Festival of 1832, organized by southern German republicans, was the most spectacular gathering that included such nationalist clubs; it functioned as a “rallying ground for radical liberalism.”⁹¹ Fraternity members, including Mathy, counted among the reported 20,000 participants.⁹² The intersection in fraternities of homosocial camaraderie and political organization reappeared in 1848 around the Frankfurt Parliament.

That most members of the network had belonged to a fraternity demonstrated the early entanglement in Central Europe of civic associations, friendship,

political organizing, and the realm of notable politics. From their teenage years, elite men formed bonds inside and around clubs and associations that offered personal fulfillment while providing political training and a model for organizing. Networks of political friendship, with their enforcement of behavioral norms and, especially after 1858, their policing of political conformity, were a refraction of the cautious, relatively disorganized associational life of the *Vormärz*. Because fraternities provided an early introduction to this form of political culture, it was likely difficult for individuals to separate their friendships completely from the structures of clubs and associations. State power nonetheless forced contemporaries to deinstitutionalize these personal bonds and concentrate political organization in personal networks—networks of political friendship, for some.⁹³

But the nineteenth century was not always “a blissful age for bourgeois associations,” as James Sheehan has contended.⁹⁴ Some future members paid dearly for fraternity membership. Württemberg police arrested Auerbach for participating in a Tübingen fraternity, and an arrest on political charges barred him from taking the state rabbinical exam.⁹⁵ Max Duncker was arrested in Berlin in 1837 for his fraternity membership and oppositional writing. A Prussian court sentenced him to six years in prison and a life-long ban on holding state office, which the king commuted to just six months in the fortress-prison of Köpenick outside Berlin.⁹⁶ Compared to the experiences of democratic and socialist activists, however, the imprisonment of liberals remained relatively rare.⁹⁷ Auerbach and Duncker were exceptional among the political friends in that regard—perhaps because of their Jewish backgrounds. A more common government strategy was to deny liberals professional positions or promotions, or to force them into exile. This became the preferred form of harassment after 1849, but governments had learned to use it in the *Vormärz*.⁹⁸

Future political friends also found intellectual and political stimulation with professors who adapted their traditional privileges to speak publicly—on academic matters—to criticize state policies indirectly. Contact with Hegel and Hegelian thought profoundly affected their thinking and other political activists who later interacted with the network.⁹⁹ Future members, from Duncker to Sybel to Haym, integrated Hegelian thinking into their politics and scholarship, especially the philosopher’s faith in the world-historical role of the (Prussian) state in the realization of human and German potential. Although none joined the radical republican “Young Hegelians,” many of their professional difficulties in the 1840s sprang from their advocacy of rationalist dissenting movements and later associations with the radical publicist Arnold Ruge in Halle.

Kant had also exerted a major intellectual influence on the future political friends—as he, alongside Hegel, did on many European liberals.¹⁰⁰ Even so, network members’ treatment of the Königsberg philosopher in their biographies tended to associate reading Kant with revelations of religious rationalism, and this epiphany, they remembered, to feelings of national belonging among

their parents' generation.¹⁰¹ Kant urged readers to consider their emotions as a “property of the soul” mediating “between cognition and appetite.”¹⁰² The friends reportedly internalized this rather ethereal Kantianism as children before studying Hegel at university. The shift among these liberals—from Kantian individualism and rationalism to Hegel's illiberal emphasis on the power of a quasi-mystical state over individual freedoms—reflected, perhaps, that they considered domestic *Bildung* (Kant) indispensable for young people, but, once individuals joined public life at university, they had to sublimate their personal desires to the interests of the state (Hegel).

Above all, scholarly pursuits prepared future members for careers in the “free professions” and civil service. With few exceptions, they studied classical philology, law, and philosophy. Haym studied philosophy and theology, though his real interests lay in literary history—and radical politics. Mathy studied state commerce and finance—*Kammerwissenschaft*—signaling a desire to join the state bureaucracy.¹⁰³ Thanks to the methodological pioneering of Niebuhr and Ranke, history was becoming a discrete discipline, although no German universities offered permanent history seminars until the 1850s.¹⁰⁴ The historians of the network, such as Duncker and Sybel, therefore studied at a time when history was still strongly associated with theology and jurisprudence.¹⁰⁵ Some friends pursued their childhood interest in the Middle Ages at university. Freytag and Duncker studied medieval documents alongside ancient authors. Under Ranke's supervision, Sybel wrote his thesis on Middle High German texts.¹⁰⁶

Future network members from princely families attended lectures on history, philosophy, and law, which exposed them to the formative university experiences of non-princely members. None earned a degree, thus deviating from the network bourgeois norm. Except for the banker Mathy, the writer Auerbach, and the state bureaucrats Roggenbach, Francke, and Samwer, all others passed doctoral examinations. Gustav Freytag, Max Duncker, and Heinrich von Sybel habilitated. Members were, therefore, not only university-educated but highly educated. Aspiring scholars were expected to study at multiple universities to experience different modes of thought and to apprentice with as many experts as possible. Duncker, for instance, attended the University of Bonn during his one-year military training. He returned to Berlin to take his doctoral degree in July 1834 and then went to Halle for his *Habilitation*.¹⁰⁷

Another formative part of future members' university lives was contact with advisors and integration into networks of professional and political patronage. Both Sybel and Duncker attended the historian Leopold von Ranke's lectures in Berlin. Sybel became his doctoral student and eventual critic: he disagreed with Ranke's conservative emphasis on the empirical facts of history.¹⁰⁸ In Berlin, Max Duncker made the important acquaintance of Johannes Schulze, a state secretary in the Prussian ministry of culture and education, who advanced Duncker's career in the 1840s.¹⁰⁹

Some university connections linked bourgeois and princely figures. Franz von Roggenbach and Friedrich of Baden studied under the young historian, Ludwig Häusser, in Heidelberg.¹¹⁰ Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia (the future Emperor Friedrich III) and Friedrich of Baden studied in Bonn under the liberal historian and exiled Hanoverian, Friedrich Dahlmann, and the conservative jurist, Clemens Perthes.¹¹¹ In Bonn, the future emperor began a lifelong friendship with Friedrich von Augustenburg, future claimant to the thrones of Schleswig-Holstein.¹¹² In the *Vormärz*, it seemed safe to place princelings under the guardianship of liberal academics. Ernst and Friedrich were royal heirs, so university study was meant to expose them to the ethos of academia and provide a measure of—closely monitored—independence outside monarchical courts.

Between University and National Assembly

Because many network members, such as Gustav Freytag, Heinrich von Sybel, and Rudolf Haym, pursued doctorates and the *Habilitation*, separating their university education from their early professional careers is unproductive. The aspiring academics among them were expected to work as private lecturers or secondary school teachers, habilitate, and then secure “extraordinary” (non-tenured) professorships. Others, such as Karl Mathy, Karl Samwer, and Karl Francke, became unpaid assessors and entry-level bureaucrats.

Karl Mathy’s life after university differed from the experience of other academic members. After completing his studies in Heidelberg, he began a sort of *Wanderjahr* in May 1828. He set off for Paris after reading an open letter by Capodistrias, president of the nascent Greek state, calling on men of “honor” and “morals” to gather under his banner. The head of the leading Greek support committee in Paris, however, questioned young Mathy’s financial resources and his legal status in Baden. He told Mathy that the Greek nation needed no more intellectuals.¹¹³ Mathy decided to stay in Paris for three months to practice his French, go to the theater, and watch parliamentary debates.¹¹⁴ When he ran out of money, he returned to Mannheim on foot.¹¹⁵

This brief episode points to three aspects of *Vormärz* liberalism. First, Mathy’s travels in France reflected a general preference among southern liberals for French government models, namely, centralized, parliamentary government, and French answers to post-revolutionary social challenges.¹¹⁶ Second, Mathy’s passion for other national struggles was shared by many *Vormärz* liberals. Greek independence, buoyed by intensely Romantic images of ancient Greece from Hölderlin to Byron, captured the imaginations of many educated Europeans—and some peasants and artisans.¹¹⁷ German national sympathies extended to Poland as well, especially during the November Uprising of 1830.¹¹⁸ Most other members started university shortly after the 1832 crackdown on free speech and association, but,

even then, pan-nationalism was waning. The anti-Slavic and anti-Danish rhetoric of the Frankfurt Parliament exemplified this shift.¹¹⁹ Third, Karl Mathy's trip to Paris was exceptional because he left Germany to enlist in the Hellenic army. The other political friends did not want to fight other nations' battles.

In the late 1830s and 1840s, more shared experiences brought the liberal political friends together. Liberal euphoria over the ascension in 1840 of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia soon faded as it became clear his affection for his subjects would not translate into a constitution.¹²⁰ The "Hungry Forties" also witnessed riots, food shortages, crop failures and crime waves, intensifying the "social question" and middle-class fears of pauperism and desperate mobs.¹²¹

Members reacted to these developments in literary, historical, and political journals, often to supplement their meager incomes as private lecturers and low-level bureaucrats. Max Duncker's father published his earliest historical essays and studies. Freytag started to concentrate on writing plays as he understood that the Prussian state would not condone his academic career. He remained a private lecturer in Breslau until 1843 while on the hunt for venues to stage his plays and cultivating contacts with Carl Alexander of Weimar. Mathy met Auerbach in the 1830s, and by 1845, the former's home in Baden hosted a close circle of political friends that included Alexander von Soiron, Baden parliamentarian and publicist, and Auerbach.¹²² Mathy also introduced Auerbach to the Dunccker in the early 1840s. Auerbach also grew close to Freytag, and he befriended Carl Alexander, who offered to make him a court librarian—a sinecure that the writer declined.¹²³

During the 1840s, the friends helped each other write and publish works that they believed contributed to the education of a liberal and nationalist citizenry. In 1843, Auerbach produced the first collected volume of the *Black Forest Village Stories* to great acclaim. German nationalists believed Auerbach's book reflected the advent of a truly German form of literary realism that focused on rural folk and undermined the influence of what Freytag called "French *Salonkram*."¹²⁴ Mathy reportedly helped Auerbach find a publisher for his prose debut after the former had spent five years in exile in Switzerland for smuggling political literature.¹²⁵ In 1847, Mathy cofounded the liberal, pro-Prussian *Deutsche Zeitung* with Soiron, G.G. Gervinus, and Friedrich Bassermann. Mathy acted as the newspaper's editor until 1849.¹²⁶ He also wrote for *Das Buch für Winterabende*, a popular Rhenish almanac meant to induct the rural populace into the ranks of a liberally minded German nation.¹²⁷ Auerbach and Freytag published similar works in the 1850s: the successful *Deutscher Volks-Kalender* and *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit*.¹²⁸

Meanwhile, Sybel began writing historical and political pamphlets.¹²⁹ Max Duncker contributed to the Young Hegelian Arnold Ruge's *Hallische Jahrbücher*. He eventually became editor in 1845 and expanded the platform for his liberal friends, Sybel and J.G. Droysen.¹³⁰ A year before the revolution, Freytag

became the editor of the eminently liberal cultural and political journal, *Die Grenzboten*.¹³¹ Non-princely members sent princes books and articles in hopes of receiving audiences, patronage, and political protection in return.¹³² Auerbach's stories, for instance, endeared him to members of the Baden and Prussian royal families.¹³³ While he entered the good graces of powerful princes in the 1840s, Auerbach also corresponded with radical political thinkers such as Moses Hess, Ferdinand Freiligrath, and Karl Marx—even contributing to the former's *Rheinische Zeitung*.¹³⁴ Such interactions presaged the political friends' later reliance on each other for political intelligence, local information, and presenting their publications to state leaders. More broadly, these connections between liberals, democrats, and socialists reflected the porousness of oppositional political boundaries in the *Vormärz*. Members of the network cut most of their ties to democrats and socialists, as they did with many *großdeutsch* activists during the Revolutions of 1848/49.

In their professional lives in the early 1840s, network members began to work as private lecturers and professors.¹³⁵ For example, Max Duncker was appointed to an extraordinary professorship in *Staatswissenschaft* in 1842 after the intervention of his patron, Johannes Schulze.¹³⁶ Schulze wanted to counter the influence of the conservative, right-Hegelian professor, Heinrich Leo, and his allies at the Hohenzollern court: the Gerlach brothers and Julius Stahl, whose politics were influenced by the Protestant neo-orthodox “Awakening” movement and *ständisch* ideology.¹³⁷ The young Duncker was, therefore, an unwelcome addition to the faculty, foisted on them by a faction of the education ministry. Duncker's low salary underlined the limits of his patron's power. This situation also meant Duncker faced intermittent ministerial harassment from Schulze's rivals in reimbursement disputes and the withdrawal of lecturing privileges.¹³⁸

At that time in the early 1840s, the young professionals began getting married. Max Duncker and Charlotte Gutike met in 1837. They married a few years later, after Duncker received a docent position at Halle. Through Charlotte Duncker's father, the marriage provided valuable connections to the educated elite of the city, to salons, and especially to middle-class dissenting circles.¹³⁹ The small university town in Prussian Saxony was a center of religious dissent.¹⁴⁰ The Dunccker's began working in 1843 with the rationalist, Protestant reformers, the “Friends of Light.” The Lichtfreunde stood at the intersection of political, social, and theological movements and, some historians have argued, represented one of the first “mass” middle-class movements.¹⁴¹ The Lichtfreunde's loose collection of religious and political objectives and organizing represented the “preliminary” development of party politics in the *Vormärz* across German society.¹⁴² It also echoed interrelated conflicts within Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism between novel forms of rationalist religiosity and state-backed orthodoxy.¹⁴³ The Lichtfreunde had a cousin in the Deutschkatholiken, with whom Auerbach sym-

pathized, just as he supported Jewish liberals' Reform movement, which sought to answer the attacks of rational Christian theologians on Jewish theology and religious practice.¹⁴⁴ The Lichtfreunde and Deutschkatholiken also maintained extensive contacts to other progressive movements, such as the Kindergarten movement, which state officials regarded as an ideological threat to the next generation.¹⁴⁵

Although neither Duncker formally joined the Lichtfreunde, both remained active in their circles. Max Duncker gave historical lectures supporting their demands for expanded suffrage, presbyterian congregations, and women's rights.¹⁴⁶ He traveled to Köthen in 1844 to deliver a lecture on the Reformation to thousands of assembled Lichtfreunde.¹⁴⁷ Fiery speeches at the event seemed to threaten the theological underpinnings of the "Christian state" that was embraced by King Friedrich Wilhelm IV and his politically conservative, religiously orthodox advisors.¹⁴⁸ The Prussian government, after some royal prevarication, classified the Lichtfreunde as a political organization and banned their meetings in 1845.¹⁴⁹ In short, religious and political dissent were inseparable across the political spectrum, contributing to the liminal nature of both liberalism and conservatism in the *Vormärz*.¹⁵⁰

Working to habilitate in Halle, Rudolf Haym associated with dissenters and described the "church liberalism" of the 1840s as a "training school for politics."¹⁵¹ Charlotte Duncker remembered that 1846 was "full of political-religious agitation; Lichtfreunde-liberal was the hallmark."¹⁵² The religiosity of the group and its relative gender equality influenced Duncker's political outlook and tendency to represent political differences in religious terms into the 1860s. The Lichtfreunde, much like the future network, allowed women to participate, but leadership remained male.

As in other parts of Europe, shared experiences of state harassment provided another basis for liberals' friendships and ambivalence toward state power.¹⁵³ Yet, because of family wealth and political connections—or the lack thereof—official chicanery affected members differently. The Prussian education ministry could harass Freytag or Sybel, for instance, but they could weather the storm financially.¹⁵⁴ Rudolf Haym lacked such resources. He therefore petitioned the education ministry under Friedrich Eichhorn in 1845 for an appointment as a docent.¹⁵⁵ Eichhorn was an occasional ally of the Gerlach brothers and a staunch opponent of the Lichtfreunde and Deutschkatholiken.¹⁵⁶

Anticipating a hostile reception to his petition, Haym strained in his "confession" to separate his current scholarship from his former radicalism: ". . . now, in my seasoned years, I hold abstract interference in the workings of an enlightened government to be folly and hubris . . ." He disavowed *Praxis*, Strauss's biblical criticism, and Hegel, all of which had been foundational to his involvement with the Lichtfreunde. He promised to focus instead on satisfying "the needs of the soul and demands of life" in Halle, where "Hegelian philosophy has dug its roots

in the deepest.” He went so far as to state that these roots needed to “be fought and, where possible, annihilated.” Haym closed by assuring the Prussian education minister of his fervent wish to serve the state and its official church.

The letter brimmed with irony, and Eichhorn—unsurprisingly—was unimpressed. He denied the request. Harassed and impoverished, Haym worked as a journalist for, among others, Ruge’s and Duncker’s *Hallische Jahrbücher*.¹⁵⁷ Financial, professional, and political precarity shaped members’ professional experiences from the beginning. Official harassment and material uncertainty returned with the state conservatism of the 1850s, despite network members’ efforts to placate ministerial authorities. Duncker, for example, sent a similarly unsuccessful “political confession” to Minister of Education Karl von Raumer in the early 1850s in which he claimed to be a Prussian patriot rather than a German nationalist. Members’ anguish over choosing between praxis or theory, government service or scholarship, likewise shadowed the political friends into the 1860s. The episode also suggests that, as early as the 1840s, at least one member of the liberal network sought a limited *détente* with conservative state leaders.

A final episode from Halle illustrates the entanglement of early political friendships and state harassment.¹⁵⁸ In February 1845, Berthold Auerbach came to the city to deliver a guest lecture on German literary history. By then well acquainted with the Dunckers, he stayed with them. One of his lectures apparently inspired some students to criticize the national and constitutional failures of the Prussian government and their university. Auerbach was barred from further lecturing. His auditors responded with a supportive demonstration outside the Duncker home. Halle authorities, incensed by such open insubordination, demanded that Duncker provide the names of the student organizers.¹⁵⁹ Professor Duncker refused. He also refused to provide details from Auerbach’s lectures or his current whereabouts.¹⁶⁰ Sensing mutiny in the ranks, university authorities threatened to jail Duncker and Auerbach until they turned in their students. Duncker refused again. The Prussian minister of education, Friedrich Eichhorn, then intervened. He warned Duncker that his refusals were “evidence of a certain lawlessness”—a dangerous inclination for a young academic.¹⁶¹ Fresh correspondence ensued between Duncker and the university until the latter finally relented, but not before chastising the uncooperative historian.

This episode captures some of the difficulty of *Vormärz* political life for liberals who sought to combine their public professions with political agitation. Auerbach’s talk must have been approved by university or municipal authorities because the ability to lecture publicly remained circumscribed until 1848.¹⁶² The education ministry and the wider Prussian government considered Auerbach and Duncker politically suspect—they were associates of the *Lichtfreunde* and the radical publicist Ruge—but evidently not suspect enough to censor. The University of Halle, however, would not abide rabble-rousing among its stu-

dents. The rector's letters to Duncker blasted his failure as a state official to assist the university judge.¹⁶³ That the relevant authorities sought the students involved in the patriotic protest, rather than the professor and the novelist, indicated that they respected Duncker's limited right to free speech as an academic. Auerbach was banned from lecturing, but he was neither a Prussian nor an academic. From the university's point of view, it was the students' fault for extrapolating contemporary political meaning from the lecture. Duncker, for his part, refused to aid in the suppression of fellow nationalists. He leveraged what little power he had to protect his students and his friend—at no small risk to his career.

The University of Halle never pursued Auerbach or fired Duncker. The reason for the decision is unclear, though the university likely received signals from Duncker's benefactor in the education ministry to stop. Auerbach had also won admirers at the Hohenzollern court, demonstrating the political value of princely patronage, even in the period of the Restoration.¹⁶⁴ The threads of ministerial authority and personal patronage tangled into a knot in Halle. Duncker showed that political friendship—and his coterminous moral duty to the nation—superseded his obligations as a state official.

Meanwhile, Heinrich von Sybel had found an extraordinary professorship in Marburg before moving to Bonn. He and Max Duncker collaborated on a number of journal articles in the mid-1840s, some historical, others contemporary, but all of them political.¹⁶⁵ Through the Dunckers, Sybel met Karl Mathy. Hermann Baumgarten also became one of Max Duncker's devotees in Halle at the time.¹⁶⁶ Duncker mentored Ludwig Ägidi as well, who became his unofficial amanuensis in the 1860s.¹⁶⁷ Roggenbach began his studies in 1843 before the Mathys introduced him to the network in the 1850s. Princely members such as Ernst of Coburg and Friedrich of Baden completed their university experiences and served as active officers in their state militaries. They continued to follow liberal cultural affairs and politics, receiving copies of non-princely members' books and articles. Taking stock: most political friends had met each other in the 1830s and 1840s and had begun to cooperate on political and literary activities. In 1848, the friends nurtured their individual relationships into a network that worked to advance members' individual and collective goals.

The Revolutions of 1848/49 and the First Schleswig War

The Revolutions of 1848/49 have been well studied. Interpretations have ranged from a condemnation of the Paulskirche delegates, whose bickering hampered the historical turn to freedom and democracy, to an insistence that the parliament's Reich constitution was a "nation-state on paper," a model for the German Empire and the Weimar Republic.¹⁶⁸ Historians have, however, largely neglected the contemporaneous war in Schleswig-Holstein led by the Prussian

army against Denmark.¹⁶⁹ The conflict occasioned many network members' first meetings with new friends and foes alike. With the dispersal of the Frankfurt Parliament in May 1849, network members focused even more of their attention on Schleswig-Holstein. After the collapse of the Erfurt Union, the political friends returned home or went north to witness the last days of the war. Nebulous mutual personal connections and vague nationalist and political commonalities began to coalesce and intertwine in Frankfurt, Kiel, and Erfurt, weaving together the emotional and political framework that subsequently sustained the network.

The revolutions began in Palermo in January in 1848.¹⁷⁰ The major spark for Central Europe, however, came from Paris in February, when crowds forced the Orléanist citizen-king to flee to Britain. When news reached the German Confederation in March, the discontented urbanites and rural folk of the "Hungry 40s" took to the streets with political demands. Within a few weeks, Central Europe was experiencing massive demonstrations, open fighting in cities, including Berlin, Vienna, and Dresden, and widespread unrest in the countryside. Liberals demanded national unification, recognition of civil rights, and constitutional government. Peasants sought to abolish remaining manorial dues and noble police powers, while artisans fought for just prices and checks on industrial competitors. Most rulers resisted their more conservative advisors' pleas to crush the crowds, partly because they could not count on their soldiers to fire. The king of Bavaria and grand duke of Hesse were forced to abdicate to younger dynasts; the Austrian emperor soon followed suit. The thirty-odd crowned heads of the Confederation consented to elections to a national assembly in Frankfurt, which was tasked with drafting the first constitution of a united Germany.

Karl Mathy, Max Duncker, and Rudolf Haym were elected by universal manhood suffrage to the Frankfurt Parliament.¹⁷¹ Mathy represented the area around Konstanz, a hotbed of radical republicanism under Gustav von Struve and Friedrich Hecker. Mathy spent much of his time shuttling between Frankfurt and his "Lake District" trying to dissuade his constituents from armed rebellion.¹⁷² He also earned the ire of radicals early on by ordering the arrest in Karlsruhe of Joseph Fickler, a republican leader, before he could leave to join Hecker's republic in Konstanz, and for censoring democratic publications.¹⁷³ August von Saucken-Julienfelde, a noble landowner and future network affiliate and ally of the Dunccker, also became a deputy. Heinrich von Sybel failed to win election to the parliament, although he sat in the Frankfurt "pre-parliament." He remained in the city as an observer. Duncker traveled to Frankfurt via Berlin, where he witnessed the revolution in March. In Berlin, he met Augusta, princess of Prussia and future German empress, with whom he continued to correspond thereafter.¹⁷⁴ J.G. Droysen, professor of history at Kiel and leading Holstein rebel, was elected and worked on the committee that drafted the Reich constitution.¹⁷⁵ Mathy's mentor Alexander von Soiron, whom Duncker "idolized," also served in

the parliament.¹⁷⁶ Karl Francke arrived at Frankfurt as an envoy of the German nationalist government in Schleswig-Holstein.¹⁷⁷

Unlike in their youth, network members traveled through German lands with relative speed. The liberal delegate Karl Biedermann needed “just” twenty-four hours to reach Frankfurt from Leipzig: the railroad ended at Eisenach, so he covered the remaining stretch by coach.¹⁷⁸ The Revolutions of 1848/49, unlike those of the 1820s or 1830s, were a “mass political experience” in Central Europe, partly because of the new speed of communication and travel.¹⁷⁹ At Frankfurt, network members found a host of 799 patriotic—and not so patriotic—delegates, with some of their families along for the trip.¹⁸⁰ The free city also hosted the Confederal diet and state ambassadors from across Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands.

The Frankfurt Parliament thus provided a *mélange* of national, social, and political groups, although most of the parliamentarians were members of the educated bourgeoisie.¹⁸¹ Nobles, wealthy farmers, innkeepers, and merchants—the traditional wielders of power in the countryside—were present, albeit in smaller numbers than urban, university-educated *Honoratioren*.¹⁸² Only seven delegates were peasants or artisans.¹⁸³ Frankfurt was an opportunity for public intellectuals and regional politicians from vast geographic distances—and much smaller social distances—to meet personally. The 1840s had seen national and regional congresses of state legislators and certain professions, but no comparable gathering had ever convened before. Karl Mathy was so enthused that he exclaimed: “I live here, not among men, but rather among angels, and I sleep in a temple of fairies.”¹⁸⁴

Most representatives had not held elected office before. This fact, combined with the sheer number of delegates, resulted in hectic, rowdy first weeks. Nascent political parties formed, named after the inns at which delegates coalesced, as deputies realized who shared their basic political views.¹⁸⁵ At first, these clubs were relatively fluid. As many as 25 percent of deputies belonged to no club; others switched or drifted between multiple factions.¹⁸⁶ Most network members belonged to the “center-right” Casino or, less commonly, the “center-left” Württemberger Hof. In these smoke-filled inns, delegates and their allies discussed the business of the parliament and the particulars of committee work—not unlike their experience in fraternities. Nonetheless, the clubs remained informal constellations.¹⁸⁷ They lacked clear organization, codified leadership roles, written platforms, and disciplined voting behavior.¹⁸⁸ This attitude reflected the situation in most pre-existing state legislatures. Political parties were outlawed in most German states into the 1860s—even in progressive Coburg—and liberals throughout Europe—even in parliamentary Britain—tended to regard organized parties as vehicles of special interests against the common good.¹⁸⁹ Liberal parliamentarian and diplomat Robert von Mohl, for example, considered party membership a sign of an “unfinished political education.”¹⁹⁰

The Frankfurt Parliament made initial strides in abolishing onerous holdovers from the Restoration: manorial dues, bans on association, and pre-censorship of the press, for instance. Stalemate soon ensued, however. It began over constitutional questions as ideological lines hardened and the revolution stopped at the throne.¹⁹¹ Liberals, in general, and network members, in particular, did not wish to destroy the existing monarchical order of things in Germany, but rather to “purge it of abuses and turn its power toward liberal aims.”¹⁹² Network members and their political allies rejected the policies of the counter elite of educated, middle-class democrats and socialists.¹⁹³ The liberal political friends had admired many of these men before the revolution, when they had a common enemy in Confederal repression. But network members, who had once supported the *Deutschkatholiken* in the *Vormärz*, now despised the “theater cashier and prophet” Robert Blum for his dangerous republicanism.¹⁹⁴

Moderate liberals’ rejection of democrats had begun earlier, in 1847, at the Offenburg and Heppenheim assemblies, where democratic leaders such as Hecker and Struve declared their succession from southern German liberalism.¹⁹⁵ This attitude continued into the 1850s, when liberals denounced leading democrats as irresponsible revolutionaries and chose to try to reconcile instead with conservative state leaders. In 1848, however, most liberals felt greater distrust for the nobles and state officials on the far right, considering them legitimists hostile to any constitutional restrictions on monarchy, hostile to the abolition of inherited privilege, and especially hostile to German unification.¹⁹⁶ These elements had been responsible for liberals’ harassment, imprisonment, and exile in the *Vormärz*. Radical delegates, for their part, considered liberals cautious and doctrinaire, but still fellow travelers on the road to popular legitimacy and parliamentary government, though few democrats wished to abolish monarchy.¹⁹⁷ And conservatives barely tried to differentiate between liberals, democrats, and socialists: all were revolutionaries endangering the Christian state and monarchy.¹⁹⁸

The members of the network shared the liberal, constitutional monarchist position concentrated in the moderate Paulskirche political groupings. They were members of socially homogenous political clubs: in the case of the center-right Casino, for example, 75 percent of its members were professors.¹⁹⁹ The rest were literati, publicists, or held other occupations reflecting the “overpopulation” of academia in the 1830s and 1840s.²⁰⁰ Duncker and Mathy were too young to take leading public roles at the parliament, although both were influential within the Casino itself.²⁰¹ The two also found new mentors at the Frankfurt Parliament.²⁰² Both Duncker and Mathy admired the leading moderate, parliament president Heinrich von Gagern. Duncker became Gagern’s protégé in late 1848. Mathy likewise supported Gagern and joined the provisional national government in 1848 as an undersecretary of state in the finance ministry.²⁰³ These relationships affected their choices during the revolution and their professional prospects in the 1850s and 1860s.

The combination of relative youth, lack of access to official government positions, and understudy roles with more senior Old Liberals meant that network members were reluctant to deliver speeches or lead their unruly factions in the Paulskirche. This situation was common among their generation, placing them in the ranks of what Christian Jansen has called historical “*Mit- und Zuarbeiter*.”²⁰⁴ Karl Mathy, apart from his work in the Reich finance ministry, avoided the parliamentary spotlight in Frankfurt. His anti-democratic reputation made him very unpopular in Baden, and, at the parliament, he avoided openly associating with causes.²⁰⁵ Max Duncker and Rudolf Haym likewise shunned speaking.²⁰⁶ Members’ later biographers stressed their quiet, contemplative roles at the parliament.²⁰⁷ Nonetheless, the friends worked on difficult political questions, conferred at clubs, and observed debates on the Paulskirche floor—important schooling in political action and social networking.

Like the aristocratic Congress of Vienna, the informal social world surrounding the parliament influenced members’ future political friendships and outlooks.²⁰⁸ The months between the March Revolution of 1848 and the Olmütz agreement in November 1850 accelerated liberal network-building as the revolution forged a pan-Confederal, bourgeois political elite.²⁰⁹ The housing shortage alone—in a small city inundated with parliamentary delegates, government officials, and journalists—compelled new arrivals to share homes and rooms. Duncker stayed with the historian and parliamentarian Karl Hagen, for example.²¹⁰ Mathy managed to find his own room. Family connections and personal contacts from university years helped delegates defray the cost of living in Frankfurt—a luxury denied less fortunate delegates. Network members fondly remembered the social contacts they nurtured through paying social calls, literary readings, and informal political discussions.²¹¹ After conflict in June over the election of a princely “Imperial Administrator” (*Reichsverweser*) ended with the parliament’s election of Archduke Johann of Austria, debates on civil rights had become “so sterile and boring,” Rudolf Haym reported, that “almost half the parliament left the Paulskirche to tramp around in the streets or the pubs.”²¹² Delegates’ increasing comfort with parliamentary work was accompanied by frustration and boredom.

But then tensions exploded in September of 1848. Popular uprisings in town and country threatened property and frightened liberals into deferring to state governments and moderate conservatives against democrats and socialists. September marked the decline of the parliament’s demands on the individual German governments and the increase of state power.²¹³ Haym recorded a telling incident in September. Crowds surrounded the Paulskirche, insulting the parliamentarians and singing the republican “*Heckerlied*.” Haym decamped with about 80 other moderates to the Englischer Hof inn. But the crowds were not so easily calmed, Haym implied. Robert Blum, a parliamentary delegate and leading republican, had reportedly arrived at the “headquarters of the left” to whip up the common folk, and by eleven o’clock that evening an angry crowd

besieged Haym and company at their inn: “Suddenly, whistling in front of the windows. Thereupon the throwing of stones. Every pane in the great hall is shattered. Eventually, they try to break in.” The liberals managed to barricade the doors. “We are besieged for half an hour. Finally, the military appears.” Haym then reported that troops dispersed the crowds and freed the beset moderates.²¹⁴

The scene is instructive in two ways. First, it highlights radicals’ discontent with the slow-moving, moderate progress of the revolution represented by Paulskirche liberals. Revolutionary violence erupted in August and September in Berlin, Dresden, and swaths of rural Silesia, Baden, and the Palatinate. This conflict reached Haym and his associates directly on that night in September. The fear apparent in Haym’s letter to the former Prussian finance minister, David Hansemann, also vilified democratic leaders such as Blum. Political alliances between constitutional liberals and democrats in the *Vormärz* were frayed in 1848/49 by the need to codify earlier ideals into a constitution. Second, the beleaguered liberals were only saved from the—allegedly—enraged mob by troops under the command of Confederal princes. The revolution threatened property and liberal constitutionalism; the monarchical state intervened to protect both. Liberals in other parts of Europe reacted to mass disturbances in a similar fashion.²¹⁵ Leading Prussian conservatives, such as Leopold von Gerlach and Julius Stahl, now saw a chance for cooperation with moderate liberals to preserve the monarchical state.²¹⁶ By 1849, Max Duncker expressed his new faith that conservatism might indeed lead “the people” to embrace a powerful state as a guarantee of social stability.²¹⁷ Already, network members’ slow accommodation with conservative officials appeared on the horizon.

Outside Frankfurt, members’ loved ones followed these events and participated in political organizing. But network women also faced expectations that militated against their participation in events. Charlotte Duncker and Anna Mathy stayed in Halle and Mannheim, respectively. They kept in close contact with their spouses in Frankfurt despite their schedule of committee meetings, parliamentary debates, and social calls.²¹⁸ Female members of the network, apart from providing emotional labor and working in socially acceptable charitable societies, became local managers of news from the Paulskirche.²¹⁹ The emotional and political were deeply intertwined, yet their expression was confined to private correspondence dealing with public issues through a medium that encouraged debate rather than confrontation.²²⁰ Letters also served as an emotional outlet for stressed and overworked political friends in 1848/49, as they did in the years of reaction and crisis in the 1850s and 1860s. For men and women alike, emotional labor was necessary when all levels of society were obsessed with protecting their “nerves.”²²¹

Network members who served as delegates in Frankfurt expressed private disbelief at the slow progress of the parliament. Max Duncker remarked in August 1848 that, “Since Sunday, we have again experienced the most remarkable

things, and the worst is, we have been held up considerably by insolence and stupidity.”²²² He blamed this souring on the radicals: a disrespectful and uneducated rabble. The abbreviated style of Duncker’s letters hint at his frustration. He was overworked and tormented by social and political worries.²²³

Berthold Auerbach exemplified another category of Germans who were largely excluded from the parliament but for a different reason.²²⁴ Auerbach’s Jewish faith precluded his election to a Black Forest district, although a handful of important Jewish Germans, such as Johann Jacoby and Gabriel Riesser, were elected.²²⁵ Auerbach suffered a deep personal loss that also distanced him from many of the events of 1848. His wife, Auguste, had recently had a son, and Auerbach admitted, “it often seems to me as if I were living inside a balloon, and the great events of the world, which had so absorbed me, lay far, far below.”²²⁶ But Auguste Auerbach grew ill and soon died. Depressed, Berthold Auerbach left for Breslau where for months, he confided in his cousin: “My most precious wish every morning and every evening is that I would die; and if it were not for my child, I would certainly have fallen on the Vienna barricades . . . I cannot write anything to you about politics. I would have to reach too deep.”²²⁷ For Auerbach, the year 1848 represented personal loss first, then political trauma. Events influenced members of the network differently, depending on their religious, gendered, or personal position. This disparity in both access to parliamentary politics and family emotional obligations affected future standing in the network. Auerbach, like Charlotte Duncker, often played a smaller role, partly because of his exclusion from formative experiences shared among the other political friends.

Meanwhile, renewed popular violence in Berlin and the rural southwest in April and May 1849 recalled for liberals the specter of mob violence and the destruction of property from September 1848.²²⁸ On the anniversary of the March Revolution, Charlotte Duncker wrote: “the times when I looked forward to this day’s return with a beating heart are over . . .”²²⁹ Frankfurt moderates struggled to convince enough democrats and conservatives to approve the new imperial constitution. It guaranteed civil rights, such as freedom of speech and association, abolished estate privileges, and established an elected legislature under a federal, Hohenzollern monarchy. The new Reich excluded the Habsburg lands after the Austrian government had retaken Vienna in November and expressed its hostility toward the Frankfurt Parliament by arresting Julius Fröbel and executing Robert Blum, both famous democratic deputies. The vote for a *kleindeutsch* state also marked the departure of the liberal political friends from much of their collaboration with *großdeutsch* activists. The parliament agreed to offer the imperial title to the Prussian king at the last minute. Heinrich von Gagern, with a deputation that included Max Duncker, traveled to Berlin to offer the Prussian king the new dignity. Friedrich Wilhelm IV rejected the “crown from the gutter,” the “dog collar” of a godless revolution.²³⁰ In short: Frankfurt was a joyous, then exhaust-

ing, and finally disappointing experience for members of the liberal network and their contacts throughout Germany.²³¹

Max Duncker returned to Frankfurt long enough to pack his things. The Prussian government recalled him with the rest of the “Prussian” delegates in May 1849.²³² Instead of returning to Prussia as ordered, Duncker accompanied Heinrich von Gagern to Holstein and stayed to report from Kiel and Rendsburg for Haym’s *Konstitutionelle Zeitung*.²³³ It was in Schleswig-Holstein that Duncker and Gagern began to address each other with *Du*.²³⁴ This intimate form of address was common among the political friends. Mathy was summoned by a liberal Baden government in May 1849 to head the finance ministry in Karlsruhe. The grand duke dismissed Mathy three days later in order to form a conservative cabinet.²³⁵ The “rump” Stuttgart Parliament then decamped in June 1849 to establish a republic in Baden. Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, liberals’ hope for the future, destroyed the leftover legislature with regular troops whose allegiance to the king and state benefits were more persuasive than the revolutionaries’ words.²³⁶ But soon after the dissolution of the Frankfurt Parliament, Schleswig-Holstein dominated the political friends’ attentions and anxieties more than the bloodshed unleashed by Prince Wilhelm in the south.

The First Schleswig War followed the initial stages of the February and March Revolutions of 1848 in Europe. The separate duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were held in personal union by the Danish monarch. The Danish king, as duke of Holstein, was a member of the German Confederation. The Duchy of Schleswig, however, was not a member of the Confederation. Yet, a series of arcane treaties beginning in the fifteenth century bound Schleswig to Holstein. Holstein, to the south, was overwhelmingly German-speaking, while a large Danish-speaking minority inhabited Schleswig.²³⁷ German and Danish nationalism, influenced by the growing connection of cultural to political unity, increased tensions between Kiel and Copenhagen. The centralizing impulses of absolutizing monarchy and growing “Eider Dane” nationalism led government ministers in Copenhagen to advocate for the incorporation of Schleswig into the Danish state. It also led, German nationalists claimed, to official discrimination against German speakers.²³⁸ Two popular rumors²³⁹ concerned the posting of Danish-speaking pastors to German-speaking parishes and Danish doctors to state hospitals and asylums—questions of economic, religious, and social importance for bourgeois Germans.²³⁹

But it was bad timing and an old-fashioned dynastic dispute that provided the spark to the powder keg on the Elbe. When King Frederick VII of Denmark ascended the throne in January 1848, it was clear he would not produce a male heir. This situation meant that the Elbe duchies, governed by Salic law, would pass to a male, “German” branch of the House of Oldenburg as the Danish crown moved down a female line.²⁴⁰ The government in Copenhagen balked at

the idea of losing Schleswig, Danes, and associated tax revenues. State ministers renewed pressure on the king to incorporate Schleswig. News of the February Revolution in Paris reached Kiel in March, and German nationalist leaders went to Copenhagen to demand more autonomy and an end to the incorporation of Schleswig. The Danish government rejected the idea, igniting armed rebellion in Holstein. The Confederal diet, still active despite popular unrest in Germany, asked the Prussian army to lead the “execution” in Holstein in support of the rebel Augustenburg pretender. Saxon troops and German nationalist volunteers from across Central Europe joined the Holstein rebels as well. Scandinavian nationalists from Sweden-Norway volunteered for the Danish side. The United Kingdom and the Russian Empire monitored the conflict as a possible threat to Baltic shipping and Danish territorial integrity.²⁴¹ This crisis, then, was a European one, which made the stakes all the higher in the eyes of network members.

Many of the future friends who did not meet in Frankfurt did so in Kiel. Duke Ernst, now the reigning sovereign of Coburg, fought in the war as a cavalry officer.²⁴² It was the only major battlefield experience that the self-styled military and renaissance man had before the Seven Weeks’ War of 1866. Duke Ernst befriended the disputed Augustenburg duke of Schleswig-Holstein during the fighting in 1848 and 1849. He then grew close to the duke’s heir, Prince Friedrich von Augustenburg. Ernst also met the lawyer Karl Samwer and the former envoy to the Frankfurt Parliament, Karl Francke. Both worked in the rebel government. Max Duncker befriended the three men from Holstein at this time as well. In 1850, Charlotte Duncker was glad her husband was working in Schleswig-Holstein because there, “at least Germany’s *immediate* national future will be decided . . .”²⁴³

It is unclear whether Max Duncker met Duke Ernst in Kiel, or if they met later through Gustav Freytag. Whatever the case, Duncker knew of, and reported on, the prince’s military exploits in the First Schleswig War. Ernst’s service bestowed nationalist credentials on the duke as it did for the Prussian commander, Eduard von Bonin. Duncker’s private and public reporting from Kiel from 1849 likewise boosted his profile as a journalist, making him one of the leading local contacts for moderate liberals and network members in Schleswig-Holstein. Alexander von Soiron solicited articles from Max Duncker, as well as from Gagern through Mathy, to rally their “party” to the war effort.²⁴⁴ Nevertheless, Duncker felt homesick and despondent in Kiel.²⁴⁵ In August 1850, Charlotte Duncker longed for her spouse, and in that frame of mind she proclaimed a gendered, subordinated relationship to politics that she later rejected: “All my politics are . . . really only longing for you. When you are here, you are my newspaper and my point of view.”²⁴⁶

Schleswig-Holstein marked the beginning of many common network political activities. The Dunckers, Karl Mathy, and Freytag raised funds in the various societies that advanced the Holstein cause. Max Duncker ran a pro-Holstein

lottery, while Charlotte Duncker worked in the Halle Schleswig-Holstein assistance society.²⁴⁷ She received more intelligence from her spouse from Kiel, which she shared in Halle, repaying him in cigar shipments.²⁴⁸ Rudolf Haym took over the editorship of the moderate liberal *Konstitutionelle Zeitung* and worked to publish pro-Schleswig articles at Max Duncker's behest.²⁴⁹ Soiron also passed information to Haym.²⁵⁰ Robert Morier, a British diplomat who soon became the foreign office's expert on German affairs, met network members after Droysen recommended his English translations of pro-Holstein publications to Samwer.²⁵¹ Droysen also fed Duncker and Francke information from Prussia.²⁵² Much like German liberals' work for the Greek national struggle, their activities remained civilian, though Duncker was a trained *Landwehr* officer.²⁵³ These individuals focused on more "respectable" tasks, such as fundraising, journalism, or recruiting for rebel units.

Max Duncker continued to work from Kiel and toured northern Germany as a "missionary" to raise funds.²⁵⁴ The tide had turned against the rebels, however, as the United Kingdom and Russian Empire intervened to restore the status quo. Prussia signed an armistice with Denmark in mid-1850. Overcome, Max Duncker begged Mathy to intensify fundraising for field hospitals and materials so that Holstein could continue the fight without Prussia. Duncker considered the armistice unnecessary, arguing that the smaller states must undermine the agreement: "Haste and fervor are necessary to save the duchies from the bitter feeling that they must enter the decisive struggle abandoned by Germany."²⁵⁵ Francke confided in Mathy, whom he addressed with *Du*, that new funds from the smaller German states would hardly meet the five million talers needed to continue the war.²⁵⁶

Network members' hopes for victory in Schleswig-Holstein and for salvaging national unification after Frankfurt diminished in the ensuing weeks. In August 1850, Francke composed a gloomy thank-you letter to Rudolf Haym: "You are fighting with the weapon of the spirit . . . for a cause that we defend with the sword . . . Your success, our success, is doubtful, but one thing remains certain: If we win, you are owed one of the most beautiful laurels!"²⁵⁷ Yet, official tolerance was over for Haym's newspaper and its campaign against the armistice with Denmark. The Berlin police threatened Haym with deportation and the cancellation of his pre-paid postage for the newspaper. He considered these threats a "brazen attempt at intimidation, a surrogate for earlier confiscations with which [they] already burned their fingers. For my part, I threatened Herr Hinkeldey [*sic*] with publication."²⁵⁸ Haym then pleaded with Max Duncker for more lead articles to sustain the paper. The circulation of political information, professional favors, and emotional support in the face of state repression became the hallmark of network activity in the 1850s.²⁵⁹

The political friends' attempts to scuttle the Prussian peace effort also presaged liberals' selective opposition to conservative governments in the 1850s and

1860s. They supported the suppression of radical leaders and plebeian mobs, but they opposed the German governments' failure in Schleswig-Holstein as *the* national issue. This attitude resurfaced during the Second Schleswig War (1864), when disputes over the rights of the Augustenburg family fractured the network. Shared traumas from reporting on, fighting in, fundraising for, and, ultimately, suffering defeat in Holstein haunted members. The war was, therefore, key to the formation of the network of liberal political friends. It also shaped members' conceptions of national and state power and the supposed national mission of Prussia—and liberal nationalism in Germany, in general.

While war still raged in the north, the political friendships forged in Frankfurt and Kiel underlay the gathering of many network members in Gotha in 1850 under the protection of Duke Ernst II of Coburg. This “after-parliament,” a reconvening of 130 moderate liberals who had served in Frankfurt, was the origin of the vaguely pejorative moniker “Gothaer.”²⁶⁰ Those who met in Gotha rarely used the term themselves. Perhaps it smacked of particularism and carried a whiff of conspiracy, an implication that their opponents likely relished. The meeting also received curiously cursory treatment in members' biographies. Yet, it was in Gotha that the remaining constitutional liberals of the Paulskirche announced their support for uniting Prussia, Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, and many of the small German states in a modest version of the “Reich-on-paper” of 1849.²⁶¹ It also represented their first post-revolutionary accommodation with conservative state power for the sake of national unification.²⁶²

The so-called Alliance of the Three Kings (Dreikönigsbund) formed in May 1849 after the kings of Prussia, Bavaria, and Hanover agreed to establish a federal *kleindeutsch* nation-state. The Prussian minister president, Joseph von Radowitz, a moderate conservative general, had pushed the plan since the demise of the Frankfurt Parliament.²⁶³ The allied monarchs called for elections across the German states to a new parliament in Erfurt tasked with voting on a federal constitution heavily influenced by the Reich constitution of 1849. It granted considerable power to the Prussian monarch and restricted voting to the three-class system introduced in Prussia. King Maximilian II of Bavaria and King Georg V of Hanover had stipulated, however, that they would support the Erfurt Union only if every German state—besides Austria—agreed to join. Unanimous acceptance of the union never materialized, partly due to pressure from a resurgent Austrian monarchy that had recently defeated the Hungarian Revolution with Russian soldiers. The Bavarian and Hanoverian kings withdrew in February 1850, and the Erfurt Union lost much of its appeal outside liberal circles.²⁶⁴

Despite their shared vision for a *kleindeutsch* nation-state, reactions to the union varied widely across the network of political friends. Like many moderate

liberals, Alexander von Soiron insisted that the union was promising—it still included twenty-six of thirty-six German states. It remained the last best hope for national political unity. But he also acknowledged the continued mistrust toward the enterprise, even among Prussian leaders.²⁶⁵ Karl Mathy, a subject of Baden, felt differently. He complained to the liberal politician Franz Buhl: “How lucky you are to be a loyal subject of the Wittelsbachs . . . [they] do not belong to the Dreikönigsbund that unites us small [states] in one sack!”²⁶⁶ Max Duncker and Heinrich von Sybel, elected to the new parliament, held out hope for a positive outcome from the assembly.²⁶⁷

Compared to Frankfurt, network members’ memories of the Erfurt Parliament were dim. Most had already met, and like the Gotha “after-parliament,” the event served to bind the political friends more tightly together. Arriving in Erfurt in March 1850, Duncker was reunited with his old classmate Otto von Bismarck.²⁶⁸ Christian von Stockmar and Maximilian von Schwerin, later a minister in the New Era cabinet and an ally of the Dunckers, were also delegates.²⁶⁹ Karl Samwer, Karl Mathy, and Karl Francke were present, too.²⁷⁰ After democrats and socialists had boycotted the election because of its restrictive voting system, the Union Parliament presented little more than an opportunity for liberals to settle old scores with Prussian archconservatives.²⁷¹

The Erfurt Union was threatened from within Germany by the Austrian government, and from without by St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, whose governments favored the restoration of the status quo in Germany. Radowitz faced opposition from the king, traditionalists at the Hohenzollern court, and rivals within his own ministry.²⁷² Domestic political problems in the reactionary Electorate of Hesse sharpened relations between the Prussian and Austrian cabinets. By November 1850, the Austrian government induced the Prussian king to sign the “Punctuation” at Olmütz, canceling the Erfurt project and calling a conference to determine the future of Germany. The Radowitz ministry collapsed, the Erfurt parliamentarians were recalled, and the full restoration of the German Confederation seemed imminent. Anna Ross has argued that Olmütz represented the true end of the revolutions.²⁷³ The next chapter suggests that, although hopes for national unification were shattered, a desperate hope for national victory in Schleswig-Holstein persisted.

Conclusion

In the 1830s and 1840s, the liberal political friends cultivated shared experiences and memories that formed the foundation of their network. These commonalities began with their upbringing in educated, bourgeois homes. There, the future members of the network were exposed to Enlightenment rationalism, Romantic nationalism, and intense religiosity: in short, to *Bildung*. University education

was universal among network men. Princely political friends were among the first generation of German monarchs to study at universities, although none earned a degree. Fraternities facilitated the first shared political experiences for many network men, influencing them for decades.

After university, most chose academic careers or entered the civil service. In the 1840s, Auerbach and Max Duncker interacted with the dissenting Lichtfreunde and defied government authorities when it meant protecting fellow nationalists. Many members had their earliest encounters with organized liberal and democratic politics within the context of rationalist religious dissent. Nevertheless, as Rudolf Haym's "confession" to the Prussian ministry of education demonstrated, poorer members were often forced in the 1840s to try to compromise with conservative officials. By the 1850s, Confederal governments had honed the economic means of repression, turning them on more and more members of the moderate-liberal network.

Partly to supplement their meager incomes as university docents and new professionals, network members contributed to the expanding market for periodicals. Haym, Heinrich von Sybel, Hermann Baumgarten, and Karl Mathy, for instance, published in popular almanacs and bourgeois journals in the 1840s. They adopted both genres to advocate for moderate, constitutional liberalism and a Prussian-led Germany. Although liberal politics in the *Vormärz* remained confined to print and state legislatures, publishing introduced future political friends to like-minded peers and princes, whom they met in person in 1848 for the first time. This small, Confederal public sphere prepared the ground for 1848 by forging contacts between liberals, democrats, and some socialists. It also hosted the relatively free mixing of German nationalists of both the *klein-* and *großdeutsch* persuasions. The political world of the *Vormärz* proved as inclusive as it was vague.

These bonds across the spectrum of political opposition and nationalist activism unraveled only later in the decade. The Revolutions of 1848/49 and the First Schleswig War left behind potent memories and bitter resentments. Shared experiences at the Paulskirche, the Gotha "after-parliament," and the Erfurt Parliament shaped network members' interactions with practical politics into the 1860s. The political friends socialized, debated, and slogged through parliamentary labors. Overall, most members were reluctant—or were not asked—to play major roles. In April 1849, the king of Prussia rejected the imperial dignity, dashing the political friends' hope for national unity under the auspices of the Frankfurt Parliament.

Nevertheless, most members of the network were elected to the Erfurt Parliament of 1850, where they endorsed the Prussian cabinet's authoritarian revision of the Reich constitution of 1849. They then found themselves defending a conservative government in Berlin against archconservatives opposed to the union. Having already scorned democrats and *großdeutsch* ideals at Frankfurt, the

liberals in Erfurt demonstrated to Prussian officials their willingness for political accommodation to drive national unification in the form of a *Kleindeutschland*. After the formal collapse of the Erfurt Union at Olmütz in November 1850, many German liberals believed that Prussia had once again betrayed its mission to unite Germany “from above.”²⁷⁴

Meanwhile, war continued in the north. All network members followed it closely. Karl Francke and Karl Samwer participated in the rebel Holstein government, and Duke Ernst of Coburg fought with German volunteers. Political friends to the south, particularly Max and Charlotte Duncker, Karl Mathy, and Rudolf Haym, raised funds for the rebel war effort and worked in the press to undermine the official peace process. The Schleswig-Holstein Question consolidated the network and later intensified members’ feeling that the revolutions had failed. Members’ fierce resistance to Prussian peace efforts showed that these moderate liberals could support conservative officials at the Erfurt Parliament while denouncing them as traitors to Holstein in the press. The decisive consideration for these moderate liberals was whether a conservative government could achieve *kleindeutsch* unification.

By January 1851, the political friends were scattered across the German Confederation. Conservative governments in Prussia, Austria, Hanover, and many of the small states had defeated the remaining forces of liberalism and radicalism. Many democratic and socialist leaders fled to Switzerland or France, some to Britain or the United States. The liberal political friends chose to remain in Germany. They spent much of the early 1850s processing the defeats, disappointments, and traumas of the revolutions. The network was essential to this process as members supported each other emotionally, professionally, and

Table 1.1. Network Members and Affiliates. Created by the author to illustrate overall findings.

Core Members	Members	Affiliates
Charlotte Duncker	Ludwig Ägidi	Friedrich Bassermann
Max Duncker	Berthold Auerbach	Carl Alexander of Weimar
Ernst II of Coburg	Hermann Baumgarten	J.G. Droysen
Karl Francke	Friedrich I of Baden	Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia
Gustav Freytag	Rudolf Haym	Robert Morier
Karl Mathy	Anna Mathy	August von Saucken-Julienfelde
Franz von Roggenbach	Ernst von Stockmar	Alexander von Soiron
Karl Samwer	Eduard von Tempelty	Christian von Stockmar
Heinrich von Sybel		Crown Princess Victoria of Prussia

Table 1.2. Key Biographical Data. Created by the author using material from: Deutsche Biographie, Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, <https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/home>; Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz; Bundesarchiv, Berlin; Staatsarchiv Coburg.

Name	Birth	First University	Primary Profession	Death
Berthold Auerbach	1812, Württemberg	1832, Tübingen	Fiction writer	1882, France
Charlorte Duncker (née Gutlike)	1819, Prussia	N/A	N/A	1890, (?)
Max Duncker	1811, Prussia	1830, Berlin	Professor/Historian	1886, German Empire
Ernst II of Coburg	1818, Coburg	1837, Bonn	Monarch	1893, German Empire
Friedrich I of Baden	1826, Baden	184(?), Bonn	Monarch	1907, German Empire
Karl Francke	1805, Schleswig	1824, Göttingen	State Administrator	1870, German Empire
Gustav Freytag	1816, Prussia	1835, Breslau	Fiction writer	1895, German Empire
Rudolf Haym	1821, Prussia	1839, Halle	Professor/Literary Historian	1901, Austro-Hungarian Empire
Karl Mathy	1807, Baden	1824, Heidelberg	Banker	1868, Baden
Franz von Roggenbach	1825, Baden	1843, Heidelberg	Landowner/State Administrator	1907, German Empire
Karl Samwer	1819, Holstein	1838, Kiel	Lawyer/State Administrator	1882, France
Heinrich von Sybel	1817, Prussia	1834, Berlin	Professor/Historian	1895, German Empire




Figure 1.1. Major Network Connections. Created by the author to illustrate overall findings.

politically against dogged state harassment. Yet revolution had also taught conservative monarchs in Germany—and their ministers—to value “public opinion” and the influence of liberal and nationalist elites.²⁷⁵ As the next two chapters show, the network of political friends recovered and began to explore this opportunity within a much narrowed social and political field.

Notes

1. On conservative innovation and accommodation to the post-Napoleonic world, see Berdahl, *Politics of the Prussian Nobility*, 5–6, 11; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 164–65; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 10.
2. Freedom and Fernández-Sebastián, introduction to *In Search of European Liberalisms*, 12, 18.
3. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 18; Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 21; Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear*, 14, 40; Kocka, *Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society*, 193.
4. The bourgeoisie organized production, as capitalists, or they provided services certified by educational qualification, such as doctors, lawyers, and other professionals. See Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear*, 3–4.
5. Roggenbach's father had served as Baden's war minister and mentored its future grand duke, Friedrich I, in military matters. See Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64.

6. Like the term “bourgeoisie,” the term “liberal” remained “vague and imprecise” until the 1840s: Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 5; Gall, “Liberalismus und ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft,’” 324. Liberalism in other European countries remained similarly broad, see also: Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile*, 25–26; Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 1; Hadley, *Living Liberalism*, 1, 3, 10; Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 4, 8.
7. They mostly belonged to the center-right at the Frankfurt Parliament, the Gothaer of 1849, the Old Liberal, and the Progressive Party of the Prussian Landtag in the 1860s. Biefang counted Mathy, Sybel, Baumgarten, Duncker among the “Old Liberals.” Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 47. Jansen described the “Konstitutionellen” as moderate liberals willing to work with the monarchies against revolution: Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 14–15.
8. Bourgeois society in Germany fully emerged during the Restoration. Members’ families contributed to that slow process. See Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 223; Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 7–12.
9. De facto territorial sovereigns, such as the king of Prussia or the elector of Bavaria, were not legally sovereign within the bounds of the Holy Roman Empire. Depending on the opinion of the particular estate, either the emperor himself or the empire as a corporate body was the single sovereign entity binding together princes, cities, and ecclesiastical bodies. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Holy Roman Empire*, 19–20, 102–103.
10. “Deutsche Bundesakte vom 8. Juni 1815,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 84–85.
11. “Deutsche Bundesakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 84–85; “Schlußakte der Wiener Ministerkonferenz vom 15. Mai 1820,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 91.
12. “Deutsche Bundesakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 84.
13. Protestant princes were also the heads of their respective state churches. This situation added another layer of religious justification for monarchical rule.
14. See Benton, *Search for Sovereignty*, 279–80.
15. “Schlußakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 91.
16. The signatories of the Final Act, and particularly the Austrian foreign minister Clemens von Metternich, hoped it would halt what they considered dangerous civil reforms in the newly expanded Confederal states such as Baden.
17. Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 304–305.
18. “Schlußakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 98. The diet accredited a Confederal ambassador only once: for the London Conference of 1864 to negotiate an end to the Second Schleswig War. The Saxon minister president, Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, received the honor.
19. “Bundesakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 87; “Schlußakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 96, 98.
20. “Schlußakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 98.
21. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 287–88; Siemann, *Metternich*, 439–40.
22. “Bundesakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 87. There was confusion about the nature of this provision during negotiations in Carlsbad in 1819. See Siemann, *Metternich*, 605–608.
23. “Schlußakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 1: 98; Nipperdey, *Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck*, 304–305. Debates over whether constitutions were the monarch’s gift or a necessary contract between ruler and ruled wracked Restoration France and the Prussian court in the 1850s, as well.
24. Confederal monarchs therefore remained the active artificers of the clockwork of state, in the absolutist sense. See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Der Staat als Maschine*.
25. Both Mecklenburg grand duchies remained without constitutions until World War I. The liberal Duchy of Coburg only received a constitution in 1852. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 40.
26. “Schlußakte,” in *Dokumente*, ed. Huber, 99.
27. Confederal monarchs would later test these boundaries at either end of the political

- spectrum—in liberal Baden and archconservative Electoral Hesse. For developments in the liberal “*Musterstaat*” of Baden, see Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*.
28. Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 233.
 29. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 18.
 30. Bourgeois and literary depictions of war were changing at this time. See Hewitson, *Absolute War*, 99, 104, 122. After 1815, however, governments in Germany also worked to repress the revolutionary aspects of nationalism and popular mobilization from understandings of war. Experiences of the Napoleonic Wars and their legacy had a lasting and at times divisive effect on German liberalism. See Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation*, 420; Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus*, 68–70.
 31. Applegate, “Mediated Nation,” 46.
 32. Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 36–37.
 33. Travel did not necessarily lead to cosmopolitanism and tolerance. For a later example of the well-traveled chauvinists of the Pan-German League, see Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German*, 127.
 34. Brophy, *Rhineland*, 258.
 35. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 275.
 36. University professors were equal to *Regierungsräte* in the Prussian state bureaucracy. See Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 425.
 37. On confessional conflict in the Prussian Rhineland, see Blackburn, *Marpingen*; N. Freytag, *Aberglauben im 19. Jahrhundert*; Brophy, *Rhineland*, 216–17, 254–58.
 38. Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 270–72; Brophy, *Rhineland*, 254–55.
 39. Duncker, “Mathy,” 45; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 7.
 40. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker’s*, 4; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 8, 10. See also Hertz, *Jewish High Society in Old Regime Berlin*.
 41. Karl Mathy to Max Duncker, 28/29 May 1867, GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 3, Bl. 255–56.
 42. Skolnik, *Jewish Pasts, German Fictions*, 28–29; Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 47–49.
 43. Gustav Freytag to Ernst of Coburg, 3 August 1858, GSA 19/339 [unfoliated].
 44. On *Vormärz* religious and confessional conflict in Baden, see Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*. See also Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 311, 321.
 45. Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 14.
 46. For a detailed examination of this connection, see Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*; Altgeld, *Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum*. On the semantic weight of the terms, see also Bollenbeck, *Bildung und Kultur*, 101, 216–20.
 47. Belief in the ecumenical power of liberalism and *Bildung* militated against party identifications, political organizing, and made *Bildung* a refuge from both authoritarian states and the working classes. See Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 18.
 48. Perrot, “The Family Triumphant,” 4: 134; Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 120, 232–33, 242.
 49. See, for example, Rotteck, “Monarchie,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., ed. Rotteck and Welcker, 10: 658; and popular reactions to the Coburg military convention discussed in chapter 3. On the Enlightenment roots of the bourgeois notion of a modern state of *Hausväter*, see Gall, “Liberalismus und ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft,’” 329–32.
 50. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 7, 11; Duncker, “Mathy,” 45.
 51. Blackburn, “German Bourgeoisie,” 9–10. For a concise overview of the earlier historiography on Pietism, see Lehmann, “Pietism and Nationalism.”
 52. Karl Biedermann later wrote, for instance, that “Tribes are a product of nature, nations are a product of culture.” See Biedermann, “Nation,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., ed. Rotteck and Welcker, 10: 317. For example, this notion of *Bildung* shared similarities with liberal concep-

- tions of “character” in the UK and acceptable “cultural patterns” in Mexico. See Hadley, *Living Liberalism*, 7, 9; Schaefer, *Liberalism as Utopia*, 15–17.
53. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 8; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 5. Furger, *Briefsteller*, 13, 26; Koschorke, *Körperströme*, 11–12. On Pietism, see Sheehan, *German History*, 476–77; and Lehmann, “Pietism and Nationalism,” 41–45. On the emotional, religious vocabulary of German nationalism, see Hoover, *Gospel of Nationalism*.
 54. Sheer, “Topographies of Emotion,” 34.
 55. Kocka, *Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society*, 108.
 56. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 234–36; Clarke, *Rise and Fall of the Woman of Letters*, 5–7; Smith, *Gender of History*, 9, 73–74.
 57. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 158. On members’ (early) reading habits, especially their consumption of novels and historical works, see Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 21, 23; Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 8–9.
 58. Daniel Fulda, “Telling German History,” 196, 198–99; Pott, “Zur Kulturgeschichte des Deutschlandsbildnis bis zur Romantik,” 66–67.
 59. Heinrich, *Leben Lesen*, 14, 44; Kaiser, *Social Integration and Narrative Structure*, 9; Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 137; Gössmann and Roth, introduction to *Poetisierung—Politisierung*, 14; White, *Content of the Form*, 9–10; Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus*, 16–17. Almanacs and calendars popular among less educated Germans often contained anecdotes and stories that were structured like miniature *Bildungsromane*. See Brophy, “Common Reader,” 154.
 60. Frevert, “Defining Emotions,” 13–14, 26–28; Gössmann, “Ich bin ein deutscher Dichter,” 21, 24.
 61. Mosse, “Friendship and Nationhood,” 355, 360; Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 247–48, 251–52. See also Pfizer, “Liberal,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 1st ed., ed. Rotteck and Welcker, 9: 713.
 62. Joskowicz, *Modernity of Others*, 15.
 63. Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 9.
 64. Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 11, 48; Kaiser, *Narrative and Social Integration*, 36.
 65. Schlüter, *Auerbach*, 11–12, 48; Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 141.
 66. Uriel Tal argued that this attitude among Christian Europeans stemmed from the Enlightenment notion that if Jews embraced rationalist theology and civic emancipation, Jewish difference would eventually disappear, or at least become irrelevant to public life. See Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 16–17.
 67. Twellmann, *Die Deutsche Frauenbewegung*, 5–6.
 68. See Charlotte Duncker’s surviving poems and stories in GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 245 [unfoliated].
 69. French, *German Women as Letter Writers*, 49. Bonnie Smith has contended that some women in the early- to mid-nineteenth century were “momentarily lionized” for their writings but that this praise should not conceal women’s exclusion from an expanding public sphere. See Smith, *Gender of History*, 40.
 70. Müller, *Our Fritz*, 7; Fritz, “Education and the Rituals of Monarchy in the Kingdom of Württemberg,” in *Sons and Heirs*, ed. Müller and Mehrkens, 76, 85.
 71. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm was the first Hohenzollern heir to be sent to university: Müller, *Our Fritz*, 66.
 72. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 17. Vick’s formulation is not unlike Sheehan’s encapsulation of bourgeois identity cited above: Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 5.
 73. Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 440, 443.
 74. Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 438–40.
 75. Härter, “Security and Transnational Policing,” 200–207; Brophy, “Common Reader,” 141. Unlike the Confederal Polizeiverein (1851–1866), the commission employed its own

- investigators and staff, who reported directly to the Confederal diet. The arrest and prosecution of suspected dissidents, however, remained a state prerogative. The commission was replaced in 1833 by a Central Investigating Agency in Frankfurt until 1843.
76. Church, *Europe in 1830*, 54.
 77. Siemann, *Metternich*, 590–91, 597–600. There was a tinge of paranoia to the two leaders' thinking. They believed, like many state officials, that secret, international networks of radical nationalists were plotting to overthrow Restoration governments through assassination, sabotage, and open revolution.
 78. For a critical re-evaluation of this infamous episode, see See, *Die Göttinger Sieben*.
 79. Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, 106.
 80. De Graaf and Vick, introduction to *Securing Europe after Napoleon*, 17.
 81. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 11.
 82. Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 56; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 169.
 83. See, for example, Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 115.
 84. Ute Frevert has estimated that 60–75 percent of students at Heidelberg, for instance, belonged to at least one student society. See Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 90.
 85. Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 97–98.
 86. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 26–27.
 87. See Zwicker, *Dueling Students*.
 88. Frevert, *Men of Honour*, 91–93. See also Sheehan, *German History*, 406–407, 444. Sheehan, *German History*, 406–407, 444; Mosse, "Friendship and Nationhood," 351–67.
 89. Duncker, "Mathy," 46.
 90. Dieter Langwiesche has argued that *Vormärz* bans on political parties resulted in a "cryptopoliticization" of fraternities and other civic associations. See Langwiesche, "Anfänge der deutschen Parteien," 328.
 91. Mommsen, "German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century," 415.
 92. Barclay, "Political Trends," in *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed., Sperber, 48; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 61.
 93. See, for example, Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur in Deutschland."
 94. Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans*, 64.
 95. Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 142; Katz, "Berthold Auerbach," 218.
 96. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 34.
 97. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 10, 23.
 98. Sheehan makes this connection between liberals' professional and political frustrations: Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 21.
 99. GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 16. On the general enthusiasm for the Hegelian conception of history among the future members, especially Duncker, Sybel, Freytag, Auerbach, and Haym, see Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 65; Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, 432–34; Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 226. Lees contends that Haym broke with Hegelian thinking in the 1850s: Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 35–37.
 100. See Rampton, *Liberal Ideas in Tsarist Russia*, 11–12, 15–16; Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 15; Leonhard, "Formulating and Reformulating," 74–75.
 101. See, for example, Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 7, 11, 14; Duncker, "Mathy," 20, 45.
 102. Frevert, "Defining Emotions," 18, 20.
 103. Duncker, "Mathy," 52, 61; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 41, 364.
 104. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 49; Smith, *Gender of History*, 75.
 105. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 48.
 106. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 85.
 107. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 22; GStAPK, VI. HA Nl. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 20, 49.
 108. Dotterweich, *Sybel*, 85; Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 40–41.

109. It seems that the “*verwaltungstechnische Liberalität*” of the Prussian bureaucracy seeped out to universities well after the end of reform in 1821: Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 419.
110. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64.
111. Gall, *Liberalismus als regierende Partei*, 64; Müller, *Our Fritz*, 66.
112. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 337.
113. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 31–33.
114. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 34–35; Duncker, “Mathy,” 46–47.
115. Duncker, “Mathy,” 46.
116. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 15–16.
117. See Hauser, *Anfänge bürgerlicher Philhellenismus*. Support for Greek national independence was especially pronounced in southwestern Germany, where Mathy spent his youth.
118. Brophy, “Common Reader,” 145.
119. See Vick, *Defining Germany*.
120. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 52.
121. Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 29–31; Barclay, “Political Trends,” in *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed., Sperber, 54.
122. Duncker, “Mathy,” 54.
123. Kaiser, *Narrative and Social Integration*, 37. Freytag was a witness to his second marriage: Mühlen, *Gustav Freytag*, 82. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 21 December 1845, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 1: 53–54.
124. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 232; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 217. Freytag’s nationalist hopes for the *Stories* reflected liberal insistence on German as the sole language of state, especially in 1848. Many German liberals disdained French as the language of the aristocracy: Vick, *Defining Germany*, 25, 128. Walker argues that Auerbach’s stories contributed to the “cult of provincialism” in their sylvan village idyll: Walker, *German Home Towns*, 325.
125. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 227.
126. Hirschhausen, *Liberalismus und Nation*, 11, 118–20.
127. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 217; Brophy, *Rhineland*, 44. In the Rhineland, newspaper circulation was small compared to the massive popularity of calendars that also addressed public matters: Brophy, *Rhineland*, 52. See also Brophy, “Common Reader.”
128. Brophy, *Rhineland*, 29; Skolnik, *Auerbach*, 43; Applegate, “Mediated Nation,” 34, 44.
129. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 43.
130. Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 63; Sybel to Max Duncker, 20 October 1843, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 202, Bl. 145. Droysen kept Max Duncker informed of events in Holstein and contributed to the *Hallische Jahrbücher* from 1845: Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 63.
131. Ping, “Gustav Freytag,” 607.
132. See also Klessmann, ed., *Mein gnädigster Herr! Meine gütige Korrespondentin!*; Ivy York Möller-Christensen and Ernst Möller-Christensen, eds., *Mein edler, theurer Großherzog!*
133. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 233; Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 140. Max Duncker also acted as his liaison to the court of the Prussian crown prince in the 1860s: GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 15. Whereas critiques of the works of Heinrich Heine, Ludwig Börne, and Ferdinand Lassalle often focused on their Jewishness, this was rarely the case in contemporaries’ reviews of Auerbach’s work. See Katz, “Berthold Auerbach,” 216.
134. Katz, “Berthold Auerbach,” 220–221.
135. German-speaking university faculty rankings ranged from docent, to extraordinary professor, to ordinary professor. Docents (or private lecturers) were usually unpaid, while professors were salaried members of the state civil service. Extraordinary professors were paid—but rarely very

- well. There was also an “honorary professor” status, which many members requested when they entered government because it allowed them to keep their lecturing privileges.
136. Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 54–55. The discipline of *Staatswissenschaft* was broad enough in the *Vormärz* to encompass lectures and seminars the topics of which ranged from sheep breeding to constitutionalism: Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 50–51. For Schulze’s role in Duncckers appointment, see Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 58.
 137. Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 51–52; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 70; Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 175–76; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 29, 33; Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, *Aufzeichnungen*, 1: 228. See also Achtelstetter, *Prussian Conservatism*, 27, 31.
 138. Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 65.
 139. Family was central to social and economic connections in German cities of all sizes. See Evans, “Family and Class in the Hamburg,” 134.
 140. Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 25.
 141. Dieter Langewiesche argues that the Lichtfreunde and Deutschkatholiken offered early liberalism “organizational backing.” See Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 38; Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 6–7; Graf, *Politisierung*.
 142. Brophy, *Rhineland*, 6; Borutta, *Antikatholizismus*, 24.
 143. Joskowicz, *Modernity of Others*, 22.
 144. Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 6; Joskowicz, *Modernity of Others*, 3, 140; Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*, 15–17, 22.
 145. See Rahal, “Garden for the Future,” 91–92, 98–107.
 146. Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 53. Rather than following episcopal authority or the direction of a local priest or pastor, individual presbyterian congregations are governed by an assembly of elected elders.
 147. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 118; Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 6, 37.
 148. Graf, *Politisierung*, 49–50; Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 58–60; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 85. The Christian state relegated non-Christians to second-class citizenship, even after the constitution of 1850 granted Jews formal legal equality. See Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans*, 13. Romantic writers, their notions underlying the Prussian conservatives’ Christian state, had long rejected Jewish emancipation. See Joskowicz, *Modernity of Others*, 95–96.
 149. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 93–94; Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 51; Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach, 1: 441–42.
 150. Herzog, *Intimacy and Exclusion*, 4.
 151. Qtd. in Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 38; Ansel, *Prutz, Hettner und Haym*, 60–62.
 152. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 118.
 153. See, for example, Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 16.
 154. Mühlen, *Freytag*, 28.
 155. Haym to Eichhorn, 30 September 1845, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 27–30.
 156. Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 45; Barclay, *Frederick William VI*, 93. See also Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1: 82, 1: 91, 1: 127.
 157. Hans Rosenberg, introduction to *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. idem, 7.
 158. Rudolf Haym retells the tale in his biography of Duncker. See Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 65. Auerbach chose not to share the incident with his cousin and confidant, at least not in published letters. See J. Auerbach, ed., *Briefe an seinen Freund*, 50–54. Friedrich Eichhorn’s letter indicated the incident took place in February: Eichhorn to Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66.
 159. Unidentified letter to Max Duncker, March 1848, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 57; Friedrich Eichhorn to Max Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66.

160. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 65; Eichhorn to Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66.
161. Eichhorn to Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66.
162. This right was restricted in 1819 by ending the exemption of universities and the Academy of Sciences from censorship: Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution*, 416.
163. Eichhorn to Duncker, 13 April 1845, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 66. Many German universities retained Old-Regime powers to arrest and imprison students well into the nineteenth century.
164. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 232.
165. Haym, *Leben Max Dunckers*, 63.
166. Baumgarten went on to mentor Max Weber. See Blackbourn, “German Bourgeoisie,” 25; Blackbourn and Eley, *Peculiarities of German History*, 258.
167. See Ägidi’s correspondence with the Dunckers in GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 12.
168. Taylor, *Course of German History*, 71; Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 5, 352. Most historians fall somewhere in the middle. Pieter Judson contends that the revolutionaries of 1848 in the Habsburg Empire worked to create the very nation they claimed to represent; nationalism was distinctly urban as peasants ascribed themselves to no nation. See Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, 213–14. For Brian Vick, liberals realized in 1848 that they did not speak for the entire nation. See Vick, *Defining Germany*, 2. Christian Jansen sees 1848 not only as a political upheaval but also as the beginning of a long period of sociopolitical change in the German Confederation. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 23.
169. Hewitson sees it as a “major border dispute,” but in Vick’s work, the issue becomes a node for debates over civil rights, masculine national honor, and language policy. It clarified liberals’ theoretical understanding of the German nation-state and its place in Europe: Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 346; Vick, *Defining Germany*, 177.
170. Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism*, 214.
171. Mark Hewitson writes that only about 75 percent of the male population was eligible to vote for National Assembly delegates. Turnout was relatively low, especially in Saxony and Holstein, where it stood at about 40 percent. State governments interpreted the assembly’s rules about voter eligibility to exclude swaths of non-taxpayers. See Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 33; Langewiesche, “Anfänge der deutschen Parteien,” 331–32.
172. Duncker, “Mathy,” 55; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 248–49.
173. Rosenberg, ed., *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, 124. Mathy had marched under the same banner—literally—with Hecker in 1843 to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of Baden’s constitution. See Bettelheim, *Berthold Auerbach*, 156.
174. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker’s*, 86, 88; Curtius to Max Duncker, 21 December 1848, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 109. Duncker had little success with the princess.
175. Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 30–31.
176. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, 148–49.
177. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 143.
178. Biedermann, *Mein Leben und ein Stück Zeitgeschichte*, 1: 321.
179. Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 255.
180. Blackbourn gives the number as 812: Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 11. Sheehan counted 799 delegates: Sheehan, *German History*, 677.
181. Indeed, though the Revolution of 1848/49 has been described as the beginning of mass politics and revolution, Frankfurt liberals considered educated, propertied men “*das Volk*.” Vick, *Defining Germany*, 149.
182. Sheehan, *German History*, 676; After 1848/49, these university educated “*Faktionseliten*” still dominated popular nationalist organizations in the 1860s, such as the Nationalverein. See Biefang, *Politisches Bürgertum*, 300–301. Sperber argues that liberalism remained a “movement

- of notables,” although during the Revolution it could still appeal to some artisans and farmers: Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 180.
183. Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 111.
184. Cited in Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 255. The flowery language sounds much more like Freytag, however.
185. Langewiesche, “Anfänge der deutschen Parteien,” 332–33.
186. Sheehan, *German History*, 679.
187. Although Sperber argues that revolutionary political clubs were initially chaotic, harkening back to debate clubs hosting divergent views, they later coalesced into groups capable of political action: Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 158–60. Hewitson sees these clubs as a prelude to mass political parties: Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 24.
188. Dieter Langewiesche has contended that the clubs exercised considerable influence over their members, and some even had written statutes with defined punishments for noncompliance; however, this power was never formalized. See Langewiesche, “Anfänge der deutschen Parteien,” 333–34.
189. Langewiesche, “Anfänge der deutschen Parteien,” 326–27, 356; Woltz, “Staatspolitische Wirken,” 24; Parry, *Politics of Patriotism*, 36; Hadley, *Living Liberalism*, 1; Gould, *Origins of Liberal Dominance*, 6–7; Soper, *Building a Civil Society*, 143, 146–47.
190. Cited in Sheehan, *German History*, 679.
191. Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 115.
192. Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 41.
193. This was Christian Jansen’s term for the left wing of the Paulskirche in *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 21.
194. Clemens von Metternich, cited in Weir, *Secularism and Religion*, 52.
195. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 449, 463–64; Mommsen, “German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century,” 416–18.
196. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 109; Blackbourn, “German Bourgeoisie,” 13.
197. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 256–57.
198. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 87; Albrecht, *Antiliberalismus und Antisemitismus*, 44. See also Schwentker, *Konservative Vereine und Revolution in Preussen*. The year 1848 also represented an important moment in the development of conservative movements. The *Kreuzzeitung*, for instance, was founded in 1848 and largely defined itself in opposition to liberal politics. See Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 457–58.
199. Like the radicals Hecker and Struve, members of the Casino also tried to distance themselves from the Francophile, southern German liberalism of the *Vormärz*. For these moderate liberals, southern German demands for legislative power went too far, rather than not far enough, as radical leaders had it. See Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 467.
200. Lees, *Revolution and Reflection*, 10. See also Koselleck, *Preußen zwischen Reform and Revolution*, 438–40.
201. Brian Vick notes, however, that Duncker led the Frankfurt “Prussian party” with Droysen. See Vick, *Defining Germany*, 129.
202. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 11.
203. Duncker, “Mathy,” 57.
204. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 27. Stefan Zweig first explored the notion that the secondary characters in history are often the most representative of their times. See Zweig, *Joseph Fouché*, 12.
205. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 281; Haym to David Hansemann, 6 June 1848, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 43.
206. Rosenberg, introduction to *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. idem, 9. Some older liberals, such as G.G. Gervinus, also shunned open debates. See Engehausen, “Georg Gottfried Gervinus,” 19.

207. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 255; Max Duncker, “Mathy,” 57; Haym, *Leben Max Duncker’s*, 86.
208. On the centrality of informal politicking at the Vienna Congress, see Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 7–8, 14, 66, 149–50.
209. Christian Jansen contends that no Germany-wide political elite existed before 1848. See Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 20.
210. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 9 January 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 49.
211. Karl Biedermann felt that the friendships forged in Frankfurt were especially “intimate, lasting, and unchanging.” See Biedermann, *Mein Leben und Ein Stück Zeitgeschichte*, 1: 389.
212. Haym to his parents, 6 July 1848, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 50–51. The title has often been translated as “Imperial Regent” as well, although the term “administrator” carries less princely freight than regent and emphasizes the technocratic connotations that these liberals perhaps had in mind.
213. Barclay, “Political Trends,” in *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed. Sperber, 60–61.
214. Haym to David Hansemann, 17 September 1848, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 59–60.
215. See, for example, Riall, *Sicily and the Unification of Italy*, 116–17.
216. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 458.
217. Leonhard, *Liberalismus*, 466.
218. It took about thirty-six hours for a letter to reach Frankfurt from Halle: Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 9 January 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 49. The Dunccker communicated daily. The average level of correspondence between separated spouses in the nineteenth century, according to Perrot, was about every two to three days. See Perrot, “Family Triumphant,” 4: 131.
219. For example, see Max Duncker to Charlotte Duncker, 20 December 1848, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 6–7; Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 21 January 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 86–87. It is unclear whether Charlotte Duncker worked in a gender-segregated charitable society, as most charitable groups were, especially in 1848/49: Frevert, *Women in German History*, 69–70, 75.
220. Goodman, *Republic of Letters*, 96.
221. Radkau, *Zeitalter der Nervosität*, 13–14.
222. Max Duncker to Charlotte Duncker, 9 August 1848, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 5–6.
223. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 157.
224. On debates about the emancipation of the Jews and the rights of Jewish men, along with the general consensus on the ineligibility of women for formal political participation, see Vick, *Defining Germany*, 80–81, 213.
225. Rose, *German Question/Jewish Question*, 232; Green, “1848 and Beyond,” 344–46.
226. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 5 March 1848, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 64.
227. Berthold Auerbach to Jakob Auerbach, 5 November 1848, in *Briefe an seinen Freund*, ed. J. Auerbach, 66–67.
228. Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 117–20; Sheehan, *German History*, 706–707. This fear sprang from older liberal fears that “beyond the established ranks of the nation were those shadowy and hostile groups which force society into chaos.” Sheehan, *German Liberalism*, 47.
229. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 29 May 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 106.
230. Blackbourn, *History of Germany*, 122.
231. On the traumatic legacy of 1848/49 for German liberals, see Walter, *Heeresreformen*, 394; Biermann, *Ideologie statt Realpolitik*, 34–35.

232. [Karl von?] Kamptz to Max Duncker, 16 May 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 123. The Prussian government's authority to recall "its" delegates was dubious.
233. Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 126–27.
234. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 147.
235. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 272–73.
236. Sperber, *European Revolutions*, 249.
237. These were the languages of the educated, largely urban bourgeoisie and country nobles. Holstein was overpopulated with the latter, particularly in the "Grafeneck." Rural people tended to speak dialects between Low German and Danish. See also Carr, *Wars of German Unification*, 35–39.
238. Vick, *Defining Germany*, 147.
239. This sort of discrimination—both perceived and real—infuriated network members into the 1860s. Ernst of Coburg, for instance, collected flysheets from 1863/64 depicting nationalist and rebel anger at a supposedly corrupt officialdom—and at Danish-speaking pastors, in particular: SAC, LA A 7215, Bl. 35–37.
240. For details on the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, see Konrad, *Baden und die schleswig-holsteinische Frage*.
241. The Russian emperor, Nicholas I, was also involved because he was the head of the House of Oldenburg. The Kiel Canal had not yet been built, so shipping still passed between the Danish islands.
242. Woltz, "Staatspolitische Wirken," 3.
243. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, [early August 1850], GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9b, Bl. 132.
244. Soiron to Mathy, 5 December 1849, BArch, N2184/55, Bl. 4–5.
245. GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 157.
246. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 31 August 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 138. Charlotte Duncker echoed here the bourgeois notion of men as "*Lehrmeister ihrer Frauen*." Habermas, *Frauen und Männer*, 339. Duncker simultaneously interpreted politics as a matter of familial cooperation and thereby claimed a limited space for herself in political deliberations, much as the wives of male historians participated in historical research and writing in the nineteenth century. See Smith, *Gender of History*, 83.
247. The Schleswig-Holstein foreign office formally thanked Max Duncker for his steadfast service to the cause in the fall of 1850: Department [*sic*] der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten to Max Duncker, 27 October 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 2, Bl. 138; GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, 182. Charlotte Duncker to Max Duncker, 31 August 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Bl. 138.
248. For example, see Max to Charlotte Duncker, 19 August 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Doc. 32; Max to Charlotte Duncker, 28 August 1850, 28 August 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 9a, Doc. 34.
249. Max Duncker to Haym, 2 July 1850, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 91–92.
250. Soiron to Haym, 18 July 1850, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 94.
251. Samwer to Droysen, 6 April 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 73, Bl. 38–39.
252. Max Duncker to Droysen, 22 May 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 57; Francke to Droysen, 29 January 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 30, Bl. 6.
253. Duncker trained as a volunteer officer in an Uhlan regiment: GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 5, Bl. 20.
254. Haym reported that he went to Halle through the Rhineland and then back to Kiel in 1850: Haym, *Leben Max Duncckers*, 125. Max Duncker wrote about conducting "business" in Hamburg and Bremen: Max Duncker to Karl Francke, 9 July 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. J.G. Droysen, Nr. 27, Bl. 60–64.

255. Max Duncker to Karl Mathy, 3 June 1850, BArch, N2184/11, Bl. 1–3; Max Duncker to “Hochgeehrter Herr,” 3 July 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 177, Bl. 36–39.
256. Karl Francke to Karl Mathy, 13 August 1850 and 27 October 1850, BArch N2184/21, Bl. 1–4 and Bl. 5.
257. Francke to Haym, 2 August 1850, in *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, ed. Rosenberg, 96.
258. Haym to Max Duncker, 25 August 1850, *Ausgewählter Briefwechsel*, 99.
259. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 4, 18, 168–69.
260. Wippermann, “National-Politische Bewegung,” in *Staats-Lexikon*, 3rd ed., ed. Rotteck and Welcker, 10: 378.
261. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 30, 224–25.
262. Sheehan, *German History*, 713.
263. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 47.
264. See Sheehan, *German History*, 712–15.
265. Soiron to Mathy, 4 November 1849, BArch N2184/55, Bl. 7–8. Soiron addressed Mathy with *Du* by January 1850, highlighting the acceleration of friendship-building among future members during the revolution: Soiron to Mathy, 17 January 1850, BArch N2184/55, Bl. 22–23.
266. Mathy to Peter Buhl, 3 November 1849, qtd. in *Nach der Revolution*, ed. Jansen, 45.
267. Mathy to Charlotte Duncker, 16 April 1850, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 86, Bl. 2; Charlotte Duncker to Hermann Baumgarten, 27 June 1849, GStAPK, VI. HA NI. Max Duncker, Nr. 19, Bl. 1–2.
268. Haym, *Leben Max Duncker's*, 116–17; Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 339; Report to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, 25 September 1862, GStAPK, BPH, Rep. 52 J. 88, Bd. 1, Bl. 469–72.
269. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 339.
270. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, 339.
271. Jansen, *Einheit, Macht und Freiheit*, 225; Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 201.
272. Barclay, *Frederick William IV*, 185–87; Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 45–46; Sheehan, *German History*, 712–15; Leopold von Gerlach, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1: 320–21, 1: 384, 1: 501–502.
273. Ross, *Beyond the Barricades*, 47.
274. Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland*, 65.
275. Hewitson, *Nationalism in Germany*, 4.